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5INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The corruption situation in Bulgaria moderately improved in 2002, as
reflected in the Coalition 2000  Corruption Indexes. Trust in the
governments anti-corruption efforts rose. However, a large part of the
public still believes the government has not yet achieved any tangible
results in reducing corrupt practices. Corruption is still perceived as
one of the gravest problems of transition. It ranks fourth by importance,
after unemployment, low incomes, and poverty.
The international community has assessed favorably the countrys
capacity to deal with corruption. Bulgaria has continued to improve its
ranking in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index -
in 2002 it was 45th out of 102 countries, up from 66th place in 1998. In this
respect Bulgaria has outperformed such countries as the Czech Republic,
Latvia, and Slovakia, and was the only EU applicant country to achieve
significant improvement of its corruption rating.
However, the evaluation of the anti-corruption measures taken by the
government is ambiguous. Inconsistent implementation of its anti-
corruption policy has been the dominant characteristic of its actions,
whether due to insufficient will to institute changes or the lack of
administrative capacity to implement it.
At the same time, it has become obvious, especially toward the end of
the year, that the accumulation of unsolved problems in counteracting
corruption has been due not only to the unconvincing performance of
the executive, but also to intensified partisan bickering. There was a
conspicuous tendency to exploit the flaws of the Constitution and the
conflicts arising between the three branches of power for partisan
purposes. All of these factors have affected adversely the fight against
corruption and its chances of success.
The politicization of the judiciary has not only intensified the conflict
between the different branches of power, but has also provided a
convenient cover for corrupt practices among magistrates. The judiciary
was used to exert influence over large-scale privatization and the
redistribution of national wealth. At the same time, the absence of
internal and external means of control over the magistrates is conducive
to impunity and mounting corruption pressure within the judiciary.
Public trust in the third power has reached an all-time low.
Political tensions in turn have affected the capacity of law-enforcement
authorities to mobilize their anti-corruption resources. It has become
increasingly obvious that any major crackdown on corruption is impossible
without more radical anti-corruption reforms in the security forces - the
Ministry of Interior, the armed forces, etc.
In this context, the risk of corruption affecting government institutions
and of consolidation of the positions of organized crime in the national
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economy remains. Furthermore, corrupt practices on the lower levels of
national and local government administration are still rampant.
fl fl fl
The 2002 corruption situation could be summarized by the following,
often contrasting evaluations of government actions:
- The old clientelist matrix reproducing corruption schemes at the
various levels of interaction between the political and economic
spheres was dismantled. At the same time, government activity
was marked by a tendency towards revival of certain non-
transparent methods and practices, which cast doubts on its
declared intentions.
- With the adoption of more transparent procedures in the economy
and the progress made in the regulation of party financing, political
corruption has been significantly restrained. On the other hand,
the level of corruption among lower-ranking public officials has
remained unchanged due to corruption impunity and weak control
over public administration work.
- Personal involvement in corrupt practices shows a steady marginal
decline in the period 1998-2002 and relative stability in 2002. On
average about 130,000 actual acts of corruption have taken place
monthly in 2002 (about 2% of the population have indicated that
they have given money, a gift, or have done a favor in order to
have a problem of theirs resolved). The declining personal
corruption involvement since 1998 is definitely indicative of certain
achievements in curbing corruption, but the level of corruption in
absolute terms remains disturbingly high.
- While there has been considerable progress in 2002 in the
development of anti-corruption legislation, the pace and quality
of the changes still remain inadequate.
- International and European legal instruments related to the
criminal prosecution of corruption were successfully adopted in
2002. This has made it all the more imperative to ensure the effective
enforcement of the new legislation and the harmonization between
the newly adopted legal instruments and existing laws.
- The implementation of the Strategy for Reform of the Judiciary in
Bulgaria began in 2002. Notwithstanding the measures to change
the legal framework of judicial governance, structure and
professional qualification, there has been no tangible anti-
corruption progress. Furthermore, the issue of the financing of the
judicial reform still remains unsettled. The issues related to the
judiciary occupy an important place in the debate on possible
constitutional changes, and more specifically on those concerning
the independence and structure of the judiciary, as well as the
immunities and irremovability of magistrates. However, the
politicization of the debate threatens to distort the very goal of the
changes needed - namely, an independent, effective, free of - and
successful against - corruption, judiciary. At the same time, there
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was not sufficient political will to implement the reforms that were
feasible under the existing constitutional model.
- In the course of the year the prosecution has become more active
in investigating corruption-related offenses, including in the high
ranks of power. On the other hand, there were allegations of non-
transparency and prejudice in the prosecution, implicating mainly
its top-ranking members, which makes it very difficult to evaluate
its impact in counteracting corruption.
- The lack of statistical records kept by the different units of the
judiciary and law enforcement, based on common criteria and
integrated in a unified information system, makes it impossible to
examine the actual role of these units in detecting, investigating,
and punishing corruption. The role of the law-enforcement
authorities for the operation of the judiciary remains unrecognized.
- The National Assembly is still far from being a model institution
in terms of anti-corruption impact. Under public pressure,
Parliament has established a standing Anti-Corruption Committee,
which is yet to become a working instrument. However, MPs have
failed to institute a mechanism for resolving conflicts of interest
within the legislature. The adoption and implementation of codes
of conduct, whether by law or by internal regulations, would help
enhance the authority of the National Assembly and public trust in
the work of the MPs.
- No sustainable results in limiting corruption in the public
administration, and particularly in the provision of
administrative services, have been achieved. Measures to develop
and reinforce specialized control mechanisms over the public
administration are yet to unfold their full anti-corruption potential.
There have been unwarranted delays in the introduction of
additional mechanisms for monitoring the work of public
administration and for countering corruption. Bulgaria continues
to be among the few European countries without an ombudsman
institution.
- A host of anti-corruption initiatives have been announced in the
economy but few have actually been implemented and have
produced any results. Despite declared intentions, the government
did not reduce the tax and social security burden in 2002, and
the regulatory intervention of the administration in the economy
remained controversial and non-transparent. As a result, the
share of the gray sector in the economy and related corruption
remains high. Efforts in this area need to shift from improvement
of the regulatory framework towards ensuring transparent and
prompt implementation of existing rules.
- The level of direct government intervention in the economy
through subsidies has remained unchanged in 2002. The adopted
Law on State Subsidies is conducive to transparency but does not
create conditions for limiting state subsidies. Aid for agricultural
producers is becoming a major risk area for corruption and abuse.
- Transparent management of budget expenditures is an important
element of the fight against corruption. The problems in this area
remain although the 2003 budget approval procedure has been
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somewhat improved. Delaying financial decentralization and
preserving matching subsidies for the municipalities create
preconditions for the use of public resources to exercise political
control over local governments. The lack of progress in the
implementation of healthcare reforms has led to an increase in
unregulated payments within the system and to rising public
discontent with the quality of healthcare services.
- Despite the 2002 amendments to the Law on Public Procurement,
which aim at improving transparency, optimizing and shortening
delays, and ensuring greater competition, public procurement
procedures are still among the main sources of corruption and
generate considerable rent for the public administration (by
conservative estimates, approximately BGN 15 million [appr. USD
7.5 mln.] in 2002). More than half of the companies that have
participated in tenders resort to bribes when obtaining every
other procurement contract.  Irregularities in the public
procurement practices in Bulgarian municipalities are a
particularly serious problem.
- In the divestiture of state owned assets, the abolition of non-
transparent privatization procedures such as negotiations with
potential buyers and management-employee-buy-outs has had a
positive effect. Privatization through tenders and auctions has
demonstrated strong fiscal efficiency and transparency. The anti-
corruption measures laid down in the Law on Privatization and Post-
Privatization Control have not been fully implemented due to delays
in the adoption of by-laws and regulations.
- The focusing of Privatization Agencys efforts on the two large-
scale and politically encumbered deals for the sale of Bulgartabak
and the national telecom BTC has led to a slowdown of the
privatization process and has reinforced negative public opinion
about rampant corruption in this area. The work of the Post-
Privatization Control Agency has been greatly impeded by the
lack of adequate financing and by the delayed adoption of its
statutes.
- Efforts to counteract corruption in the public sector have been
adversely affected by the absence of proper coordination in the
actions of the executive. This could adversely affect the effective
implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy.
- Public-private partnership in counteracting corruption has been
particularly effective when implemented with the support of
international governmental or private organizations. An example
of best practice in anti-corruption partnerships is the USAID
supported Open Government Initiative project. A number of
government ministries, and most notably the Ministry of Justice,
the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
demonstrated readiness to work with non-governmental
organizations, including on counteracting corruption. Nevertheless,
the potential of public-private partnerships is still not fully utilized
owing to the reluctance or inability of state institutions to engage
civil society and to seek broader public support for their policy.
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- In the course of 2002 a large number of corruption-related
investigations have been initiated as a result of publications and
reports in the media. Nonetheless, obscure regulations diminish
the impact the media could make in this area. The problems
related to the professional skills and inadequate legal awareness of
journalists also have a negative impact.
- Most international institutions and donor agencies provide
significant technical and financial assistance to anti-corruption
efforts in Bulgaria. There was, however, insufficient coordination
among internationally supported government projects and
inadequate public accountability about their results.
- Regional aspects of the spread of corruption were still relevant in
2002. The reports of the Southeast European Legal Development
Initiative (SELDI) indicate a strong impact of trafficking on corruption
in Southeast Europe. This warrants a stronger focus by law
enforcement agencies on the cross-border sources of corruption.
fl fl fl
Judging by the successes and setbacks of anti-corruption efforts no
breakthrough was achieved in 2002. Intended reforms in the judiciary
and the security forces, also needed in the context of EU and NATO
accession, could be a turning point in curbing corruption in Bulgaria.
This needs to be a priority task for both the government and society as a
whole. Proceeding with reforms in these areas would further ensure anti-
corruption progress.
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A. CORRUPTION LEVEL AND DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TO CORRUPTION
Coalition 2000 Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) results show that in 2002
corruption did not increase but it did not decline either; corruption
continued to rank among the top four critical problems faced by
Bulgarian society along with unemployment, poverty, and low incomes.
Coalition 2000
Corruption In-
dexes
The corruption in-
dexes are the main
output of the Cor-
ruption Monitoring
System (CMS) of
Coalition 2000 .
Their values are
updated quarterly
based on empirical
survey data. The
corruption indexes
assume values from
0-10. The closer
the value of the in-
dexes is to 10, the
more negative are
the assessments of
the respective as-
pect of corruption.
Index numbers closer to 0 indicate approximation to the ideal of a
corruption-free society. Corruption indexes are computed for the
general public and for the business sector and include:
Attitudes to Corruption
l Acceptability in principle - this index reflects the extent to which
various corrupt practices are tolerated within the value system.
l Susceptibility to corruption - measures citizens inclination to
compromise on their values and principles under the pressure
of circumstances.
Corrupt practices
l Corruption pressure - measures the frequency of attempts by
public sector employees to exert direct or indirect pressure on
FIGURE 1. IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
PROBLEMS BULGARIANS FACE TODAY* (GENERAL PUBLIC) (%) -
OCTOBER 2002
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000.
(*) Note: 1) % of those citing each factor 2) The respondents cited up to three answers and
the percentage therefore exceeds 100.
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citizens in order to obtain money, gifts, or favors.
l Acts of corruption - reflects the involvement of citizens in various
forms of corrupt behavior, i.e. accounts for the actual number
corruption cases.
Assessments of the spread of corruption
l Spread of corruption - registers citizens assessments of the
spread of corrupt practices among public sector employees.
l Institutional spread of corruption - reflects public perceptions
of the spread of corruption by professional groups.
l Practical efficiency of corruption - shows citizens assessments
of the extent to which corruption is becoming an effective means
of resolving personal problems.
Corruption-related expectations
l Expectations regarding the development of corruption -
reflects assessments of the potential of Bulgarian society to cope
with corruption.
The Coalition 2000 CMS measures two types of corruption-related
phenomena: 1) corrupt behavior, and 2) attitudes and perceptions related
to corruption. The assessment of corrupt behavior is the most important
indicator measuring the actual level of corruption in the country (the
average monthly incidence of cases of corruption). Corrupt behavior takes
two basic forms: bribes demanded  by public sector employees
(Corruption Pressure Index) and bribes offered to public sector employees
by the citizens (Personal Involvement in Corruption Index). The indexes
reflect actual cases of involvement in various corrupt practices
acknowledged by the citizens. They register the actual frequency of
involvement in corrupt practices (i.e., the level of corruption-related
victimization), and not attitudes or opinions about corruption.
The Personal Involvement Index showed a marginal but steady decline
in the period 1998-2002, and relative stability in 2002. The index value
for October 2002 was 0.5, representing a monthly average of about
130,000 actual acts of corruption (about 2% of the population indicated
that they had given money, a gift, or had done a favor in order to have a
problem of theirs resolved). The declining index values since 1998 are
indicative of certain achievements in curbing corruption. The comparison
between Bulgaria and the remaining countries of Southeast Europe under
this indicator also provides some grounds for optimism. However,
although the level of corruption in the country did not increase in 2002,
in absolute terms the number of instances of corruption was alarmingly
large. The overall effect of the efforts made could be considered to be
deterring: corruption neither grows nor decreases.
The Corruption Pressure Index values in the period 1998-2002 showed
an unstable decline (improvement) tendency. This index reflects the
extent to which public officials interpret objective realities as an atmo-
sphere of impunity and freedom. As a rule, its values are lower than that
of the Personal Involvement Index since not all demands to get some-
thing lead to actual corruption transactions. The index values suggest
A.1. Level of Corruption
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FIGURE 2. INVOLVEMENT IN CORRUPT PRACTICES*
(BULGARIA 1998-2002; SOUTHEAST EUROPE, JANUARY 2002)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000; SELDI
(*) Note: The maximum value of the index is 10.0 indicating the highest possible level of
corruption. The minimum value is 0.0 indicating total absence of corruption.
Legend: AL - Albania; BIH - Bosnia and Herzegovina; BG - Bulgaria; MK - Macedonia;
RO - Romania; HR - Croatia; SERB - Serbia; MNTR - Montenegro.
Bulgaria Southeast Europe
that the administrative
environment created by
the present government
did not deteriorate in the
course of the year, but
then neither were there
any more tangible im-
provements.
Both indexes reflect the
level of corruption and
are primarily related to
low-level everyday cor-
ruption. Of the 130 thou-
sand acknowledged
cases of involvement in
corruption, the most fre-
quent bribe-takers were
traffic police officers,
low-rank administrative
officials, and those work-
ing in healthcare.  As evi-
dent from the data (see
Figures 1 and 2), after the steady decline since 2000, both indicators reg-
istering personal corruption-related experience in terms of personal in-
volvement and corrup-
tion pressure remained
at the same levels. In this
respect everyday life of
ordinary Bulgarians still
has not changed. Ac-
cording to expert esti-
mates, with 5-6 thou-
sand requested bribes
or cases of abuse of
public office per day,
the institutions con-
cerned should investi-
gate several hundred
perpetrators a month.
This necessitates funda-
mentally different
mechanisms for control,
investigation, and pun-
ishment, which should initially have the capacity to handle 3-4 thousand
cases a year.
Public expectations regarding the radical reduction of corruption are fairly
high. The evolution of public assessments of the activities of the govern-
ment in this respect was contradictory. On the one hand, there was a
significant decrease of the share of those who think that the Government
was not making any particular efforts to find effective solutions to the
problem. The decline in negative evaluations is indicative of public trust
in the declared readiness to fight corruption and in the activity of the
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000; SELDI
FIGURE 3. CORRUPTION PRESSURE
(BULGARIA 1998-2002; SOUTHEAST EUROPE, JANUARY 2002)
Bulgaria Southeast Europe
A.2. Effectiveness of
Government
Action
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government to date (Fig-
ure 4).  On the other
hand, a considerable part
of the public (41-44%)
still thinks the govern-
ment is not doing any-
thing to counteract cor-
ruption.
The comparison be-
tween the corruption
situation under the
present government
with that under the pre-
vious government re-
veals the way in which
the public reacts to the
process of accumulation
of corruption allegations
against the government.
In this respect the data
suggest that despite the
buildup of intense criti-
cal attitudes to the
present government, this has not led to its evaluation by public opin-
ion as more corrupt than the preceding government (Figure 5). By con-
trast, evaluations of Ivan Kostovs cabinet (1997-2001) grew more unfa-
vorable than those of the previous government already in early 1999,
with the difference increasing considerably to the last parliamentary elec-
tions (July 2001).
It should be noted that
such attitudes were reg-
istered despite the dras-
tic fall in trust in Simeon
Saxe-Coburg Gothas
cabinet (down from 50%
in August 2001 to 28% in
December 2002) and de-
spite the increase of pes-
simistic evaluations of
the countrys economic
prospects.
The higher public expec-
tations from the govern-
ment when it first came
to power were mirrored
in the hopes that the cor-
ruption problem would
be resolved (October
2001). A year later trust
in those in power and
optimism as to the ca-
pability of Bulgarian society to deal with the problem of corruption
have shrunk considerably (Figure 6). Such an outlook on the situation
FIGURE 4 ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT ANTI-CORRUPTION
EFFORTS *
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
(*) Note: Relative share of the answers The Government is not doing anything
Source: Early Warning Report, UNDP
FIGURE 5 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION: COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT
SITUATION AND THE SITUATION UNDER THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
(JULY 1998 -  DECEMBER 2002)
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Source: CMS of Coalition 2000; SELDI
FIGURE 6 CORRUPTION EXPECTATIONS
(BULGARIA 1998-2002; SOUTHEAST EUROPE, JANUARY 2002)
Bulgaria Southeast Europe
inevitably affects the as-
sessments (attitudes and
perceptions) of corrup-
tion dynamics and mani-
festations.
Notwithstanding that corruption is a problem primarily of the social sys-
tem, rather than a matter of personal choice and values, the moral rejec-
tion of corruption is a prerequisite for its reduction. Of the multitude of
corruption-related public attitudes, the Coalition 2000 CMS monitors two
main groups of indicators. First, indicators reflecting the extent to which
various practices are
identified as corrupt be-
havior and are consid-
ered unacceptable (Ac-
ceptability in Principle
Index). Secondly, indica-
tors reflecting peoples
subjective inclination to
use corruption as a prob-
lem solving tool (Suscep-
tibility to Corruption In-
dex). The values of these
two indexes appear to
have settled permanently
at relatively low levels.
The Corruption Accept-
ability in Principle Index
assumed its lowest values
in February 1999, which
is indicative of a firmly
established moral rejection of corrupt practices and their perception
as socially unacceptable.
Yet the Susceptibility to Corruption Index continued to be nearly twice
as high as the Acceptability in Principle Index. This shows that corrupt
behavior largely occurs under the pressure of everyday circumstances
and the pragmatic interests of those involved in corrupt dealings. In this
sense, a considerable part of the general public still tends to consider
corrupt practices an effective, even if morally unacceptable, means of
resolving private problems.
A.3. Value System and
Ethical Preconditions
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000; SELDI
FIGURE 7.A ACCEPTABILITY IN PRINCIPLE
(BULGARIA 1998-2002; SOUTHEAST EUROPE, JANUARY 2002)
Bulgaria Southeast Europe
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Source: CMS of Coalition 2000; SELDI
FIGURE 7.B SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION
(BULGARIA 1998-2002; SOUTHEAST EUROPE, JANUARY 2002)
Bulgaria Southeast Europe
The indexes reflecting the spread of corruption (Spread of Corruption and
Practical Efficiency of Corruption) summarize public assessments of the
corruption image of institutions and/or people in power. Their values
are in general considerably higher than those reflecting the actual level
of corruption (Corruption Pressure and Personal Involvement). The dynamics
of these evaluations are affected by personal experience and impressions
as well as the public debate on corruption in all its dimensions (media
coverage, statements by various actors, shared experience and opinions
of friends and acquaintances, etc.). In the context of a more intense public
debate, assessments of the spread of corruption often tend to go up, which
does not necessarily mirror the actual level of corruption.
Bulgarians general esti-
mation that they live in
a society in which cor-
ruption constitutes a
serious problem  (see
Figures 8 and 9) did not
change substantially in the
period February 1999 -
October 2002. The nega-
tive changes observed in
the period May 2002 -
October 2002 were con-
ditioned by several prob-
lem situations with a di-
rect or indirect impact on
corruption: the judiciary
reform debates, the
Bulgartabak privatiza-
tion, the disclosures re-
lated to corruption in law enforcement, and others. The assessments of
the spread of corruption among public sector employees in 2002 were
affected not only by the exercise of power in political terms, but also by
the efficiency of the institutions ensuring court and administrative con-
trol.
Assessments of the
spread of corruption in
the judiciary deterio-
rated. Corruption pres-
sure exerted by all of the
professional categories
related to the judiciary
(lawyers, prosecutors,
judges) appeared to be
on the rise. In the course
of the year, the focus of
public interest shifted
from the legislative and
the executive to the
cases of corruption in
the judiciary.
The shift in public atten-
tion also affected public
A.4. Assessment of the
Spread of
Corruption
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000; SELDI
FIGURE 8 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION
(BULGARIA 1998-2002; SOUTHEAST EUROPE, JANUARY 2002)
Bulgaria Southeast Europe
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perceptions of the factors
of corruption. Increasing
importance came to be
ascribed to those de-
pending directly on the
state of the legal frame-
work and the operation
of the judiciary. As a re-
sult, there emerged a
high level of distrust in
the capacity of the gov-
erning elite and the po-
litical class as a whole to
tangibly reduce corrup-
tion in the country.
The year 2002 was
marked by gradual re-
definition and transfor-
mation of the notion of corruption as a problem of essentially ethical
nature to its perception as a problem of the practical aspects of the
technology of political power and governance. Corruption gradually
came to be considered and dealt with in terms of mechanisms, people,
and institutions, rather than in the context of political and ideological
disputes on whether or not corruption actually exists. The government is
now expected to ensure a clear-cut political strategy to curb corruption
and to implement it effectively.
In terms of popular assessments, however, curbing corruption involves
considerable risks - real measures lead to public exposure of corrupt
officials and corrup-
tion schemes and in
this sense reinforce
the perception of Bul-
garian society as se-
verely affected by cor-
ruption. Yet, this risk is
l ikewise associated
with increased oppor-
tunities. The broader
coverage of anti-cor-
ruption measures with-
in the system of the
Ministry of Interior ex-
posed the scope of the
corruption problem,
but likewise boosted
public trust in this
ministry and support
for its efforts.
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000; SELDI
FIGURE 9. PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF CORRUPT PRACTICES
(BULGARIA 1998-2002; SOUTHEAST EUROPE, JANUARY 2002)
Bulgaria Southeast Europe
General Spread May October
2002 2002
Customs. Custom officials. 33.2 30.4
Parliament, Presidency, Government, political elite 24.1 30.3
Court, Judiciary, Justice, Lawyers 23.5 28.5
Healthcare system (incl. National Health Insurance Fund) 25.6 20.6
In the system of the Ministry of Interior (incl. Traffic police) 20.6 19.9
Public Institutions May October
2002 2002
Privatization Agency 22.0 22.5
Customs 12.6 10.9
National Health Insurance Fund 2.5 2.6
TABLE 1. ASSESSMENTS OF THE SPHERES WITH THE
HIGHEST SPREAD OF CORRUPTION (% OF
THOSE CITING EACH SPHERE)*
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000;
(*) Note: The questions were open-ended and the above categories summarize the institutions
cited by the respondents.
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B. PUTTING IN PLACE AN OVERALL INSTITUTIONAL AND
LEGAL ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK
The development and making operational of efficient legal and
institutional mechanisms limiting corruption have been seriously
addressed since 1997-98 in a number of anti-corruption initiatives.
Initially, these were mainly non-governmental or public-private initiatives,
including those of the Coalition 2000, which were later integrated into
various government programs and strategies.
A number of political decisions and legal instruments adopted at the end
of 2001 and in the course of 2002 resulted from the commitment to put
in place a legal and institutional framework hostile to corruption. On
October 1, 2001, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy was adopted and
complemented by the Program for the Implementation of the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy adopted by a Decision of the Council of Ministers on
February 13, 2002.
The program provides for the creation of legislative, organizational and social
prerequisites facilitating the implementation of the European and international
anti-corruption principles and standards in nine major areas. An Anti-Corruption
Coordination Commission, chaired by the Minister of Justice was set up (Decision
No. 77 of the Council of Ministers of February 11, 2002).
The results of the Program
for the Implementation of
the National Anti-Corrup-
tion Strategy in the first
half of 2002 were de-
scribed in a six-month
report. In addition, an
annual report was re-
leased on the implemen-
tation of the Strategy and
the Program. Nonethe-
less, the results of the
anti-corruption mea-
sures undertaken were
not sufficiently publi-
cized neither were the
problems encountered
during the implementa-
tion of those measures.
The reports contained
primarily findings, rather
than an analytical over-
view of existing problems
FIGURE 10. ASSESSMENT OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFECTIVENESS OF INSTITUTIONS
IN BULGARIA* (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000, October 2002
(*) Note: Respondents marked up the three most effective institutions in curbing
corruption, therefore the sum total of percentages exceeds 100.
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that might help formulate
future tasks. Greater
transparency is neces-
sary, as well as regular
reporting on the activities
of the governmental
Commission, in view of
its fundamental tasks to
analyze and summarize
the information about
any existing anti-corrup-
tion measures, coordi-
nate and monitor the
implementation of the
National Strategy, and
propose further mea-
sures to enhance the
fight against corruption.
The Commission also
needs considerable insti-
tution-building and insti-
tutionalized democratic
civil involvement in its
work.
In 2002, the high level of corruption persisted and was perceived as a
viable pattern of behavior. This was largely due to the unresolved problems
of the nation-wide administrative reform and the means of control over
the administration. The lack of efficient anti-corruption measures
undertaken by state institutions and of meaningful interaction between
them, on the one hand, and between the state and the society, on the
other, and the insufficient level of civil anti-corruption control have also
contributed to the persistently high levels of corruption.
Administrative reform in Bulgaria has been under way since 1998. It started
by adopting new laws in that area, its philosophy was refined in the National
Anti-Corruption Strategy and in the Strategy for Modernizing Public
Administration approved by Government Decision No. 645 of July 9, 2002.
The Strategy for Modernizing Public Administration is based on the following
key points: bringing the administration into line with the principles of the
rule of law, market economy and respect for human rights; strengthening
the capacity of the administration to plan, coordinate and implement the
pre-accession processes, and preparing the public administration for a
fully-fledged operation within the EU. The Strategy also lists measures
that would help build an adequate administrative environment to prevent
and curb corruption. These measures are to be implemented in the
framework of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. This approach reiterates
the significance of the modernization of the administration for
successful anti-corruption efforts and actions.
In 2002, the process of formulating the strategic basis of the administrative
reform was finalized. Almost all intended legislative instruments and
measures for the day-to-day implementation of the reform were approved,
the implementation of the reform being the most serious challenge of all
FIGURE 11. ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION EFFECTS* (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000, October 2002
(*) Note: Respondents marked up the three most harmful consequences of corruption,
therefore the sum total of percentages exceeds 100.
B.1. Public
Administration
Reform: from
Legislation to
Practice
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changes so far. While a lot has been achieved in the context of
administrative reform, the objective results still fail to match the public
expectations of better administrative work, especially given that the
administrative sphere is prone to corruption. The problem is important
as corruption affects, to a larger or lesser degree, the administration of all
bodies of the executive. Failure to solve that problem and the persisting
limited administrative capacity will hinder compliance with the stringent
requirements to the administration in the context of Bulgarias future
membership of NATO and the European Union.
B.1.1. The Common Organizational Model of the Administration:
Its Anti-Corruption Potential and Results
The implementation of uniform standards for institution-building and
internal organization of the administration is a serious guarantee that
corruption would be confined by way of clearly defining the powers and
responsibilities of the variety of administrative structures. The Law on the
Administration (in force as of December 1998, amended in 1999, 2000
and 2001) became the basis for the introduction of a common
organizational model, and common rules on the internal structure of
various executive bodies (central, regional and municipal). Similarly, an
electronic register of the administrative structures and the acts of the
administrative bodies has already been functioning.
The administrative structures were completely restructured in 2001 but,
since then, numerous deviations from the common organizational model
of the administration and from its anti-corruption potential came into
being:
- The administrative structures proliferate in a way that is not strictly
necessary in view of their specific activities (e.g. Nuclear Regulation
Agency, Bulgarian Standardization Institute). Some structures were
created but still have a rather obscure place and role in the system
of government agencies. This entails ambiguous powers and
responsibilities and makes it even more difficult to consolidate the
institutional environment that should act as a barrier to corruption.
- The rank of some administrative structures does not correspond to
the hierarchical place of the respective authorities they should assist,
as required by art. 67(3) of the Law on Civil Servants. Almost all sets
of internal organic rules deviate from the legislative requirements
about general administration directorates. Legal and information
services are often provided by the specialized administration, in
violation of art. 7 of the Law on the Administration.
- Executive agencies are set up with the special purpose to provide
administrative services but they do not carry out such activities in
reality (e.g. Military Residential Estates and Disposal of Property,
National Communications System). The process of freeing the
administration from extraneous functions thus slows down and
becomes cumbersome.
Relieving the administration of the burden of extraneous functions and
the privatization of administrative services still tend to be isolated
examples, rather than a consistent policy aimed at curbing corrupt
practices based on a clear distinction between public and private and on
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the active involvement of NGOs in various regulatory functions. Serious
efforts should be made in that respect, as the withdrawal of the
administration from such spheres of action would naturally mitigate
the administrative environment beneficial to corruption.
l Openness, transparency, access to information
A prevailing number of central administrative bodies, as well as some
regional and municipal ones have already set up their web-sites that
provide information on their structure, functions, procedures, and
sometimes even the forms to be filled out for the services sought. A number
of administrations have also established an interactive dialogue and
solicited feedback from citizens.
The measures ensuring the openness in the work of the administration
still fall short of what is needed, despite the annual reports describing the
performance of the administration and the reports of separate
administrative structures presented at their web-sites. While almost all
administrations have special reception rooms for citizens having petitions
or complaints, there are no efficient mechanisms ensuring feedback and
the drafting of adequate legal norms. The constitutional right of citizens
to file petitions and complaints should be governed by a new piece of
legislation, as the existing Law on Proposals, Warnings, Complaints and
Petitions of 1980 is deplorably obsolete.
In August 2002, the Ordinance on the Conditions and Procedure for Keeping
the Register of Administrative Structures and the Acts of the Administrative Bodies
was supplemented with additional regulations. Under the new rules, the
main parameters (including sample documentation) of all licensing,
authorization, registration and coordination procedures within the
respective administration should also be entered into the register. This
will certainly facilitate the individuals and the legal entities, and would
also provide ample data for an in-depth analysis of the existing regimes.
The procedures to exercise the right of access to public information, the
grounds for refusal of access and the appeal procedures are covered by
the Law on Access to Public Information passed in 2000. This instrument put
in place the minimum required legal framework to gradually overcome
the traditional aspiration of any administration to keep most of the
information related to its operations for official use only. Although a
number of provisions in the Law on Access to Public Information have a
rich anti-corruption potential, the practice of its implementation has
brought to light the lack of sufficient guarantees for transparency and
public accountability. In April 2002, the law was amended and
supplemented with the intention to remove some of the existing regulatory
drawbacks: the restrictions on the access to public information were only
confined to classified information; the period during which access to
some categories of public information for official use could be refused
was shortened from 20 to 2 years; the courts were given the power to
also control the legality of the affixing of security marks if access to
information was denied on account of classification.
In April 2002, a Law on the Protection of Classified Information was passed.
It covers the creation, processing and storage of information constituting
a state or official secret and the conditions and the procedure for
providing access to such information. The principle of legality has been
introduced with respect to state and official secrets alike. However, the
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information that is subject to classification as a state secret is included in
a list annexed to the law, whereas the official information is to be
announced by the head of each administration in a separate list. The
procedure and the way for announcing the lists of official secrets will be
part of the rules implementing the law. No such rules have been set up
yet. The lack of those lists, therefore, has blocked the application of the
Law on the Protection of Classified Information as far as official secrets are
concerned. Hence, it is possible to refuse access to information on
grounds of unclear criteria, and these circumstances lead to
corruption.
Greater accountability is needed, as well as better access to information
within the possession of public authorities, as that would limit the
possibilities for corruption-driven action or inaction.
l Accountability in the administration
In implementation of art. 61(3) of the Law on the Administration, in 2002
the government drafted and discussed a Report on the Situation with the
Administration in 2001. Based on the analysis in that report, proposals have
been made to restructure and streamline the administrative units in the
central administration and to make some urgent changes in the statutory
framework. The report, however, does not contain any findings of corrupt
practices, nor does it refer to specific anti-corruption measures. It is
still difficult to identify benchmarks for the efficiency of administrative
work and for a target-oriented performance management. The same holds
true of the annual reports of the variety of administrations most of which
are available on their web-sites. To prevent those reports from becoming
a pointless formality, however, clear emphasis should be laid on the
degree to which the objectives set have been met and on how the
problems within the competence of a given administrative structure are
solved.
B.1.2. Introducing a System of Professional Civil Service
The public perception of a high level of corruption among officials in the
administration makes it necessary to examine with utmost care the
implementation of the Law on Civil Servants and of the anti-corruption
measures envisioned in the Law.
In line with the Law on Civil Servants (in effect as of August 1999), a system
of professional civil service is currently being introduced to comply with
the principles of lawfulness, political neutrality, loyalty and accountability.
On that basis, civil servants status has been gradually introduced in the
administration of the Council of Ministers, the ministries, and some other
administrative structures, the regional and municipal administrations.
The civil servant status has been introduced in all structures of the central
administration and in 95 per cent of the municipal administrations. It is
unusual, though, that the status is inapplicable to the National Audit
Office and the tax administration, especially given the important
supervisory functions of those bodies. Similarly, the Law on Civil Servants
is not yet applicable to the expert positions within the general
administration which remain covered by the Labor Code. There is a trend
for some special laws (e.g. the Law on the Judiciary providing that the
officials within the administration shall avail of that status, the Law on the
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Ministry of Interior, the Law on Defense and on the Armed Forces, the Law on
the Constitutional Court) to include only a few beneficial elements of the
civil servant status, without taking on board the status as a whole. The
derogations from and exceptions to the status of civil servant impede the
introduction of a system of professional civil service based on a steady
anti-corruption behavior and culture.
l Recruitment and professional qualification
As the competition procedure is not compulsory for taking a position in
the civil service, most administrations simply do not apply it. This gives
rise to well-founded doubts that inadmissible influence is exerted for the
appointment of civil servants. The lack of clear criteria for the evaluation
of the professional knowledge and skills of applicants nurtures corruption
and fails to guarantee objective recruitment based solely on professional
merit. The existing possibility for the head of an administration to appoint
any of the first three applicants ranked by the recruitment committee,
instead of the winner, is also conducive to corruption.
The professional qualification of civil servants, as a means to enhance the
efficiency of the administration, is a major factor that contributes to
limiting corruption. In that respect, in February 2002, the government
approved a Strategy for Training the Officials in the Administration. It provides
for the introduction of a modern system to evaluate the needs for training
and of rules that would ensure the required financial resources for such
training. It is necessary, though, to put in place a general system for the
development of professional skills and qualifications of those working
in the administration. The introduction of a systematic training of public
officials on corruption-related issues could also be quite important.
The latter is offered by the Institute of Public Administration and European
Integration, an institution that has been mainly involved in offering
compulsory and specialized training courses to improve the qualification
of civil servants over the past two years.
l Stability and career development
Servants who are aware of their uncertain status are much more inclined to
misuse their official position. Stability is, therefore, a key anti-corruption factor
within the administration. Unfortunately, the guarantees provided for in the
Law on Civil Servants have proved to be insufficient. Civil servants are often
times laid off on account of formal internal restructuring and reshuffling of
various units within the administrations. The highest structural levels strive to
blur the divide between political and career-based appointments. This is
a serious challenge to the comprehensive implementation of the status of
civil servants, of which stability is a core element.
The performance-based career development of any civil servant is a
decisive precondition to improve the work of the administration as a
whole. The implementation of fair and transparent career development
procedures contributes to uprooting the existing conditions for in-house
corruption. In May 2002, the Council of Ministers issued an Ordinance on
the Evaluation of Officials in the Public Administration that introduced a
performance-based evaluation system. The latter has been applied on a
pilot basis since June 1, 2002, in the administration of the Council of
Ministers, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Regional
Development and Public Works. It is still early to see if that would yield
the required prerequisites for a systematic, well-founded and documented
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evaluation of the performance of any official in the administration and to
what extent such a system would be beneficial to their professional
development and career promotion. This, however, should be a major
task for the administration as it creates a genuine incentive for civil servants
to perform better and rectifies the imbalance between the capacity of
the administration and the needs of society, whereas that imbalance being
a serious corruption-generating factor.
The implementation of the merit principle to career development must
also be reflected in the remuneration which currently depends exclusively
on the position held, the category of the respective administration and
the length of service of the official in question. The lack of material
incentives for better performance is a serious reason for corruption;
moreover the salaries in public administration are far from being
comparable with those in the private sector.
l Ethical norms of conduct
Already at the end of 2000, the Minister for Public Administration
approved a Code of Conduct for the Civil Servant which is not yet published
in the State Gazette. Therefore, it is not really sure if all civil servants are
aware of it but, at the end of the day, they are expected to model their
conduct after the Code. In addition, the administration is composed of
civil servants and employees whose status is governed by the Labor Code.
Thus, without any good reason the officials working under contracts of
employment are not bound by those ethical norms, although employees
are an equally risky group in terms of corruption. The Code itself needs
serious changes; it should contain clearer anti-corruption rules and
mechanisms ensuring their observance. Recommendations along these
lines were made in the Corruption Assessment Report 2002. A number of
European instruments also contain important blueprints in that sphere,
viz. Recommendation No. R (2000)10 of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe to the Member States on codes of conduct for public
officials adopted at the 106th session of the Committee of Ministers on
11 May 2000 and the Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials annexed
thereto, and the Code of Good Administrative Behavior adopted by the
European Parliament on 6 September 2001 which is based on the case-
law of the European Court of Justice and on the domestic laws of EU
member states with respect to the administration.
l Internal control and corruption-preventing mechanisms
The application of legal instruments concerning the administration has
shown that the latter has no working and efficient self-control
mechanisms.
The inspectorates with the various ministries and government
agencies, as set up by virtue of art. 46 of the Law on the Administration
fall short of performing their tasks. In a number of cases they only
exist formally and have a minimum number of officials which makes
them unable to exert genuine control. If their staff is sufficient, the
inspectors could be involved in the internal investigation of
maladministration and corrupt practices of the officials. In view of
these tasks, it would be appropriate to provide for better protection
of the inspectors that should guarantee their impartiality.
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Given the practical implementation of the Law on Civil Servants, the
government has started drafting some amendments. The draft envisages
a number of anti-corruption measures, such as the mandatory organization
of competitions in the event of recruitment and appointment, introducing
incompatibility between holding an office as a civil servant and working
as a trustee in bankruptcy or a liquidator; removing the possibility for an
earlier promotion in rank on the basis of unclear criteria, etc. In order to
ensure the avoidance of any conflicts of interest, the restriction on
relatives to work in the same administration should be extended and made
applicable to any type of hierarchical relationship, be it direct or indirect.
In view of the better implementation of the principle of political
neutrality, the restriction on the members of municipal and local councils
to work as civil servants should apply to all administrative structures, not
only to municipal administrations as is the case now.
B.1.3. Administrative Services
The measures aimed at improving the administrative services for citizens
and the prevention of existing corruption, arbitrariness and abuse in this
sphere are of key importance, as the public perception of the
administration is built up exactly in the process of applying for and
providing administrative services. This process must convince citizens that
the administration is there to service them. It would thus be possible to
eradicate the years-old negative perception that the administration is a
slow, bureaucratic and hostile system.
Further to the implementation of the Law on Administrative Services for Natural
and Legal Persons, the administration has started opening up towards the
citizenry. The step-by-step implementation of the one-stop shop principle
in the separate administrations upgrades the quality of administrative
services. The annual reports on the situation with the administration contain
details about the number of administrative services provided and analyze
the general picture of the provision of administrative services.
Nonetheless, the expected results,  i .e. lawfulness, swiftness,
accessibility, good quality of administrative services and declining
corruption, have not been seen yet. Many administrations have addressed
the problems of administrative services only formally, without going down
to the essence of the reform under way. There is no understanding that
efficient services are unthinkable without the improvement of the internal
procedures applied in each administration. The required information
materials are not always provided or, if provided, they sometimes contain
obsolete information. The quality of administrative services differs from
one administration to another. This is a practical obstacle to the gradual
development of administrative services from the mere provision of a
service to integrated administrative servicing, to constructing a uniform
model of one-stop shop services provided by any administration within
the executive branch. This finding is reconfirmed by the fact that the
legal instruments rarely provide for procedures of ex officio coordination
among several administrations. The process of improving the
administrative services is also undermined by the lack of financial
resources for documents and equipment.
It is necessary to put in place a reliable feedback mechanism to solicit
the views of service recipients, so that their ideas could be used to improve
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the process of administrative servicing and to resist corruption. Special
attention should be given to providing various channels of access to
services (phones, post, e-mail, internet portals) and to the use of a flexible
working time by administrative service units. The specialized training of
officials working at those units should spread out a new administrative
culture and improve their competitiveness. That would make the provision
of services more efficient and suppress the reasons for corruption. Such
training should prepare the officials to meet the new requirements in
their relations with citizens: to provide information, to make transparent
decisions, to guarantee the right of appeal.
Two recently adopted documents are the E-Government Strategy and the
Concept Paper for Improving Administrative Services Based on the One-Stop
Shop Principle. Both of them provide guidelines for a modern and efficient
administration meeting the public demand for high-quality and readily
accessible administrative services, including those provided through
electronic links between the citizens and different public administration
agencies. While the most optimistic predictions suggest that the complete
automation of the administrative process would take at least seven to ten
years, the gradual implementation of the model of electronic
administration in the course of that process would entail greater
transparency, accountability, flexibility and swiftness of administrative
processes and, hence, reduce the level of expenditure. The exercise of
state power, including the provision of administrative services through
information technology vehicles, would reduce bureaucracy and advance
a corruption-hostile environment.
B.1.4. Specialized Control Bodies
The reinforcement of the control exercised by the National Audit Office,
the bodies of public internal financial control, the Financial Intelligence
Bureau remains a key issue in all anti-corruption initiatives and strategies.
Equally central is the drafting of clearer rules on the competencies of
those bodies and the coordination among them, the introduction of new
mechanisms and instruments loaded with a potential to curb corruption.
l The National Audit Office
As of the end of 2001, a new Law on the National Audit Office has been in
effect. It is expected to strengthen the independence and extend the
powers of the National Audit Office to exert control and prevent
corruption, as discussed in detail in the Corruption Assessment Report
2001: enlarge the scope of audit activities, reinforce current control,
improve the interaction with the National Assembly and other state bodies.
The implementation of the new measures approved in 2002 is a good
basis to summarize the following results and problems relating to the
control of the management and spending of public funds in Bulgaria:
- At the beginning of March 2002, a special current audits department
was set up to carry out on-going monitoring of income and
expenditure, to identify the possible risks in the execution of the
state budget, and to timely warn the government and the parliament
of them;
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- The results of the audits performed are now more widely disclosed
to the public;
- Cooperation and interaction agreements have been signed with the
Public Internal Financial Control Agency, the tax administration,
the customs administration, the Agency for State Receivables, the
Financial Intelligence Bureau and the public prosecution. The
agreements provide that interaction would take the form of
exchanging information about any violations of the relevant
legislative instruments, the risky spheres and areas in terms of
corruption, any financial irregularities, the efficiency of the legal
framework and the mutual provision of expert assistance. Those
agreements aim to extend cooperation and improve the interaction
in the fight against fraud, corruption and money laundering,
enhance the efficiency of the control system in the country and the
collection of state receivables;
- Contacts have been established and good relations are maintained
with the specialized EU committees for combating corruption, fraud
and crime, the interaction with specialized institutions in other
countries is also expanding. Joint inspections are organized with
the Romanian National Audit Office to check the observance of
customs legislation and the collection of customs revenues, in view
of reinforcing the customs control. A regional association of audit
offices in the Black Sea region is in the process of being set up. It
would enable joint operations on common issues, including
suspicious international transactions involving public resources. The
drafting and adoption of Rules of Procedure of the National Audit Office
is forthcoming - it will be an important instrument in the fight against
fraud and corruption, the development of procedures to detect
fraud and corrupt practices in the public sector, and the introduction
of an electronic public register;
- The efficiency of the National Audit Office is hindered by the fact
that it lacks powers to impose sanctions if it comes across violations
of the law. Under the legislation in force, the findings of the National
Audit Office must be reconfirmed by the Public Internal Financial
Control Agency which is a body of the executive. In other words,
the body that is especially created to monitor the lawfulness of
public expenditure may only notify the executive which should
then penalize itself.
It is necessary to think and discuss ideas about how to improve the Law
on the National Audit Office and the practice of its implementation along
the following lines:
- Vesting the National Audit Office with supervisory powers not only
with respect to budget-funded entities but also with respect to banks
and commercial companies that might be used to drain public
resources;
- Extending the existing powers of the National Audit Office to rely
on the results of audit operations; the findings in the audit reports
and the materials collected during the audits should be the proper
evidence before the competent authorities. That would require the
corresponding amendments to the Law on Accounting, the Law on
Public Procurement, the Law on the Judiciary and other instruments;
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- Granting the auditors from the National Audit Office with the status
of civil servants;
- The Law on Property Disclosure by Persons Occupying Senior Position
in the State should be amended as follows: setting up time limits in
which the persons appointed or removed from office should file
declarations; providing for a possibility to control the information
in the declarations filed; envisaging appropriate sanctions for failure
to file a declaration or to respect the time limits, and for declaring
false data; extending the list of persons under an obligation to
disclose their property, income and expenses.
l Public Internal Financial Control
The Pubic Internal Financial Control Agency (PIFCA) must harmonize and
co-ordinate the development and functioning of ex-ante and ex-post
financial management and control systems. In October 2002, the Law on
Public Internal Financial Control was amended (amendments in effect as of
January 1, 2003) to correct some inconsistencies with other domestic laws.
Many amendments are clearly inspired by the endeavor to combat
corruption and the need to harmonize Bulgarian legislation with the acquis
communautaire.
The amendments provide that financial comptrollers should be
appointed who would be in charge of ex-ante control. All first-level central
or municipal budget spending units, the units spending funds under EU
programs and the heads of the National Social Security Institute and the
National Health Insurance Fund are now obliged to appoint financial
comptrollers. The major idea of that change is to spread the functions
of making decisions, exerting control and keeping the accounting books
among various persons. This would help overcome the current practice
of concentrating the supervisory and accounting functions in the same
hands (those of the chief accountant), enhance and improve the efficiency
of the financial management and control systems and restrict the
conditions for corrupt practices.
The amendments have also introduced additional guarantees for
objectivity and impartiality in the process of exerting control. In that
respect, in-house auditors are prohibited from getting involved in the
management, accounting and control of entities where they have
previously carried out ex-ante control, for a period of three years after
that control has ended. The rule should prevent conflicts of interest that
might invite corrupt practices.
Another interesting change is the extended scope of the public internal
financial control - it now covers the operations of the spending units
with funds provided under international treaties, agreements, conventions
and other international instruments, where the relevant instrument so
provides. Other changes concern the extended list of individuals and
entities put under an obligation to build up financial management and
control systems. Similarly, the Law on Administrative Offences and Penalties
has been amended so as to set a longer time limit for finding violations of
the statutory instruments governing the budget-related, financial,
economic and reporting activities. That would guarantee better detection
of those administrative offences.
The application of the amendments would largely predetermine the extent
to which PIFCA would properly exercise its control powers, including
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those to combat corruption. As a sustainable anti-corruption institutional
environment should be promoted and the recommendations of the
European Union towards Bulgaria taken on board, it is necessary to
distinguish more clearly between the functions of PIFCA and those of the
National Audit Office.
l Measures against money laundering
The transparent movement of cash flow is a must in the fight against
corruption. The key role in preventing and detecting money laundering
is entrusted to the Financial Intelligence Bureau (FIB).
In the first half of 2002, the FIB submitted to the public prosecution 116
reports on money laundering cases worth a total of 193 millions US dollars.
During the same period, 14 investigation cases were instituted based on
FIB reports. The biggest case which the FIB submitted to the public
prosecution involved 83 millions US dollars. In the first half of the year
the BFI, jointly with the privatization authorities, prevented the investment
of significant funds of a suspicious origin in the privatization of the
government stakes in several commercial companies. From the beginning
of the year up until June 2002, the BFI received 105 suspicious transaction
reports worth a total of 172 millions US dollars. Most of those reports
were submitted by commercial banks, as usual. The FIB works in active
cooperation with foreign financial intelligence units to combat the
financing of terrorism and to exchange methodologies, experts and
theoretical information. Thus, more than 500 persons were inspected out
of the lists supplied by competent American services.
The FIB also carries out operations directly related to the combat against
corruption, in line with the Program for the Implementation of the National
Anti-Corruption Strategy. Some of the measures undertaken by the FIB to
shield itself against corruption are the in-house internal training program
drafted in line with the general strategy for anti-corruption training of
civil servants and the initiative to additionally protect classified information
by enhancing the system of personal accountability of FIB officials. With
its media strategy, the FIB endeavors to ensure the transparency, the
general accessibility and openness of its work. Especially important for
the success of FIB is the effective cooperation between the Bureau and
other bodies and institutions, such as the Ministry of Interior and the
national services attached thereto (National Service for Combating
Organized Crime and National Security Service), the Public Prosecution,
the Customs Agency, PIFCA, the General Tax Directorate, foreign financial
intelligence units. Lasting contacts have been established with the financial
intelligence services of some well-known offshore areas and joint projects
are under way.
On October 1, 2002, the Council of Ministers presented to the parliament
draft amendments to the Law on Measures against Money Laundering. The
objective of the draft is to complete the harmonization of Bulgarian laws
with the core instruments of the acquis communautaire in the area of
combating money laundering (Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention
of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and
Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 4
December 2001 amending Directive 91/308/EEC), and to expand the scope
of anti-money laundering, while improving its mechanisms and efficiency.
In line with the explicit requirement of Directive 2001/97/EC, the list of
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reporting entities under art. 3(2) of the Law on Measures against Money
Laundering has been extended. Bound to report on any suspicious
transactions and operations would be the attorneys-at-law, and other
persons who provide consultations on a professional basis; real estate
dealers and persons organizing unofficial securities markets; persons
dealing in high-value items on a professional basis, etc.
Some of the amendments aim to extend the forms and ways of identifying
natural and legal persons, for instance if a transaction or an operation is
not made in the presence of the client, which covers electronic statements,
documents, signatures, etc. With commercial banks, the so-called double
signature system applies that has proven to be quite efficient.
The proposed amendments put in place conditions for a quicker and
more effective exchange of information between the FIB and the law
enforcement structures. Later, this would hopefully result in a quicker
and efficient investigation of instances of money-laundering by way of
combining the information resources of units that use different methods
of information gathering and processing.
The draft amendments envisage that a supervisory mechanism should be
set up for the financial investigation work. In particular, a Chief Financial
Investigation Inspector will be appointed who would be one of the
Deputy Ministers of Finance. While the Chief Inspector would be able
to monitor and control the activities of the FIB, strict legal guarantees
would prevent him from unduly intervening in its day-to-day operations.
The passing and efficient implementation of the law would result in a
more comprehensive and accurate cash-flow monitoring, thus severely
restricting the opportunities to engage in strong corruption triggers such
as money laundering.
B.1.5. Other Control Mechanisms and Means to Combat
Corruption: the Ombudsman Institution
The public authorities and bodies endowed with controlling or supervisory
powers in Bulgaria cannot always timely and effectively resist corruption.
The specialized authorities themselves are not immune from corruption.
Examples have been seen already of abuse on behalf of public officials
who are in charge of preventing various forms of corruption. The process
of fixing the relevant institutional and legal framework, and of drafting
in-house rules of conduct for the officials of different institutions or units
is still under way (e.g. Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, including
the police, the border police and other specialized services, the Ministry
of Finance and the Customs, etc.). The same holds true for the elaboration
of codes of ethics and other internal control mechanisms for combating
corruption. Hence, there are widely spread instances of maladministration
(misuse of power, corruption, disrespect for human rights and insufficient
protection). All this entails the need for a new mechanism that should be
implemented in parallel to the existing institutions and complement their
work. An institution like the Ombudsman may well play this part. Bulgaria,
however, is among the very few European countries whose legislation
does not provide for an Ombudsman.
The idea of setting up a specialized institution that should control and
monitor the administration (an ombudsman or a civil/public defender),
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inter alia in the event of corruption, was developed by the Center for the
Study of Democracy back in 1998, in a special report Opportunities for
Introducing Ombudsman Institution in Bulgaria. The report outlined the
fundamental principles and possibilities for a future legal framework in
Bulgaria of an institution similar to the ombudsman that should match
the current needs, the public attitude and the political and constitutional
background in the country. The recommendations in the report were
included in the Anti-Corruption Action Plan, a major document produced
by Coalition 2000. Starting from a detailed strategic basis, a Draft Law on
the Ombudsman was prepared. The draft provides that the institution of
the ombudsman should be introduced at both the central and the local
levels and should combine the features of the classical institution (the
Swedish ombudsman) and the versions of other countries, while matching
the peculiar conditions in Bulgaria. In 2002, a modified version of the
draft, viz. the Draft Law on the Civil Defender and the Local Civil Mediators
was presented to the Chair of the National Assembly and to the
chairpersons of the standing parliamentary committees for human rights,
for citizens petitions and complaints and for legal issues. Nonetheless,
the modified draft was not officially tabled by the 39th National Assembly.
Later, three other draft laws on the ombudsman were officially presented
to the Assembly and they were all passed at first reading.
On the basis of the three drafts officially presented to the parliament,
the Standing Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights and
Religions developed a consolidated Draft Law on the Ombudsman
that will be tabled for second reading. That version contains only
some of the proposals of the first draft elaborated by Coalition 2000.
Moreover, some of the solutions embodied in the new summarized
version invite doubts as to whether the future institution would be
politically neutral and efficient. For example, the list of persons
empowered to nominate candidates for an ombudsman (only MPs
and parliamentary groups) would somewhat politicize any election
made by a simple majority, there would be fewer possibilities for
selection, for alternatives and for competition among the
candidates. There is no rule on what should happen if none of the
nominees is elected at the second voting in Parliament. In his or
her activities, the future ombudsman should be supported by an
administrative service, a point that is not covered by the
consolidated draft either. The procedure for handling complaints
is incomplete and there is no possibility whatsoever for the
ombudsman to require an administrative authority to pronounce
explicitly in the event where the deadline to appeal against a tacit
refusal has expired.The consolidated draft law contains only one
general text that enables the municipal councils to elect local
public mediators (ombudsmen).
Despite the lack of relevant legislation local ombudsman institutions, set
up mainly on the initiative of the civil society and with the assistance of
the local authorities, operate quite successfully in a number of
municipalities (e.g. Sofia, Veliko Tarnovo, Razgrad, Zavet, Loznitsa, etc.).
Their work is geared towards facilitating the access of citizens to the public
services offered and reducing the improper contacts between citizens
and municipal officials where the latter perform their duties.
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The public has become better aware of the need for and usefulness of
such an institution at the local level, of its potential in enhancing the
transparency of the local administration, improving the administrative
services and fostering a climate of respect for human rights and
intolerance to corruption. Recently, amendments were drafted to the Law
on Local Self-Government and Local Administration according to which the
municipal councils should have autonomous budgets. Therefore, it would
be appropriate to envisage that, when adopting the corresponding
municipal budget, the municipal councils should also be able to adopt a
budget for the local ombudsman.
In addition to the guarantees for transparency and openness of
administrative and governance processes and functions, the general
institutional and legal climate needed for the fight against corruption
would be greatly supported by enhancing the law enforcement and social
functions and by streamlining the regulatory functions of the state. In
particular, the state should withdraw from the economy and the sphere
of services, the democratic values and anti-corruption morality should
be rooted in politics and in public relations, civil control should be
institutionalized. While the efforts of the state and society to fight
corruption in 2002 did bring about some positive results, those efforts
are not yet based on a consistent partnership.
B.2.1. Parliamentary Governance and Law
l The role of parliament
The exercise of state
power in a democratic
context is based on the
principle of the separa-
tion of powers but is in-
trinsically linked to the
development of dialogue
and cooperation among
the three branches of
power.
As a supreme institu-
tional representation of
the nation, the National
Assembly holds a key
place in the system of
state authorities. Its tasks
require that the parlia-
ment should work with
maximum openness and
transparency and con-
tribute to the efficiency
of all anti-corruption ini-
tiatives in the state and in
society in general.
By the decision of September 11, 2002, the National Assembly set up a
B.2. The State
Institutions, Law
and the Society
Source: SELDI, January 2002
(*) Note: The maximum value of the index is 10.0 indicating the highest possible level of
corruption. The minimum value is 0.0 indicating total absence of corruption.
Legend: AL - Albania; BIH - Bosnia and Herzegovina; BG - Bulgaria; MK -
Macedonia; RO - Romania; HR - Croatia; SERB - Serbia; MNTR -
Montenegro.
FIGURE 12. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN THE PARLIAMENT*
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Bulgaria, January 02Southeast Europe,
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Standing Anti-Corruption Committee. The committee is still in the pro-
cess of identifying its position and role within the overall anti-corruption
process. In order to become an operational anti-corruption mechanism,
the Committee should fulfill its intent to analyze corrupt practices, the
legal and social conditions that perpetuate or benefit such practices, and
initiate the required legislative measures in that respect.
Although in 2002 the parliamentary committees again tended to invite
NGO representatives to participate in the discussions on various draft
laws, public hearings and the democratic participation in the process of
law-making are not a well-established practice yet.
The Committee on Civil Society Issues and some of its members were
very active in preparing and tabling draft laws with varying anti-corruption
potential, e.g. the drafts laws on lobbying, on the ombudsman, on ethical
rules, on political parties, etc. Serious criticism could be voiced in that
respect, however, as no sufficient efforts were made to involve a wider
roster of experts, to fully use the existing potential and experience gained
by the spectrum of civil organizations, or to launch a wider public debate
on any initiated anti-corruption legislation. Members of Parliament in
this and other standing committees may also be recommended to more
actively commit themselves to the anti-corruption initiatives of the civil
society. There have been specific examples of an almost complete absence
of MPs from fora organized in public-private partnership or on the
problems of judicial reform, the role of the judiciary and law enforcement
in combating corruption, on the ombudsman institution, etc.
Despite some of the measures taken, the National Assembly is still far
from being an institution serving as a model of anti-corruption
efficiency. No mechanism ensuring the settlement of conflicts of interests
within the legislative branch was set up in 2002 either. A group of MPs
presented a Draft Law on the Ethical Norms Applicable to the Work of the
Members of Parliament. The draft contains some principles for the conduct
of MPs (priority of public interests, transparent actions, respect for the
citizens, objectivity, etc.), rules on the disclosure of information (declaring
and disclosing information about the income and property status of MPs),
and also principles and rules on the conflicts of interests.
The proposed norms place Members of Parliament under an obligation
to provide information about their income at the beginning and the end
of their tenure (including information on the sources of funding for their
pre-election campaigns), about expenditure for their reception rooms or
offices, on technical and other assistants and/or advisers, information
about their trips and travel, on gifts received, and also on the details of
any personal or family interest involved in the exercise of their powers. It
is proposed to set up a standing parliamentary ethics committee that
should keep record of any declared conflicts of interests, handle
complaints from citizens and civil organizations from MPs behavior
incompatible with the law and with the Rules of Procedure of the National
Assembly, and propose sanctions. The draft law also identifies a list of
possible sanctions. The establishment of ethical rules and their practical
implementation would consolidate the reputation of the National
Assembly and enhance the public confidence in the work of MPs.
In addition, the following measures remain indispensable:
- Introducing a mechanism to inform the public of any violations of
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the fiscal discipline committed by MPs, and of the sanctions imposed
in each case; here, a subtle balance should be struck between the
requirement to keep confidential the information that the future
standing parliamentary ethics committee would use in its work and
the need for transparency and openness.
- Improving the quality of the legislation while avoiding the automatic
copying of foreign experience and taking into consideration the views
of the experts in every relevant field and the lasting public interest;
- Bringing the legislative program in line with the needs of society
and the aspiration to root an anti-corruption model of relationships
between state and business, and state and civil society;
- Making changes towards the democratic decentralization of the state.
The parliament creates the legal basis for the functioning of the other
branches of power. It elects and removes from office the members of the
government, elects some of the members of the Constitutional Court and
the Supreme Judicial Council (the body that administers the judiciary)
and participates in the formation of a number of other important state
authorities. It is therefore indispensable for the National Assembly to play
a key part in establishing a democratic balance among the different
branches of power, overcoming the conflicts and tension that arise from
time to time between some of them, and coordinating anti-corruption
efforts. Due to the specificity of transition in Bulgaria, the separation of
powers often results in opposition between the branches of power, rather
than in a balanced relationship between all those branches. The negative
effect of that peculiarity over the past year was enhanced by the lack of
homogeneity, coordination and dialogue both within the government and
inside the parliamentary majority. Practice has given a number of good
examples of the lack of dialogue or of a mechanism to overcome the
tension between the branches of power. A fresh example was the fact
that the Supreme Court of Cassation challenged the consistence of the
latest amendments to the Law on the Judiciary with the Constitution,
resulting in most of the amendments being adopted to be declared anti-
constitutional. Other examples include the preparation of the draft budget
and the ensuing debates which resulted in the Supreme Judicial Councils
challenging the draft budget before the Supreme Administrative Court;
the fact that the Supreme Judicial Council requested the Prosecutor
General to resign, etc. In addition, last year, the tools available to the
judiciary and the constitutional justice venue were much more frequently
used against the executive than were the tools of parliamentary control.
The right solution, however, would hardly lie in limiting judicial review
of the acts issued by the executive. The parliament itself should develop
its supervisory functions and more actively apply the mechanisms of
parliamentary scrutiny and control. In the end, it is exactly the parliament
that has the heaviest responsibility in fortifying statehood.
l Improving the process of law-making
The principle of the rule of law is intrinsically linked to the law-making
process and to drafting and application of legislative instruments. In that
sense, the existing Law on Legal Instruments (passed in 1973) is not an
adequate basis for law-making. The prevailing opinion is that the legal
instruments are of poor quality, which is due to the insufficient
administrative capacity in the area of law-making. The instruments of
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secondary legislation are often inconsistent with the requirements of the
laws they are intended to implement. The legislation is oftentimes
amended and this entails difficulties not only for the citizens and
organizations trying to enforce their rights but also for the administration
that has to apply the rules. The unclear and contradictory provisions and
the existing principle of abolishing obsolete rules pave the ground for
subjective assessment, thus advancing a corruption-friendly environment.
Hence, it is mandatory to draft a new piece of legislation that should
govern the law-making work. That law should provide for coordination
procedures that guar-
antee the involvement
of the structures of
civi l  society in the
drafting of all legisla-
tive programs and le-
gal instruments. A sys-
tem of criteria should
be developed to
evaluate the expected
results of the imple-
mentation of legisla-
tive instruments, also
with respect to the in-
dividuals, institutions
and organizations
concerned. It is espe-
cially important to rely
on the capacity of lo-
cal authorit ies and
civil organizations, in
particular by devising
a mechanism to con-
stantly monitor the ef-
fects of the implemen-
tation of legal instru-
ments, and to make
appropriate conclu-
sions about the re-
quired amendments.
MPs who exercise their legislative initiative are not bound to coordinate their
drafts with various ministries or agencies, unlike the government, which is under
an obligation to coordinate its bills. This affects the quality of the drafts presented
by MPs and may easily entertain suspicion that improper influence has been
exerted. As the MPs from the ruling majority exercise their right of initiative
more than frequently, the political government has no serious commitment to
the drafts presented by MPs and to their enforcement once they are passed.
Out of 436 draft laws presented to the 39th National Assembly until
the end of 2002, 235 were produced by the Council of Ministers,
whereas of 201 bills submitted by MPs, 97 came from members of
the NMS2 parliamentary group.
Source: Web-site, Bulgarian National Assembly
January September  January October January May October
2000 2000  2001 2001 2002 2002 2002
Fast personal enrichment 57.0 57.8 60.8 59.2 58.6 58.6 58.4
sought by those in power
Imperfect legislation 35.1 40.5 39.1 38.0 43.0 39.7 39.2
Ineffectiveness of the 24.7 22.2 27.2 28.5 32.3 31.2 38.0
 judicial system
Low salaries 47.2 41.6 33.7 32.3 38.5 36.0 36.6
Lack of strict administrative 30.8 32.3 31.8 35.2 34.5 38.9 34.5
control
Mixing official duties and 28.3 32.6 25.8 31.7 26.7 26.9 28.8
personal interests
Moral crisis in the period 18.2 17.0 18.9 21.1 18.3 16.3 13.2
of transition
Problems inherited by the 7.3 7.8 4.4 5.8 5.0 6.9 6.3
communist past
Specific characteristics of 5.9 4.2 5.9 4.4 5.3 4.3 4.9
Bulgarian national culture
TABLE 2 MAJOR FACTORS FOR THE SPREAD OF
CORRUPTION*
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
(*) Note: 1) % of those citing each factor
2) Respondents marked up to three answers, therefore the sum total of percentages
exceeds 100.
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It appears that the principles of the legislative process should be
reconsidered so as to guarantee the better quality of bills presented by
individual MPs and mechanisms should exist for the compulsory
coordination of those bills with the widest possible range of institutions
and persons involved in the area in question. Despite the progress towards
transparent reforms that is demonstrated by the public hearings on a
number of draft laws, larger openness is needed at the stage of developing
and discussing the program for reforms. Otherwise, the current practice
of presenting alternative draft laws will persist, as will the trend to
consolidate the different bills mechanically and pass versions that are
devoid of a consistent strategic basis.
B.2.2. Anti-Corruption Measures within Public Order and
Security Bodies
The specific role of the institutions in charge of ensuring public order and
security gains importance in the fight against corruption (i.e. the Ministry
of Interior and its national and specialized services, the Ministry of Defense
and its structures, the special and specialized institutions subordinate to
other authorities such as the National Intelligence Service, the National
Guard Service etc.).
At the same time, corruption within the public order and security
institutions is among the most distressing, complex and important
problems as those institutions are vested with the widest powers to combat
corruption in the overall political, economic and social life of the country.
The major problems of combating corruption inside those institutions stem
mainly from the lack of coordination among the different bodies, the
duplication of functions, the poor equipment and underfunding, the
insufficient training of staff, the difficult recruitment of good experts as a
result of the low salaries, etc.
A key factor that predetermines the spread of corruption within the public
order and security institutions is the significant volume of classified
information that they have to collect, process and store. The possibility
for that information to be improperly used paves the ground for
particularly dangerous and disturbing corrupt practices.
At the end of 2002, on the initiative of the Parliamentary Committee for
Foreign Policy and the Parliamentary Committee for Domestic Security
and Public Order, a debate was launched if it would be possible to draft
a special Law on National Security to delineate the place of the secret
services, their functions and the interaction among them. The opportunity
is discussed, inter alia, to merge the secret services in a National Security
Agency that would have the status of a ministry directly subordinate to
the Council of Ministers. The steps to be undertaken should be closely
linked with the efforts to more efficiently combat corruption.
In line with the tasks stemming from the National Anti-Corruption Strategy,
the Ministry of Interior (MoI) adopted and started implementing its own
Anti-Corruption Program. The latter aims in particular to limit corruption
by way of efficient mechanisms for consolidating the status of the units
involved in anti-corruption efforts, improving in-house control and the
interaction between the bodies of the MoI and the mass media. It is worth
mentioning that an Intra-Ministerial Anti-Corruption Coordination
Board has been set up within MoI and a set of Methodological Rules for the
36 CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT REPORT 2002
Organization and Procedure of that Board have been adopted. The Board
is chaired by the line Deputy Minister of Interior who is in charge of the
general monitoring and supervision of interaction in the fight against
organized crime and corruption.
The operational interaction between MoI structures upon receiving,
notifying and clarifying the complaints of internal corruption, and the
control of their handling, have been entrusted to a special Department
on Combating Corruption within MoI, of the Inspectorate. In the national
and the territorial services of MoI, specialized units have been assigned
the functions of conducting operations to check information about
corruption. In conformity with the legal requirements for checking
complaints of corruption, the directorates at the national and territorial
services summarize information at the end of each quarter and provide it
to the Department on Combating Corruption within MoI of the
Inspectorate. In turn, every six months the department drafts and submits
to the Intra-Ministerial Coordination Board consolidated reports analyzing
corruption prevention and detection in the system of the MoI.
The data provided by the newly-created Intra-Ministerial Anti-Corrup-
tion Coordination Board within MoI show that, in the first six months of
2002, 113 officials of the Ministry were penalized for corruption. One
of them was a civil servant, 63 were officers and 49 were sergeants.
Twenty-six persons were fired, 20 were moved to other positions, and 19
were subjected to psychological aptitude tests. Files about violations com-
mitted by 40 officials were submitted to the public prosecution and 8
officials were arrested.
The results of the anti-
corruption efforts made
by the MoI were appre-
ciated by the leadership
of the Ministry who are of
the opinion that the new
mechanism for prevent-
ing and detecting corrup-
tion among MoI officials
operates smoothly at all
levels.
Measures were taken to
reinforce the commit-
ment of the structures of
civil society in the fight
against corruption while
relying on public recep-
tion rooms, hotlines,
mailboxes and other
forms that enable NGOs
and individual citizens to provide information about instances of corrup-
tion on the basis of guaranteed anonymity. The Crime Prevention and Public
Relations Groups with the Metropolitan Directorate of the Interior and at
the county police directorates across the country frequently appear in broad-
casts on local media. Attention is paid to the possibility of citizens to file
information about corruption among officials of the MoI. The opening up
and greater accountability of MoI towards the society needs to be further
promoted. The working style of secrecy and concealment which gives rise
FIGURE 13. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN THE POLICE FORCE
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Source: SELDI, January 2002
Bulgaria, January 02Southeast Europe,
January 02
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to suspicions and forms a good ground for corruption should be replaced
with wider transparency and openness. The development of a system of
staff recruitment and career development, on-the-job training, the use of
objective performance evaluation criteria are also of key importance as
they all promote the motivation of staff members.
To enhance the efficiency of MoI in combating corruption and to
reconfirm the role of the Ministry in that process, the structure of the
Ministry should be streamlined and the place and functions of the special
services should be better defined.
After Bulgaria was invited to start negotiations for NATO membership,
the Ministry of Defense declared it would start working to reform the
legislative framework of defense and of the armed forces. The initial ideas
suggest that the reform would already start at the beginning of 2003. It
will have to distinguish between two separate sets of legal rules - on
defense and on the armed forces. This will be achieved, among other
things, by passing two separate laws - a law on defense that should cover
the entire system of interaction among, and subordination of all institutions
in the country for the purpose of national defense and security, and a law
on the armed forces that would govern in detail the system of the armed
forces and professional military service.
When the contemplated reform of the legislative framework is
implemented, it should not be forgotten that some specific problems of
the Ministry of Defense may also generate corruption, e.g.: the lack of
transparency and of sufficient controls in the allocation of the considerable
budget funds earmarked for army maintenance and modernization, and
for tendering procedures; the management of substantial property,
including real estate, and the fact that large portions of that property
have become redundant in the army as a result of the military reform. At
the beginning of December 2002, the government approved an Ordinance
on the Conditions and the Procedure for the Award of Public Procurements
relating to National Defense and Security. The entities that may be contracting
authorities under the Ordinance are those vested with defense and
security-related functions in Bulgaria, whereas the potential bidders must
satisfy the conditions for access to classified information or the
requirements for applying special security measures. It is still early to
conclude to what extent the application of the Ordinance would help
curb corruption.
B.2.3. The State and Society
l The system of political parties
The year 2002 witnessed further gradual transformation of the political
party system into more transparent and independent of the state system.
The funding of political parties had already been covered by the relevant
legislative instrument in 2001 which, however, preserved the possibility
for anonymous donations, along with a number of anti-corruption
provisions. In May 2002, a new Draft Law on Political Parties was presented
to the National Assembly. A number of its rules intend to establish lawful
means of financing and mechanisms to control the funding of political
parties, such as:
- a full ban on anonymous donations and on the possibility of political
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parties to receive support, in whatever form, from commercial
companies with any government or municipal equity interest (by
contrast, the current rule only prohibits such support if the
government or a municipality is a majority shareholder);
- a possibility for restricted, albeit authorized and controllable
economic operations so as to cut off the current practice of
conducting business operations in the shadow, avoiding the
legislation in force.
A second draft law on political parties is in the process of being prepared
and should be presented to the National Assembly. Its underlying ideas
are close to those of the first draft. The second draft provides for more
stringent restrictions on donations to political parties, and a total ban for
such parties to be funded by companies involved in the business of
gambling. It also suggests a new mechanism for allocating government
subsidies for political parties and prescribes a mandatory requirement
for political parties to submit their financial statements for the last three
years to the National Audit Office in order to participate in elections.
Political consensus is required for the most important anti-corruption
measures concerning political parties and the informal links between
political parties and various private interests. It is clearly necessary to
ensure, by legislative means, maximum transparency in the course of
conducting activities as a political party, to make clear the sources of
funding, to do away with the shady cash flows from and to the
headquarters of political parties. The attainment of these objectives would
move forward the combat against corruption and help reform the system
of political parties while placing it on a solid anti-corruption basis.
The Draft Elections Code, presented to the National Assembly in 2002,
pursues similar objectives. It seeks to codify the law on elections, to change
the elections system and to provide for new rules on the funding of
election campaigns. It would prevent state-owned and municipal
companies from funding such campaigns. Another provision introduces
a ceiling on the expenditure in the course of an election campaign (2 400
000 Bulgarian levs for a political party and 80 000 levs for each
independent candidate). In addition, a deposit should be paid in advance
(10 000 levs for each political party and 500 levs for each candidate
standing on a first-past-the-post basis) on a bank account of the Central
Elections Committee, with the proviso that the Committee would release
the deposit after the political party or candidate in question submits a
report on collecting and spending the funds for the campaign. The draft
proposes that a permanent elections administration should be put in place
and the spending of the funds should be controlled by the Central Elections
Committee, instead of the National Audit Office.
The introduction of a new control mechanism that should achieve the
required transparency is largely supported by the major political forces.
Nonetheless, it needs discussion and sophistication so that its anti-
corruption ideas and potential could be fully developed. Most debatable
are the envisaged changes to the current election legislation, e.g. the
introduction of a mixed (majority and proportional) elections system
modeled after the German one. The establishment of a professional
elections administration has also given rise to some controversy.
The reinforcement of the autonomy and transparency of the political party
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system, the eradication of any possibilities to use corruption in order to
achieve the goals of political parties necessitate the adoption of a modern
and consistent domestic legislation that should be strictly implemented.
l Lobbying and conflicts of interests
Lobbying is a specific activity which greatly exceeds the constitutional
right of citizens to lodge petitions and make proposals to state institutions.
It often accompanies, in one form or another, state governance at different
levels. Lobbying is practiced on behalf of a third party, against payment,
and aims to promote specific private interests, individual or collective.
To implement the principles of transparency in the interaction between
state and society, and to demolish corruption in that sphere, clear rules
are needed about the mechanisms whereby individuals and private
organizations could influence decision-making within the executive and
the legislative branches of power. This will stop any inappropriate pressure
behind the scene and any conflicts between private and public interests.
This objective, however, requires a complex process of adopting new
legislative and ethical norms, while simultaneously infiltrating new
practices and developing a corruption-hostile public and political culture.
Some very practical steps were undertaken along this path in 2002. The
Draft Law on the Disclosure and Registration of Lobbyists and Lobbying,
presented to the National Assembly by a group of MPs from the ruling
majority, proposes that a Public Register of Lobbyists and Lobbying is
set up. It contains definitions of the concepts of lobbyist and lobbying
and covers the conditions, procedure, prohibitions and restrictions in
relation to lobbying. The draft rules, however, trigger a number of critical
remarks:
- the formulation of lobbying is far too broad, there is no
requirement that lobbying and the financial investment therein
should be disclosed to the public;
- the possible addressees of lobbying, be they institutions or
personalities, are too numerous (all authorities of the legislature
and the executive, authorities of local self-government, civil
servants, members of political cabinets and persons working under
contracts of employment at the bodies of the Executive, at the
administration of the National Assembly and at the administration
of the President of Bulgaria);
- there are no criteria to distinguish between the activities defined
as lobbying, on the one hand, and ordinary civic activities or
democratic civic involvement in the process of law-making and the
general political process, on the other hand. The draft does not
treat as lobbying only those activities of NGOs that are developed
under projects with grant financing from the European Union, other
international organizations or specialized foreign government
programs. All the other activities of NGOs, including those in pursuit
of public interests, would thus fall within the definition of lobbying;
- the relationship between unlawful lobbying and the crime of trade
in influence remains unclear.
Given the lack of traditions in Bulgaria, and the lack of experience in
most European countries, in order to achieve its goal and provide for
additional guarantees to enhance transparency in the work of state
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institutions and to curb corruption, the draft needs to be substantially
improved and reflect the views of a wider range of experts, representatives
of the civil society, individuals and organizations that might be engaged
in lobbying.
l Civil control, legal and institutional framework of the non-governmental sector
The legal framework for the non-profit sector has developed more than
slowly: the Law on Not-for-Profit Legal Persons only came into effect on
January 1, 2001. While that law laid the legal foundation of a modern
non-profit sector in Bulgaria, it failed to address a number of issues
concerning the institutionalization and strengthening of anti-corruption
civi l  control,  the dialogue and interaction between non-profit
organizations and the state. Since the entry into force of the law, no steps
have been undertaken to improve the legislation, regardless of the
problems encountered in practice. Some of those problems are the lack
of clear criteria to distinguish between non-profit organizations depending
on their objectives and on how society assesses the relevance and
usefulness of those objectives, the complicated procedure for the
registration of non-profit public benefit entities and the complex
requirements they should meet.
In addition, no guarantees have been envisaged for a fully-fledged
implementation of the freedom of association, as enshrined in the
Constitution, and to avoid the risk that many profession-based non-profit
organizations might actually become monopolies strongly linked with the
corresponding state structures.
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C. JUDICIAL REFORM AND ITS ANTI-CORRUPTION
DIMENSION
The problems of corruption are most painfully mirrored in the assessment
and perception of the judicial system in the country. The major units and
bodies of that system are called upon to investigate corruption-related
crimes and to punish their perpetrators, so any failure to perform those
duties or to perform them in good time undermines the public confidence
in the judiciary. Public opinion polls in 2002 did not reveal any change in
the continuing negative attitude of different social groups towards the
judiciary and to the magistrates and officials working therein, or to the
legal professions as whole.
In addition to the prevail-
ing impunity of corrup-
tion, which is wide-spread
across all segments of the
society, the instances of
corruption inside the ju-
diciary itself have even
stronger demoralizing
effects as they undermine
the very idea of justice,
democracy and the rule of
law. Under the strong
pressure exerted by civil
society in Bulgaria and the
numerous critical assess-
ments of the Bulgarian ju-
dicial system (e.g. the
regular reports of the Eu-
ropean Commission
and other international
monitoring fora and in-
struments), the measures
aimed to reform the judi-
ciary have obtained a
clearer shape.
In the process of applying the Strategy for Reform of the Judiciary in Bulgaria,
in March 2002 a Program for the Implementation of the Strategy was approved,
whereas on July 18, 2002 the draft amendments to the Law on the Judiciary
proposed by the government were passed by the National Assembly (in
effect as of August 3, 2002). This was the thirteenth set of amendments (the
law itself was passed in 1994) passed in an attempt to find a more
comprehensive approach to the reform of the judiciary and to ensure
the attainment of its priorities. Many of the latest amendments were geared
FIGURE 14. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY*
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Source: SELDI, January 2002
(*) Note: The maximum value of the index is 10.0 indicating the highest possible level of
corruption. The minimum value is 0.0 indicating total absence of corruption.
Legend: AL - Albania; BIH - Bosnia and Herzegovina; BG - Bulgaria; MK - Macedonia;
RO - Romania; HR - Croatia; SERB - Serbia; MNTR - Montenegro.
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towards eradicating the prerequisites for corruption inside the judiciary.
Most of them, however, were labeled as falling outside the scope of the
existing Constitutional model and encroaching upon the independence of
the judiciary. During the preliminary discussions and after the passing of
the law, some of the major amendments provoked disagreement and
criticism by some judicial institutions and professional circles, and the
conformity of the new provisions with the Constitution was challenged by
the Supreme Court of Cassation.
By its Decision No. 13
of December 16,
2002, the Constitu-
tional Court declared
44 provisions of the
Law Amending and
Supplementing the Law
on the Judiciary anti-
constitutional. In other
words, new legislative
solutions will have to
be sought. The view
that the constitutional
model needs to be
modified in order to
achieve the main pri-
orities of the judicial
reform gains an ever
wider ground. To be
productive, the de-
bate about the judicial
reform should go be-
yond institutional con-
flicts and personal at-
tacks and scandals.
In addition to the
commitment of the
government to judicial
reform what is needed
is a consensus among
the political parties
about its philosophy,
goals and specif ic
stages. On the other
hand, a stronger and
more substantial par-
ticipation in the re-
form on behalf of the
judiciary itself is re-
quired as well. Other-
wise future amend-
ments to the Constitu-
tion with respect to
the judiciary would
not be feasible.
April Sept. January April Sept. January October January
1999 1999 2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002
Customs 8,78 9,10 9,02 9,10 8,90 8,96 9,06 8,95
Privatization 7,46 7,86 7,96 8,28 8,06 8,24 8,66 8,57
Agency
Judiciary 7,62 7,88 7,68 7,68 7,60 7,82 8,04 8,21
Tax administration 7,10 7,98 7,68 7,56 7,54 7,42 7,62 7,72
Industry line 6,94 7,40 7,24 7,44 7,50 7,56 7,12 7,34
ministries
Police 7,16 7,54 7,30 7,24 7,14 7,36 7,34 7,22
Parliament 6,78 7,16 6,96 7,24 7,42 7,46 6,78 7,18
Committee on 6,40 6,84 7,00 7,10 7,00 6,82 6,80 7,08
Energy
District governors 6,90 7,32 7,02 7,04 6,94 6,90 6,90 7,01
Commission for the 6,14 6,40 6,18 6,68 6,54 6,84 6,88 7,00
Protection of
Competition
Ministerial level 6,58 7,12 6,94 7,10 7,44 7,42 6,44 6,87
Municipal 6,64 7,24 6,82 6,74 6,54 6,54 6,58 6,73
administration
Securities and 6,24 6,28 6,22 6,50 6,46 6,48 6,40 6,73
Stock Exchanges
Commission
Bulgarian - - - 6,28 6,60 6,30 6,42 6,63
Telecommunications
Company
National Audit 5,74 5,86 5,54 5,84 5,98 5,82 5,72 6,07
Office
National Bank 5,34 5,32 5,34 5,16 5,72 5,48 5,24 5,49
Army 4,88 5,06 5,06 5,08 4,98 4,80 4,70 5,13
National 4,80 4,54 5,00 4,68 5,02 4,76 4,61 4,68
Statistical
Institute
President and 4,46 4,50 4,28 4,52 4,52 4,24 4,26 4,63
Presidents
administration
TABLE 3. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR*
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
(*) Note: The maximum value of the index is 10.0 indicating the highest possible level of
corruption. The minimum value is 0.0 indicating total absence of corruption.
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The lack of an overall concept for the reform and of consensus among
the separate branches of power and the different institutions of the
judiciary on the key priorities of the reform results in fragmentary and
inconsistent reform efforts or even attempts to block the reform. These
considerations formed the basis for the evaluation provided in the Regular
Report of the European Commission in 2002. In the view of the Commission,
despite the progress made towards reform, the judicial system remains
weak and there are almost no concrete changes in its functioning.
The acceleration and practical implementation of the judicial reform is a
conditio sine qua non to crack down on corruption, including that in the
judiciary. For that purpose, more comprehensive and swifter solutions
are required of a number of major issues:
l developing and harmonizing the anti-corruption legal instruments;
l achieving consistency between the organization (structure and
management) of the judiciary and the principles of the rule of law,
independence and stability, swiftness, accessibility, efficiency and
fairness of justice;
l reaffirming the status of magistrates on the basis of impeccable
professionalism and better staffing;
l improving the organization and work of the court administration, the
technical infrastructure and the funding of the judicial system.
The development and harmonization of the legal instruments needed to
resist corruption are a must for the success of the reform and for endow-
ing it with a coherent anti-corruption basis. In terms of harmonization,
there is a sharper need not only to align Bulgarian domestic legislation
with European and international standards but also to ensure its consis-
tency and conformity with Bulgarian legal traditions and the realities
in the country. The legal instruments passed or initiated are impressive
in number and volume but the legislative framework still lacks a consis-
tent conceptual basis. Oftentimes solutions are copied verbatim from
foreign legislative traditions, the recommendations given are taken on
board without any adjustment; models are adopted that go counter to
the legislation in force in the country. This is valid both for the acts of
parliament, that the bodies of the judiciary apply in the process of their
work, and for the legislative instruments directly intended to reform law
enforcement and the administration of justice.
The key place within the first group of anti-corruption legal instruments
is attributed to the provisions of substantive criminal law that directly
incriminate various corruption acts, to the rules of criminal procedure,
and to all rules of substantive and procedural civil law that might indi-
rectly affect the reasons for the spread of corruption and its suppression.
The second group includes the fundamental provisions of the Constitution
concerning the judiciary, and the rules of the Law on the Judiciary which
regulates the structure and the main principles of organization of the judiciary
as embedded in the Constitution (status of magistrates, powers of the Supreme
Judicial Council, relationship between the judiciary and the executive).
C.1. Developing
Anti-Corruption
Legal Instruments
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C.1.1.  Criminal Law and Procedure
Bulgarian criminal legislation contains no definition of the concept of
corruption. While this term is most frequently associated with bribery,
its real scope may be delineated by reference to the crimes connected
with the misuse of power and official position that entail the erosion
of statehood and the substitution of personal benefit for the public
interest. Therefore, the criminal law understanding of corruption should
include, along with bribery and trade in influence, also malfeasances and
other offences (e.g. embezzlement by public officials, document forgery,
mismanagement of public property, some tax offences) where those are
connected with or aim at disguising or concealing a corruption offence
stricto sensu.
The 2002 legislative amendments relating to the prosecution of corruption
extend the list of possible corruption-related crimes. Those amendments
formed part of the government anti-corruption strategy and of the program
for its implementation and match Bulgarias commitments under some
international anti-corruption instruments, including the Council of Europe
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption , the OECD Convention Against the
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The need for
such amendments had been highlighted already in the recommendations
of Coalition 2000 made in its Corruption Assessment Report 2001.
l Measures undertaken
On September 13, 2002, the National Assembly passed a Law Amending
and Supplementing the Criminal Code (amendments in effect as of October
1, 2002). The idea of the amendments was to improve the rules on
punishing bribery, embezzlement by public officials, documentary fraud,
organized crime, trafficking in human beings, terrorism and cybercrime.
The new rules reflect the aspiration to construct a modern legal framework
with sanctions for corruption crimes. For that purpose, the existing
elements of various crimes were refined (e.g. the scope of the corpus delicti
of bribery, the various forms of actus reus in the event of bribery, the type
and amount or duration of the penalties), new offences were added (trade
in influence) and the list of possible perpetrators of bribery was extended
(incriminating the bribes in the private sector, the bribery of arbitrators,
the passive bribery of foreign public officials and extending the concept
of a foreign public official).
The most substantial amendments that bear directly on the prevention
and prosecution of corruption, in line with international standards, could
be summarized as follows:
- Improving the fundamental elements of the criminal offences
known as active and passive bribery by providing legislative
coverage of all forms of actus reus and adequate penalties (making
and accepting a proposal for or promise of bribe, art. 301(1) and
art. 304(1));
- Including the intangible benefits in the corpus delicti of bribery.
This change brought to an end the misunderstanding that only a
material benefit could be used for bribery. This extension of bribery
is a positive step towards covering a wider range of corrupt practices;
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- Enlarging the con-
cept of foreign pub-
lic official  (art.
93(15)) and incrimi-
nating the passive
bribery of such offi-
cials, along with the
active bribery (art.
301(5)), in conformity
with the Council of
Europe Criminal Law
Convention on Corrup-
t ion .  This change
brought under the no-
tion of foreign public
officials also the indi-
viduals holding an of-
fice in international
parliamentary assem-
blies or international
courts;
- Extending the list
of special perpetra-
tors of bribery. Be-
sides public officials
and expert witnesses,
passive bribery is now
punishable when per-
petrated by arbitra-
tors  (art. 305(1)). A
special offence was
included to enable the
penalizing of attor-
neys-at-law who give
or accept undue ben-
efits in order to help a
specific case be re-
solved in favor of the
other party to the pro-
ceedings or to the det-
riment of their own
client (art. 305(1) and
(2)).
- Aggravated of-
fences are envisaged
for the active and pas-
sive bribery of judges,
public prosecutors,
investigators or ju-
rors (art. 302(1) and
art. 304a). The provi-
sions, though, do not include police investigators who are the com-
petent pre-trial authorities in a great number of criminal cases.
Relative share of responses
Almost everybody or most are involved (%)
January April Sept. January October January May October
2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002
Customs 77,0 78,6 75,2 74,3 77,3 74,2 70,8 79,2
officers
Judges 48,5 56,0 50,1 50,6 56,4 55,0 50,8 63,0
Prosecutors 46,3 54,4 51,3 50,7 54,8 55,4 51,0 63,0
Lawyers 54,8 51,9 52,9 50,3 55,0 55,5 52,5 62,3
Police 51,9 50,5 54,3 51,0 53,7 47,0 50,7 59,6
officers
Tax 53,9 51,0 53,7 47,3 51,6 51,2 41,9 58,0
officials
Criminal investigators 41,0 48,0 43,8 43,5 48,4 48,0 43,1 57,5
Members of 45,0 55,1 51,7 52,6 43,5 47,8 39,2 56,2
Parliament
Doctors 42,5 40,9 43,6 27,0 46,8 45,7 52,3 54,9
Political party 37,5 45,0 43,8 39,1 40,8 43,0 33,0 54,0
 and coalition
leaders
Ministers 45,3 53,4 55,0 52,3 41,2 45,4 35,6 50,8
Municipal 45,0 46,5 41,6 35,9 39,6 39,4 30,0 49,1
officials
Business people 48,5 51,4 42,3 43,6 42,2 41,6 41,4 48,9
Ministry 47,9 55,1 49,7 43,9 45,8 47,1 36,7 48,3
officials
Mayors and 32,5 35,2 32,1 30,9 26,3 31,8 23,4 48,3*
Municipal
Council members
Administrative 42,0 45,2 40,2 36,8 41,7 41,1 36,5 45,0
officials in the
 judicial system
Bankers 20,9 38,8 33,5 35,6 32,5 31,7 29,5 37,2
University 29,4 29,3 28,1 21,6 27,4 27,7 29,8 33,4**
professors or 23,1**
officials
Representatives of 16,2 18,2 23,9 18,2 19,8 21,8 15,3 21,4
non-governmental
organizations
Journalists 10,6 14,1 13,9 11,3 10,5 12,2 9,5 15,3
Teachers 9,5 8,2 10,9 5,8 9,3 9,7 9,8 13,9
TABLE 4. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY OCCUPATION (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000.
* Assessment of Mayors and municipal councilors have been merged since October 2002
** Since October 2002 the spread of corruption assessments have been split for Univer-
sity professors and University officials.
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- Circumstances under which active bribery would not be criminal
were limited (art. 306). With the new amendments, criminality can
only be withheld if two conditions are met simultaneously: the
perpetrator of active bribery should have been blackmailed by the
public official and the perpetrator should have immediately and
voluntarily notified the authorities of the bribe given.
- Introducing fines as penalties in cases of bribery (in addition to
imprisonment). This has to do with the self-interest involved in that
crime which is in fact an illegal transaction.
- Incriminating bribery in the private sector. The new provision
inserted in Chapter Six, Crimes against the Economy, of the
Special Part of the Criminal Code (art. 225c) now provides a basis
for the prosecution of passive and active bribery in the private
sector. Passive bribery is defined as requesting or accepting an
undue gift or another benefit or proposal for or promise of such a
gift or benefit in order for an act to be performed or omitted in
violation of the duties of the perpetrator in the course of business
operations. Active bribery in the private sector means giving,
offering or promising a gift or another benefit to persons engaging
in business operations so that they would break their duties. Acting
as an intermediary for giving or accepting a bribe in the private
sector is also punishable.
The criminalization of bribery in the private sector has ensued from the
fact that so far the Criminal Code could not be adequately applied to bribery
in the economy. Placing anti-bribery rules in the chapter Crimes against
state authorities and public organizations suggested that the rules are
inapplicable to the giving or acceptance of undue gifts or benefits to or
by someone involved in business operations. It was thus made impossible
to suppress corruption in the private sector, including the field of public
procurement. Hence, the creation of a legal framework to combat
bribery in the private sphere is crucial.
- Incriminating trade in influence. The Criminal Code now covers
for the first time the trade in influence. This exists in Bulgaria and is
based on a tri-partite corruption relationship where a person having
a real or supposed influence on a public official trades in that
influence in return for a benefit from someone seeking such
influence. The new rule makes punishable the request, acceptance,
giving or promise of an undue benefit for the purpose of influencing
a public official in relation to his or her office, and the giving,
promising or offering of an undue benefit to a person claiming that
he or she could influence public officials so as to conduce them to
have a specific behavior in the context of their office (art. 304b).
- Introducing a special regime for the embezzlement of EU funds,
along the standards of the Convention on the Protection of the Financial
Interests of the European Communities. The amendments introduced
two aggravated offences - embezzlement by a public official where
the moneys misappropriated are from funds of the European Union
or have been provided to Bulgaria by the European Union (art.
202(2), point 3) and document forgery where the property obtained
is derived from such funds (art. 212(3)). Thus, heavier penalties are
envisaged for a most dangerous corrupt practice, viz.
misappropriation of European funds - a problem frequently raised
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by the European Commission in relation to moneys allocated from
EU funds. The measure is not only intended to sanction this serious
form of embezzlement by public officials but has also come in
response to an important international commitment undertaken
by Bulgaria.
l Corruption and the problems of global security
An important portion of the amendments to the Criminal Code concern
areas which, in the context of the globalization of security concerns,
pertain to combating corruption - terrorism, organized crime, trafficking
in human beings and drugs, cybercrime. The perpetration of those
offences often involves corruption or the offences themselves facilitate
various forms of corrupt behavior.
l Terrorism and organized crime
The possible link between organized crime and terrorism, on the one
hand, and corruption, on the other, attracts increased attention. On the
one hand, criminal groups and terrorists use corruption as a vehicle to
influence the activity of government and, hence, the economic and
political stability of states. On the other hand, corruption fosters poverty
and instability and is one of the reasons for the existence of political and
religious extremism that fuels terrorism.
To pursue their criminal business, crime syndicates in the country apply
corruption schemes as regards the structures of power, including law
enforcement authorities. By assisting criminal operations, corrupt civil
servants in turn get involved in organized crime.
The combination between transborder crime and corruption is
particularly dangerous as it underlies the existing illegal trafficking routes
across the country that could be used, inter alia, for the infiltration of
terrorists. After September 11, greater attention is devoted to the link
between drugs trafficking, money laundering and terrorist acts. As Bulgaria
is on the so-called Balkan drugs way, it is especially vulnerable to
trafficking from Asia and the Middle East.
Corruption of Bulgarian public officials could thus turn into a problem of
international security. This was evident in the case of the illegal export of
goods with possible dual use from a factory of the state owned Terem
company in Targovishte where civil servants were suspected in concluding
a criminal transaction in arms destined ultimately for an embargoed country.
The amendments to the Criminal Code added special provisions with respect
to terrorism and the financing of terrorism (art. 108a), in line with the
anti-corruption instruments of the European Union, the UN Convention
against the Financing of Terrorism, and the relevant Resolutions of the UN
Security Council. Besides, the amendments to the Criminal Code provide
for prosecuting the establishment, management of and participation in a
terrorist group; the preparation of terrorist acts, and the threat to carry out
such acts. Confiscation is envisaged of the property, or of a part thereof,
belonging to the perpetrators of terrorist acts and to the persons funding
their operations. With such a harmonized legal basis Bulgaria is able to be
actively involved in anti-terrorist actions around the globe.
In addition, in June 2002 the government presented to the National
Assembly a Draft Law on Measures against Financing of Terrorism (draft
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prepared by the Ministry of Interior). The draft lists measures to combat
the funding of terrorism, sets out the organization for and control of their
application, and lists the administrative sanctions for failure to implement
those measures. The bill was drafted in line with Resolution 1373 (2001) of
the UN Security Council and with due consideration of Council Regulation
(EC) No. 2580/2001 of December 27, 2001 on the specific restrictive anti-
terrorist measures against some individuals and legal persons.
While the fact of the draft law has to be welcomed, as it forms an integral
part of the efforts of Bulgaria to actively contribute to preventing and
suppressing any forms of terrorist activity, a number of critical remarks
would be appropriate as well. Firstly, the specific measures should be
better defined (freezing sums of moneys, financial assets and property of
the natural and legal persons placed on a special list; prohibition to
provide sums of money, financial assets and financial services to those
individuals and entities; proclaiming invalid the transactions and the
operations carried out with frozen sums of money, financial assets and
property of persons on the list and the provision of money and financial
services to those persons).
Legal guarantees are needed to avoid any possible abuse of power by the
authorities, and any interference with the rights of individuals and
organizations, in the event of an automatic freezing of the assets and
property of persons who are parties to criminal proceedings but had not
been convicted. Thus the mechanism could be also used in favor of private
economic interests. Given the slow pace at which a criminal procedure
develops, the provisions of the draft law, if not further specified, may
inflict irreparable damage to some individuals, organizations or entire
economic groups. Unclear legal rules on the actions to be undertaken by
the state authorities and the lack of swift and efficient control of their
steps may well nurture corruption and the exertion of pressure on persons
that are in the money.
Criticism is also invited by the possibility for any person to file information
with the Minister of Interior without any restriction in terms of official,
banking or trade secrecy, without being bound by liability of violation
of other laws. Moreover, the application of the law could be frustrated
if there are no rules to ensure the anonymity of the reporting individual
or institution. Hence, the controversial texts should be rephrased and
made consistent with the laws in force in the country and with the
principles of the rule of law.
As regards the need to pass adequate legislation on the prosecution of
organized crime, it is worth mentioning that the Criminal Code now defines
the concept of organized crime syndicate (art. 93(2)). The legal definition
of organized crime is in line with the EU Joint Actions of 1998 for incriminating
the participation in a crime syndicate in the Member States of the European
Union, and with the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(ratified by Bulgaria). This is also true of the amendments that provide for
criminal repression in the event of setting up, managing and participating
in an organized crime syndicate (art. 321).
l Trafficking in human beings
In 2002, Bulgarian criminal law was brought in conformity with the
standards of the Protocol concerning the trafficking in human beings, especially
women and children that complements the UN Convention on Transnational
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Organized Crime (both instruments were ratified by Bulgaria) and the EU
Joint Actions of 1997 against the trafficking in human beings and the sexual
exploitation of children. As a result, a new section, Trafficking in Human
Beings, was inserted in the Criminal Code. The National Assembly passed
at first reading a Draft Law against the Illegal Trafficking in Human Beings
that aims to prevent the trafficking in human beings and ensure assistance
to victims. The draft corresponds to the latest international and European
acts and instruments. The adoption of that new law and its enforcement
would help provide better protection and assistance to the victims of
illegal trafficking and improve the co-operation between the central and
municipal authorities, on the one hand, and the NGOs, on the other
hand, so that a nation-wide policy could be developed in this area.
l Cybercrime
The wide access to and use of information technologies in various spheres
of public life has entailed the use of such technologies for the purpose of
corrupt practices. Computer crimes increasingly become a prerequisite
for or the result of various corrupt acts. The adoption of relevant criminal
provisions and their effective enforcement would bring down the general
level of corruption.
An important segment of the amendments to the Criminal Code concern
the incrimination of violations of the global access to computer
information data or to the use of information systems and services.
Therefore, definitions were introduced in the criminal law in line with
the European Convention on Cybercrime (soon to be ratified by Bulgaria)
and a new chapter, Computer Crime, was added. It contains rules on
the criminal prosecution of various acts against the security, inviolability
and proper operation of computer systems and computer information.
l Required legislative amendments
The amendments to the Criminal Code made in 2002 are a serious step
towards bringing the Bulgarian criminal law into line with international
standards, both in terms of the range of incriminated corruption offences
and in terms of the type and amount or duration of the penalties envisaged
for the perpetrators. Regardless of the numerous changes, however, a
number of issues should be addressed as they still need to be regulated:
- The clarification of the concept of public official is still a topical
issue, as the current definition also covers some persons in the
private sector.
- Police investigators should be urgently added to the category of
individuals considered to occupy responsible official positions,
so that they could held liable in that capacity.
- The title of the section Bribery in the Criminal Code should be
modified as it now covers both bribery and trade in influence.
- The expanded scope of the subject of bribery should go hand in
hand with an accurate and unambiguous definition of the term
benefit that should exclude any doubt that criminal repression is
unduly intensified. The new approach to the corpus delicti of bribery
also entails a new formulation of art. 307a. It should be specified
that the corpus delicti of bribery is forfeited for the state where the
benefit is material.
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In addition to the current penalties, fines should be introduced not only
for bribery but for a number of other malfeasances motivated by self-
interest as they may also be corruption acts in their nature.
The existing rules on corruption offences in the Criminal Code largely meet
modern standards. Thereafter, a decisive will is needed to implement
the new criminal legislation and to enhance the capacity of law
enforcement and the courts to combat corruption. For that purpose,
training programs for police officers and magistrates should be introduced.
Adequate interpretation of the new rules by the courts is especially
important for their enforcement, as is the co-ordination between court
caselaw and the explanatory reports to the relevant international
instruments.
C.1.2. The Role of Criminal Procedure in Combating Corruption
The existing procedural difficulties and obstacles in the process of
investigation and prosecution of any crime, and corruption in particular,
require relevant amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure to enhance
the efficiency of criminal proceedings and ensure the timely defense of
the prosecutorial interest of the state.
Although no such amendments were made in 2002, in November the
government prepared and presented to the National Assembly draft
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The draft suggested the
following important changes:
- Provisions to accelerate the development and closure of criminal
cases (reducing the number of cases remitted by the courts to the
public prosecution, changing the rules on the appeals against
warrants of public prosecutors to discontinue the proceedings, etc.)
in order to improve the combat against crime and corruption in
the criminal process.
- Reinstatement of the rules on police investigation (that were in
force in the beginning of 2000) free from the redundant
procedural formality of the amendments made in 2001. This
legislative approach should enhance the swiftness, the operational
capacity and the good results of police investigation.
- Reinstatement of the rules on plea bargaining. This new institute
had been successfully introduced in Bulgarian law in the beginning
of 2000 and later became a flexible tool to speed up criminal
prosecution and to resist corruption.
- Introduction of the so-called private-public proceedings in order
to free the courts, the prosecutors and the investigating authorities
from some of their workload. Such proceedings existed in Bulgarian
law at the end of the 19th century and many European countries
are familiar with them. The term is used to denote a procedure
that develops based on a bill of indictment but can only start
following a request by the victim.
- The defendant will be able, after a period of time substantially
exceeding the maximum term of investigation, to request the
court to hear his or her case on its merits (new art. 239a). Hence,
a statutory mechanism will exist to prevent corruption in the
judiciary. Defendants are subjected to numerous restrictions -
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measures for non-absconding, other forms of procedural coercion,
etc., and the law should enable them to seek the timely hearing
and resolving of their cases by the court. The proposed rule should
serve as an incentive for the public prosecution to finalize the pre-
trial stage on time, within the statutory time limits, and should
reduce the opportunities for lengthy investigations in contravention
of the law as a method to exert corrupt pressure on the defendants.
The draft presented by the government triggered contradictory reactions
among the magistrates. According to some opinions, the future
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure should ensure time limits
for investigation, submitting the bill of indictment to the court and
finalizing the court stage, coupled with strict personal liability for failure
to observe the deadlines. They should also limit the instances of remitting
cases for additional investigation (remittance by prosecutor to investigator
or by court to prosecutor) and a simplified procedure should be made
available to arrest suspects and accused having committed serious
offences. The Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation, in turn, believe
the proposed new rules in the Code of Criminal Procedure would not
contribute to speeding up criminal prosecution but would rather affect
adversely the work of the prosecution offices. Some representatives of
the Supreme Prosecution believe the legislation should guarantee the
key role of public prosecution at the pre-trial stage and ensure better co-
ordination among public prosecutors, investigators, policemen and experts
in various areas to collect fit evidence.
The diverse views about and the contradictory reactions to the draft, as it
stands now, solicit an in-depth discussion on all proposals, including
that to elaborate a brand new Code of Criminal Procedure.
C.1.3. Civil and Administrative Substantive Law and Procedure
The reforms of civil and administrative law and procedure could
significantly foster the prevention of corruption in the administration of
justice. In that sphere, however, appropriate legislative solutions are still
being sought, whereas the enforcement of the existing legislation has not
exhibited ostensibly its anti-corruption potential.
l Measures undertaken
The amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure (in force as of November
11, 2002) brought about a number of rules intended to improve civil
proceedings, primarily in terms of accelerating the procedure and ensuring
procedural economy of time and effort, to make the administration of
justice more efficient and shrink the chances for corruption as a result
of the lack of reliable protection in the case of slow and inefficient
procedure:
- Chapter 12a of the Code was amended by extending the list of
cases that may be handled in summary proceedings. Similarly,
now more cases are not subject to appeal before the Supreme Court
of Cassation in order to prevent that court from being overloaded
with petty cases and to speed up their resolving. Differentiated
criteria have been introduced for the quantum of the claim
depending on the type of case (civil or commercial).
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- A new ground for cassation appeals was added, viz. unjustified
judgment, thus providing stronger guarantees against incorrect
judgments made by lower court instances.
- The Supreme Court of Cassation now has fewer opportunities to
remit cases back to the court of appeal. This should stop the endless
circulation of cases between those two tiers of the system. If the
second judgment is appealed against, the Supreme Court of
Cassation shall decide the case on its merits.
- Considerable amendments were made to the execution
proceedings. This is a corruption-friendly area that had remained
almost unreformed over the past 13 years. The court of appeal can
now issue a writ of execution based on a judgment subject to interim
enforcement. A new ground for execution was added - the excerpts
from the Central Pledge Register; that would extend the chances
of companies to finalize more quickly the process of enforcement.
Appeals against the steps taken by the bailiff were streamlined as
they are now only possible before one instance (the district courts)
and the court has to pronounce on the appeal within 30 days. There
are more detailed rules on the public sale of movables and real
estate. Detailed provisions will govern the execution against
securities, including dematerialized ones, and against stakes and
interests in commercial companies. This also creates better
opportunities for a swift procedure and for the efficient protection
of the interests of creditors.
The intention is that the latest amendments should speed up and improve
civil proceedings and the execution proceedings in particular, and better
protect the interests of the parties, thus helping confine corruption in
the administration of justice in civil cases. At the same time, people
could be a bit skeptical in their expectations, as the amendments are to
be implemented by unreformed courts which work with very few judges,
all of them overloaded, most of them lacking a solid professional
background, without enough court rooms and equipment, with scarce
budget and along with the painful issue of the security of court buildings
and access thereto. In addition, the chances of parties to procrastinate
the cases, including through corrupt means, have not been fully
eradicated.
The Draft Law on the Forfeiture to the State of Any Property Acquired by Criminal
Activity prepared by the Ministry of Interior gave rise to heated debates.
Two key measures suggested in the draft are noteworthy:
- A complementary financial sanction is introduced in addition to,
and independently of criminal liability. Any asset worth at least
30,000 levs that has been acquired directly or indirectly through
criminal acts (terrorism, drugs trafficking, smuggling, money
laundering, trafficking in human beings, bribery and fraud) shall be
forfeited in favor of the state, provided that the acquisition should
not be returned to the victim.
- A summary procedure (the so-called special proceedings) is
envisaged for freezing and seizure in view of future forfeiture. The
proceedings start on the initiative of a district prosecutor or on the
basis of information notified by the bodies of the Ministry of Interior
or the Ministry of Finance. The proposal of the public prosecutor
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should be published in the State Gazette before the court has
formed an opinion on whether on not a given criminal activity and
an acquisition are necessarily linked.
The following proposals of the draft leave room for criticism:
- The obligation to apply summary proceedings not only when
criminal proceedings have been instituted for the above-listed
offences but also when sufficient data exist that an asset has been
acquired directly or indirectly from criminal activity connected with
other offences, but which cannot be forfeited for the state by virtue
of the Criminal Code.
- Those proceedings would be applicable to third parties as well, i.e.
those who acquired the property seized, unless the asset was
acquired for consideration and the third party acted in good faith.
- The retroactive effect of the law and the rules on the burden of
proof.
Although the draft provides for a mechanism to quickly forfeit and freeze
assets obtained from criminal activities and may enhance the efficiency
of the combat against crime, it does not provide any guarantee against
the possible illegal use of the measures to favor unlawful economic or
political interests. Indeed, the intended effect of the law could turn into
its opposite - instead of preventing and sanctioning corruption, it may
well nurture it.
The public opinion poll and the evaluation made in the course of the
public debates on the draft law have revealed the high percentage (nearly
90 per cent of the interviewees) of approval and support for the measures
proposed. The explanation could be attributed to the public awareness
of the need for stricter and quick measures against expanding crime. At
the same time, despite the large-scale approval of the draft law and the
understanding about its positive potential to improve the business climate,
there is still a high percentage of respondents who tend to see a lot of
possibilities for abuse.
l Forthcoming and indis-
pensable amendments
- codifying adminis-
trative procedure
A number of steps were
taken in 2002 to limit the
possibility to circumvent
the laws while resorting
to corrupt means. In or-
der to introduce uniform
criteria, procedures and
control in the existing
rules on administrative
procedure by way of its
codification, a thorough
review was made of the
system of administra-
tive justice in Bulgaria. The resulting Interim Report contains data about
the nature and volume of cases in the pipeline, and the number of ad-
FIGURE 15. POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE WHILE IMPLEMENTING
THE ASSET FORFEITURE LAW (%)
Source: Vitosha Research, September 2002
The law can be easily abused of
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ministrative acts issued and appealed against under the Law on Adminis-
trative Proceedings or in some special procedures. To arrive at an efficient
and modern system of administrative justice, it is recommended to con-
solidate the judicial review proceedings by enacting a single Administra-
tive Code (a recommendation also made by Coalition 2000 in its previous
Corruption Assessment Reports) and complement it with a set of admin-
istrative courts with special jurisdiction. The system of administrative jus-
tice should be rearranged from beginning to end in order to protect the
rights of citizens against infringements by the administration and to put
in place a framework for external review that should improve the work of
the administration.
The proposals to set up courts of special jurisdiction follow the same
logic. The operation of specialized administrative and commercial
courts may be of key importance for the efficient functioning of the central
and local authorities and also resist corruption in the administration.
According to these proposals, specialization would result in improvement,
swiftness and good organization of administrative justice, the consolidation
of case-law and the reception of international and European standards.
- corporate administrative liability
After the amendments to the Criminal Code were enacted, the most serious
deficiency in terms of penalizing corruption is the lack of rules on
corporate administrative liability for corruption crimes that the heads
of legal entities commit in the interest of the respective entity. The
introduction of this type of liability (given the theoretical obstacles to
introducing corporate criminal liability and the inapplicability of the law
of torts to engage civil liability in the event of corruption) remains the
sole way to sanction corporate corruption. The need for quick legislative
steps along these lines stems from the commitments under some anti-
corruption conventions ratified by Bulgaria (OECD Convention, Council of
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption) and from the duty to bring
Bulgarian law in line with the EU acquis communautaire. Bulgaria has been
urged to do so by the European Commission (see the Regular Report on
Bulgarias progress towards accession, 2001), the Council of Europe (the
GRECO report 2002) and the OECD (evaluation of the Corruption Task
Force of 1999).
Although the government has included the relevant task in the Program
for the Implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy , no
amendments to the Law on Administrative Offences and Penalties have been
put forward yet to envisage financial sanctions for legal entities on account
of criminal offences committed by their managers.
- commercial law
Previous amendments to the legal rules on commercial insolvency have
not entailed any acceleration of the insolvency proceedings. The number
of long pending insolvency cases and of new insolvency proceedings
remains too large. The substantive and procedural rules on insolvency
should be changed so as to limit the conditions for seeking quicker and
more appropriate court orders and judgments by way of corrupt practices.
The Draft Law Amending and Supplementing the Commercial Law, submitted
to the National Assembly in December 2002, has rules to accelerate the
insolvency proceedings and makes some proposals with respect to
corporate governance (enhancing the legal guarantees for the participation
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of minority shareholders of general meetings of shareholders, management
and supervision in joint-stock ventures, and rules to avoid conflicts of
interests), so as to restrict the possibilities for abuse and increase
transparency. Changes in this area are especially important for the
development of corruption-free commercial and business operations in
the country, but any such changes should be carefully thought over and
discussed with all stakeholders. That would help arrive at rules meeting
practical needs and evade the turbulence of frequent changes generating
instability and insecurity.
Although the review of the legislation that forms the legal basis for the
anti-corruption operation of the judicial system in 2002 showed some
clear progress, the pace and the quality of changes as a whole remain
unsatisfactory. The same finding applies to all legislative instruments
forming the general legal environment for handling corruption, in
particular those that regulate the work of the administration and the
business environment. This is further illustrated by public opinion polls -
according to the public, in 2002 the deficiencies in the existing legislation
were an important factor that, in addition to inefficient law enforcement,
contributed to the wide spread of corruption.
The reforms of the judiciary that concern the structure, governance and
principles on which it is based and operates have not resulted in an
efficient model of law enforcement and administration of justice despite
their key role in successfully counteracting corruption. Since the beginning
of 2002 the search for new solutions in that respect has been persistently
linked to the idea to amend the Constitution. Decision No. 13 of the
Constitutional Court delivered at the end of 2002 (see above) has only
reiterated that perception. As the debate for constitutional amendments
would still have to go through a long process of finding generally
acceptable solutions, at least two points should be kept in mind: firstly,
the existing constitutional model has not been completely exhausted yet
and, up until any amendments are passed, it still enables a good deal of
stronger anti-corruption measures; and, secondly, the anti-corruption
potential of many of the latest amendments to the Law on the Judiciary
that were declared anti-constitutional should be reproduced in new legal
provisions, while duly taking into consideration the decision delivered
by the Constitutional Court and its reasons.
C.2.1. Governance
The result of the implementation of anti-corruption legislation and
measures within the judiciary depend on the improvement of the
administrative management and on the model of interaction and
distinguishing between the judiciary and the executive.
The amendments to the Law on the Judiciary established the requirement
to set up a reporting system within courts, public prosecution offices
and investigation services, adopting codes of ethics for magistrates
and employees in the judicial system, etc. By Decision No. 13 of 2002,
the Constitutional Court declared anti-constitutional the provision obliging
the Minister of Justice to draft an annual consolidated report on the
work of the bodies of the judiciary (on the basis of the annual reports
and statistical information submitted by the courts, the public prosecution
C.2. Organization
(Structure and
Governance) of
the Judiciary. Its
Role in Combating
Corruption
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and the investigation services) and to present it to the National Assembly
after discussion at the Supreme Judicial Council. This requires an
appropriate solution for introducing an accounting system, which is in
compliance with the constitutional principle on the mutual checks and
balances in the operation of the three branches of power, without affecting
the independence of the authorities administering justice.
Likewise, the attempt to redefine the powers of the Supreme Judicial
Council as a body governing and representing the judiciary, and the
powers of the executive as represented by the Minister of Justice gave
rise to serious debates, and even to accusations that the government would
interfere with the judiciary. The recommendations for the institution-
building of the Supreme Judicial Council set out in the Corruption
Assessment Report 2001 are still valid. A number of measures are directly
related to the fight against internal corruption and to the new powers of
the Supreme Judicial  Council:  introduce wider openness and
transparency in the work of the Supreme Judicial Council, develop its
capacity to set standards for the timely and good work of the different
elements of the judiciary, the disciplinary proceedings against
magistrates, the building up of an information control and co-ordination
system, the reinforcement of the administrative and managerial
capacity.
It is quite necessary to free the relations of the judiciary with the National
Assembly and the government from any political influence. Solving that
issue also forms part of the constitutional problems about the composition
of the Supreme Judicial Council and the structure of the judiciary. The
recommendation that the work of the judiciary and its units should be
more transparent remains unchanged.
C.2.2. The Role of the Court, the Public Prosecution and the
Investigation in Combating Corruption
The improvement of the structure of the judiciary and the interaction
among its major components are very important for the successful
investigation, detection and prosecution of corruption. Finding a
solution to this problem should take into account the specificity of the
anti-corruption measures at different structural units. Under the
Constitution present, the judiciary consists of the courts, the investigation
and the public prosecution. This is in fact the hottest issue: should the
public prosecution and the investigation remain within the judiciary, or
should the public prosecution move to the executive and the investigation
to either the public prosecution or the Ministry of Interior. The cons
derive from the different functions of the current three branches of the
judiciary and are based on the concept of judiciary which traditionally
comprises only the courts. The pros stem from the risk of the public
prosecution becoming politically dependent if it became part of the
government. As regards the proper location of the investigation services,
account should also be taken of the need to have guarantees for
independence and the need for eff icient interaction with law
enforcement. In historical aspect, the currently criticized constitutional
model, that was chosen in 1991, resulted from an aspiration to guarantee
the widest possible independence of the public prosecution and the
investigation, given the negative experience with their full subordination
and politicization in the former totalitarian state.
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The general structure of
the judiciary cannot be
changed unless the Con-
stitution is amended.
However, the Constitu-
tion does not provide for
any detailed rules on the
public prosecution and
the investigation. It is thus
possible to amend the
Law on the Judiciary and
find solutions that would
entail wider accountabil-
ity, independence of po-
litical turmoil, better
transparency and interac-
tion. The lack of compul-
sory international or Eu-
ropean standards about
the way in which a judi-
cial power should be
structured means that a
good solution could be
found to match the Bul-
garian conditions.
The problems of the investigation and the public prosecution in the
context of the anti-corruption dimensions of judicial reform deserve a
special emphasis not only because they currently form part of the judiciary
on an equal footing with the court. The key reason is that, due to the
nature of their functions, their work is and is supposed to be - much less
public and open. Therefore, in addition to the general anti-corruption
measures, specific anti-corruption guarantees are necessary for those
bodies. Moreover, their work directly reflects on the way in which courts
administer justice.
l The public prosecution
The need to undertake reforms with respect to the public prosecution
and inside the public prosecution has remained a topical issue in 2002.
The amendments to the Law on the Judiciary put the regional, district and
appellate prosecutors under an obligation to compile and submit to the
Inspectorate with the Ministry of Justice information about the opening
and movement of cases (art. 115(3)), whereas the Prosecutor General
has to draft an annual report on the work of the public prosecution and
submit it to the Minister of Justice for inclusion in the annual report on
the work of the judicial system (art. 114(6)). The previous restriction that
prevented the Inspectorate with the Minister of Justice from scrutinizing
the activities of the Prosecutor General, the Supreme Prosecution Office
of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Prosecution Office was
abolished. As those amendments were declared anti-constitutional, the
need for well-thought guarantees for transparency and accountability
in the work of the public prosecution remains.
FIGURE 16. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG JUDGES*
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000, October 2002; SELDI, January 2002
(*) Note: The maximum value of the index is 10.0 indicating the highest possible level of
corruption. The minimum value is 0.0 indicating total absence of corruption.
Legend: AL - Albania; BIH - Bosnia and Herzegovina; BG - Bulgaria; MK - Macedonia;
RO - Romania; HR - Croatia; SERB - Serbia; MNTR - Montenegro.
Bulgaria, October 02Southeast Europe,
January 02
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Given that public pros-
ecution has a uniform
and centralized struc-
ture, every prosecutor is
subordinate to his or her
superior and all prosecu-
tors are subordinate to
the Prosecutor General.
The Supreme Prosecu-
tion Office of Cassation
insists that the existing
hierarchical structure
and governance should
be preserved, the reason
being that these features
guarantee the uniform
application of the Consti-
tution and the laws
throughout the country
and protect prosecutors
at the local level from
political or other influence incompatible with the interests of criminal
justice. This approach is criticized for offering no mechanism for account-
ability of the Prosecutor General and no legally formulated forms of sub-
ordination as well as for the existing practice of orders of superior pros-
ecutors to be given orally without being documented, which creates op-
portunities for informal pressure inside the public prosecution system.
The need for a mechanism that guarantees the accountability and
responsibility of the Prosecutor General has been better articulated over
time, albeit divergent views as to whether the Prosecutor General should
report to the National Assembly or the Supreme Judicial Council or the
Ministry of Justice, or if it would be appropriate to oblige the Prosecutor
General to answer parliamentary questions. While these issues relate to
the possible changes in the structure of the judiciary as set out in the
Constitution, some of them could also be solved within the framework of
the existing model and should not be delayed. The public prosecution
concentrates a tremendous volume of information and power resources,
so the measures of self-control appear insufficient to ensure the lack
of abuse, nor is it sufficient for the steps to make it more transparent to
be solely initiated by the prosecution. Regardless of the place of the public
prosecution in the system of state authorities, statutory and institutional
guarantees are necessary for independence, transparency and
accountability.
A series of anti-corruption measures were undertaken inside the public
prosecution. Three specialized investigation units were set up within
the Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation: on malfeasances and
corruption, on organized crime, and on economic crime and money
laundering. The measure is aimed at improving the methodological
guidance and increasing the effectiveness of the investigation of this group
of offences.
The Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation has launched special
monitoring of all corruption-related crimes. As regards the most typical
of all corruption offences - bribery - the district and appellate prosecution
FIGURE 17. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG PROSECUTORS
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000, October 2002; SELDI, January 2002
Bulgaria, October 02Southeast Europe,
January 02
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offices collect and summarize information and provide it on a monthly
basis to the Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation which, in turn,
consolidates all data and proposes specific measures to accelerate the
investigation of cases. In addition, information is regularly gathered on
other corruption-related crimes as well, e.g. in banking and in the
privatization area.
A special unit has also been set up composed by prosecutors from the
Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation with the main task to receive,
assign and investigate any complaint of corruption that citizens have
submitted to the office. However, the required steps have not been
undertaken to make the citizenry aware of that opportunity. The public
is not familiar with the working procedures of that unit, nor with the
duties and responsibilities of the prosecutors working there.
According to the data of the Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation,
from January 1 1999 to July 31, 2002, 910 individuals were sentenced for
corrupt practices. Of them, 80 were sentenced for taking bribes, as follows:
twenty in 1999, twenty-five in 2000, twenty-five in 2001, and ten in the
first half of 2002. At present, there are reportedly 601 pre-trial proceedings
against persons having committed corruption offences. Despite the lack
of a single information system and of a uniform approach to the number
and type of crimes referred to as corruption-related, the statistical data
give some idea about the volume and the results of the work of the
judiciary. There are, however, no data about the discontinued and
pending proceedings. There is no information about corruption offences
committed by magistrates either.
In view of improving the organization of public prosecution and enhance its
role in combating corruption, it is recommended to study and analyze the
foreign experience of setting up special structures to investigate serious
Period Provision of Criminal Code Penalties Imposed Executed Penalties
201- 219 220 224 228 257 282- 289 301- Effective Conditional Penalty Others Effective Others
205 para 285 307à imprisonment sentencing imprisonment
1
1999 89 10 1 0 0 0 10 0 20 11 80 37 2 11 2
2000 210 8 2 0 1 1 32 0 25 15 161 99 4 15 2
2001 222 21 2 0 0 1 36 0 22 17 146 126 13 19* 8
January - 153 3 1 0 2 4 21 0 14 19 105 72 2 19 1
July 31
2002
Total 674 42 6 0 3 6 99 0 81 62 492 334 21 64* 13
Acquittals 1999 to July 31 2002 106
Defendants in pending, 1999 to July 31 2002 601
TABLE 5. OFFENDERS WITH SENTENCES THAT HAVE COME INTO
EFFECT IN CORRUPTION-RELATED CASES 1999 - JULY 31 2002
Source: Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation (based on data supplied by district prosecution offices)
* One person is wanted for the execution of the penalty
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instances of corruption. Especially interesting along these lines is the National
Anti-Mafia Directorate founded in 1992 in Italy as a central authority in charge
of coordinating the investigation and prosecution of organized crime. In
response to some corruption-related scandals in Spain, in 1995 a special
prosecution was set up there within the general prosecution service in order
to investigate corruption-related economic crimes. The office started its
operations in 1996 and brings together the efforts of public prosecutors, tax
inspectors, policemen. That combination of diverse skills and the specialized
training of the members of the unit make them very flexible in the investigation
of corruption crimes. The work of the office is also appreciated as it provides
a better ground for the investigation of corruption offences than ordinary
prosecution offices at the local, provincial or regional level could provide.
Recently a separate structure was also set up in Romania, viz. the Anti-
Corruption Prosecution. It forms part of the national prosecution service which
is subordinate to the executive. Given the dynamics of corruption-related
crime in Bulgaria, the question of whether a new unit could be set up inside
the public prosecution and be vested with powers to specifically combat
corruption deserves to be discussed.
l The investigation
The amendments to the Law on the Judiciary changed yet again the structure
of investigation in Bulgaria. The National Investigation Service was
restored (it had existed until 1998) as a body managing the other
investigation services from an administrative and financial point of view
and providing them with methodological assistance. According to the
amendments, the National Investigation Service should have specialized
departments for the investigation of cases that are particularly complex
and of crimes committed abroad. The Director of the National
Investigation Service is given the power to coordinate the investigation
operations of the district services and their interaction with other
government agencies.
In order to be efficient, however, the amendments to the Law on the
Judiciary should be coupled with the corresponding amendments to the
Code of Criminal Procedure that should reflect the new structure of
investigation and the powers vested in the reinstated National Investigation
Service. The existing rules of that Code mirror the old organization of the
investigation when it was directly subordinate to the public prosecution
and had very limited possibilities to get actively involved in the
investigation of serious offences. The data of the National Investigation
Service reveal that in 2002 the Prosecutor General used 27 times his power
under art. 172a(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, viz. to assign crimes
that are complex in fact or in law to the National Investigation Service
(compared to only two such cases assigned to the former Specialized
Investigation Service in 2001) but this is far below the real capacity of the
service. Amendments are needed which should enable the National
Investigation Service to organize the investigation of serious crimes under
the procedural control of the public prosecutor.
To make the investigation of corruption crimes more efficient, additional
measure are needed along the following lines: developing methodological
instructions for the investigation of corruption crimes; introducing special
monitoring by the National Investigation Service of corruption-related
pre-trial proceedings; improving the joint operations with the bodies of
the Ministry of Interior in the investigation of serious corruption crimes.
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TABLE 6. MAJOR INVESTIGATION INDICATORS
Source:  National Investigation Service
Indicators Malfeasances Bribery General economic
(art. 301 - 307 of the crime
(art. 282 - 285 of the Criminal Code)  Criminal Code) (art. 219 - 227à of
the Criminal Code)
1999 2000 2001 I 1999 2000 2001 I 2001 I
semester semester semester
2002 2002 2002 ª.
1. Unclosed 2487 2533 2634 2509 183 151 127 113 1278 1120
from earlier
periods
2. Newly 915 818 828 388 75 43 46 21 469 163
instituted
3. Received, 72 164 128 100 10 12 18 12 105 63
reopened and
transformed
4. Total 3474 3515 3590 2997 268 206 191 146 1852 1346
cases in
proceedings
5. Closed with a 818 848 1009 536 86 74 75 38 707 339
recommendation:
- to bring to court 212 264 251 112 51 43 49 19 170 75
- to discontinue 497 475 612 333 23 21 16 11 442 212
proceedings
- to suspend 109 109 146 91 12 10 10 8 95 52
proceedings
6. Remaining open 2556 2630 2512 2435 174 126 113 107 1120 987
at period end
7. Accused 338 380 323 164 60 53 57 20 193 85
persons:
- arrested 10 9 3 4 12 5 4 2 1 8
- foreign 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
nationals
8. Damages 6443573802 219878016 198147366 10736028 22091312 97021 14962 700 21740874 3424571
inflicted (BGN)
9. Additional damages 291215080 2372 30752 0 3960000 0 0 0 9255869 0
found (BGN)
10. Damages 306248438 938226 158667242 1847945 15462312 88675 7282 260 5072807 22
redressed (BGN)
11. Collateral 16496119 28065 146491 0 5000000 0 1560 0 0 0
provided (BGN)
12. Signals 95 260 408 159 10 11 12 1 162 80
13. Cases assigned by 2 27
Prosecutor
General
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The place of investigation in the structure of the judiciary is still an
open issue which should also be addressed in the discussion of the future
constitutional amendments. In addition to other proposed amendments,
it is suggested that investigation should be removed from the judiciary
and made part of the Ministry of Interior. Possible future changes along
these lines, however, should be backed by adequate guarantees for the
independence  of investigators when they conduct preliminary
investigation in criminal cases and by powers that enable them to manage
and supervise other bodies performing procedural steps or functions
in the criminal process.
C.2.3. Institutions outside the Judiciary that Affect Directly its
Operation
The measures to reform the judicial system in view of combating
corruption are still isolated from the measures to reform the institutions
whose activities are directly linked to the functioning of that system. At
the same time, the debate over judicial reform has made it clear that a
number of institutions outside the judicial system may play a key part,
positive or negative, for the anti-corruption efforts of courts, public
prosecution offices and investigation services. Seen positively, this fact
fosters the search for more efficient forms of cooperation and interaction
to prevent and detect any corrupt acts. The drawbacks are mainly
connected with the existence of corrupt practices outside the process -
i.e. before or in parallel to the steps undertaken by the investigation, the
public prosecution and the court. Besides the direct negative impact on
the public perception of a high level of corruption and on the trust in the
institutions designed to combat corruption, those drawbacks may directly
inhibit the work of the judiciary.
l The Ministry of Interior in the combat against corruption
The work of Ministry of Interior (MoI) as a whole and of the National
Police Service in particular, directly bears on the efficiency and
promptness of those bodies of the judiciary that are involved in the
criminal prosecution of corruption crimes. In 2002 no flexible legislative
solutions were adopted for the place and role of police investigation, for
improving its contribution to the operational capacity, procedural
economy and better quality, for preserving or abolishing the preliminary
police inquiry and its link to the institution of police investigation. The
advantages and disadvantages of police investigation proceedings, as
analyzed in the Corruption Assessment Report 2001 on the basis of the
case-law relating to the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure
made in 2000 and 2001, were taken into consideration in the new draft
amendments to the Code which provide for more sophisticated rules on
police proceedings. It is still necessary, however, to improve the legal
knowledge of police investigators (a total of some 12 000 officers) so as to
ensure efficient investigation within the confines of the law and the
collection of fit evidence. All this would substantially improve the work
of all components of the judicial system - investigation services, public
prosecution offices and the courts.
To make anti-corruption work more efficient, the status of the specialized
anti-corruption unit at the National Service for Combating Organized
Crime was changed (it is no longer a sector but a department) and its
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operational staff was doubled. The department has the function of
combating corruption both within MoI and in the state and local
administration.
During the first half of 2002 the services of the Ministry of Interior
detected 1089 malfeasances and 34 cases of bribery .  While
malfeasances come third in percentage terms among all economic crimes
(14.3 per cent) and are often connected with corrupt practices, bribery is
rather insignificant (just 0.5 per cent).
The above data are
rather in-house statis-
tics on the rate of de-
tection of corruption.
However, the criteria
on which those statis-
tics are based remain
unclear. This fact,
along with the lack of
links to investigation,
prosecution and court
statistics, makes it im-
possible to get a more
precise view about the
detection of corruption crimes and the extent to which they are pun-
ished. Because of the lack of essential indicators, it is not possible to see
where the weak point in the enforcement mechanism is - the police, the
investigation, the public prosecution or the court. The different statistics
kept by different units and bodies of the judiciary are not based on the
same indicators or system, so the data tend to be incomplete and contra-
dictory. The required transparency is not present either.
Hence, it is urgent to put in operation the single information system for
combating crime provided for in the Law on the Judiciary in order to ensure
proper interaction and the exchange of data relative to the suppression
of crime among the institutional information systems of the bodies of the
judiciary, the National Assembly, MoI, the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance. A single system would
report the data about the registration, investigation and prosecution of
crimes, including corruption-related ones, and would also facilitate the
work of law enforcement and the courts, narrow down the room for
speculation and unauthorized use of information about the fight against
crime. It would also provide consolidated information on the dynamics
of crime, the criminal process and the execution of penalties on the basis
of uniform criteria.
As far as the area of justice and home affairs is concerned, the draft EU
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe prepared in 2002 requires
the harmonization of the legislations of Member States as well as closer
cooperation between police and justice. Debates are currently under way
to set up institutions like a European Border Guard and a European Public
Prosecutor, and introduce a European arrest warrant. As a EU candidate
country, Bulgaria should do its best to harmonize its domestic laws with
EU legislation before joining the Union and to enhance the professional
skills of people working in the field of justice and home affairs. Especially
important for the combat against domestic and transborder corruption is
First semester Malfeasances Bribery
(art. 282-285 of the Criminal Code) (art. 301-307à of the Criminal Code)
2001 1 197 38
2002 1 089 34
TABLE 7. EXPOSED CORRUPTION CASES
Source: Ministry of Interior
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the fact that Bulgaria will become an external border of the Union and
should thus meet the EU criteria for security and efficient administration
of justice.
Besides the police, various tasks in combating crime are entrusted to the
National Service for Combating Organized Crime, the National Security
Service (in the event of corruption affecting the security of the country),
the National Border Police Service (in protecting the state borders and
other areas, as defined in the statutes, where it operates), the territorial
structures of the National Police Service, the National Security Service
and the National Service for Combating Organized Crime at the regional
Directorates of Interior and the Metropolitan Directorate of the Interior.
The efficiency of their work is often of great importance for preventing
corruption and assisting the bodies of the judiciary to detect and prosecute
corruption-related crimes.
l The Bar
The debate over the anti-corruption dimensions of judicial reform helps
consolidate the view that some attorneys-at-law assist, in a number of
cases, the spread of corrupt practices in the judicial system and in the
administration. Those attorneys either act as intermediaries or benefit
themselves while falsely pretending that they are corrupt intermediaries.
In order to put an end to those negative phenomena, the Bar should
tighten its control.
At the end of 2002, a
Draft Law on the Bar was
introduced in the Na-
tional Assembly. The
draft reflects an aspira-
tion to improve the repu-
tation of the legal profes-
sion and remove the
drawbacks in the work of
the Bar. Many of the pro-
posed changes in the le-
gal framework of the Bar
are directly or indirectly
focused on achieving
those goals. Strict criteria
shall be implemented for
access to the legal profes-
sion, e.g. a legal appren-
ticeship period of at least
two years and a success-
ful Bar admission exam.
Assistant-attorneys will
be introduced. The du-
ties of attorneys under the law shall be extended and members of the
guild will have to abide by a number of ethical rules and norms of con-
duct in order to sustain the trust and respect that are vital to the pro-
fession. The disciplinary procedures for failure to comply with the statu-
tory duties and the code of ethics have been improved. There are rules
on the associations of attorneys and on the obligation of attorneys to
provide free legal assistance to persons lacking resources or entitled to
FIGURE 18. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG LAWYERS
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000, October 2002; SELDI, January 2002
Bulgaria, October 02Southeast Europe,
January 02
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alimony or support money.
Some criticism could be addressed on account of the lack of a wider
professional and public debate on the proposed amendments, and the
slow process of passing the new draft.
Another lingering issue concerns the possibilities to reduce the excessive
workload of the judiciary as this factor often delays the proceedings and
sometimes even worsens the administration of justice and opens the door
for corrupt practices to accelerate the process. In that respect, alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) means are still underused. Forty to sixty per
cent of disputes in countries with firmly rooted and well functioning
judicial systems are resolved through ADR. The court should only deal
with matters of principle that concern human rights, criminal offences,
large material claims, and not waste time with disputes that might be
resolved more quickly by arbitrators or mediators. NGOs could greatly
help advertise and introduce the means of alternative dispute resolution.
C.2.4. The Status of Magistrates. Professional Skills and
Recruitment
The status of magistrates (judges, public prosecutors and investigators)
depends on the procedure for their appointment and is based on the
principles of independence, irremovability and immunity from criminal
prosecution. Recognition of and compliance with that status largely
predetermines their conduct in the process of combating corruption,
either in their capacity as members of the judiciary who investigate or
prosecute corruption, or as possible perpetrators of corrupt acts.
l Criteria for appointment and obtaining irremovability. Qualification
There are not yet uniform methods and criteria to organize competitions
when appointing judges, or to monitor their work before their becoming
irremovable or their promotion. The amendments to the Law on the
Judiciary provided a system of measures to ensure respect for the status,
to improve the professional skills and the recruitment and selection of
magistrates. Some of those amendments, however, were declared anti-
constitutional, which calls the necessity for finding their substitutes.
- Competitions were partially introduced for the appointment of
magistrates. The law requires that a competition must be held when
junior judges and public prosecutors are appointed, and in the cases
of initial appointment at an office within the judiciary when there
is no applicant from the bodies of the judiciary, up until a
competition has been advertised (art. 127a). Competitions are also
required for the appointment of bailiffs (art. 150(3)) and judges in
charge of registering collateral (art. 160(3)) where there are more
than one applicants. Members of the court staff should also be
appointed after a competition (art. 188a). At the end of 2002 the
first centralized competition was held to appoint junior judges,
prosecutors and investigators on the basis of Interim Rules adopted
by the Supreme Judicial Council. Nonetheless, the required
guarantees are not yet in place that the competitions would be
transparent enough and their results would be objective.
- The evaluation of magistrates was introduced as a mandatory
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requirement to become an irremovable magistrate. The amendment
which provided that a negative evaluation should form a ground to
remove the magistrate from office for lack of aptitude to perform
the professional duties was declared anti-constitutional.
- An issue that remained unsolved concerns the introduction of terms
of office and rotation for the senior administrative positions in the
bodies of the judiciary (art. 125a). The principle of rotation was
rejected already during the discussions on the draft law at the
National Assembly. The rule that provided for strict terms of office
was declared anti-constitutional with the motive that it went counter
to the principle of irremovability of magistrates. The dissenting
opinion attached to the decision of the Constitutional Court
emphasizes that the irremovability of a magistrate should guarantee
his independence in the performance of his duties, rather than his
capacity of a manager or leader.
- The qualification of magistrates was covered by specific rules. As
of January 1, 2003, a National Institute of Justice would be set up
as an institution under public law. It would be in charge of providing
professional training to magistrates, bailiffs, judges for the
registration of collateral, court officials and the officials at the
Ministry of Justice (art. 35f). As the provision for setting up the
Institute with the Minister of Justice was declared anti-constitutional,
this leaves open the question about the status of the institute and
will frustrate its establishment.
Professional training may also be offered by specialized non-profit public
benefit legal persons, with the approval of the Supreme Judicial Council.
So far, the only institution that has been successful in training practicing
magistrates is the Magistrates Training Centre set up in 1999 as a non-
governmental organization. Amendments should ensure sustainability of
the training. The future curricula should necessarily include training in
the application of anti-corruption legislation. In more general terms, the
training should help educate the magistrates in values and principles like
impartiality, independence, intolerance to corruption, etc.
- An obligation was imposed on all magistrates to declare their
income and property both upon appointment and annually
thereafter. The declarations shall be filed with the National Audit
Office under the Law on Property Disclosure by Persons Occupying
Senior Position in the State (art. 135(2)). Compliance with that
obligation would foster transparency and would also act as a
deterrent, indeed a moral one, to corrupt behavior. The practice
in application of this rule has confirmed this expectation.
- There are provisions on ethical rules for magistrates that should
be adopted by the respective guild organizations and approved by
the Supreme Judicial Council. The importance of those rules is
twofold. Firstly, they must be taken into consideration when
evaluating whether the applicant judge, prosecutor or investigator
has the moral and professional qualities to be appointed at the
respective position (art. 126(2)). Secondly, the violations of
professional ethics rules form a ground to make the magistrate in
question disciplinary liable (art. 168(1), point 3).
The gradual implementation of some of the above measures started at
the end of 2002 and will have to be reconsidered in view of the decision
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of the Constitutional Court.
The difficulties in embedding the status of magistrates generally stem from
the structural problems of the judiciary under its current model. As judges,
prosecutors and investigators have different functions and powers, they
could hardly be given the same status. The status of judges, prosecutors
and investigators differs in practice, due to the different degree of
transparency in the recruitment, appointment and promotion policy, and
due to the different hierarchical links that exist. Hence, independence,
irremovability, responsibility and immunity should be covered by a
clearer and differentiated legislative solution. This would be largely
possible even in the framework of the existing structure but any future
change in that structure will cast additional light on the different legal
status of judges, prosecutors and investigators.
Measures are also needed to make disciplinary proceedings more
efficient. Besides the need to specify the types of disciplinary offences
and the penalties they entail, various proposals are being discussed, e.g.
to set up a specialized unit with the Supreme Judicial Council to deal
with corruption in the judiciary, to introduce an independent prosecutor
to be appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council who would not be
subordinate to the Prosecutor General and would investigate crimes
committed by magistrates. Other proposals suggest that other bodies, e.g.
the Parliament, the Minister of Justice, etc., should create such units or
appoint such officials in the context of constitutional reforms currently
debated. Unlike disciplinary proceedings, however, where the panel is
composed from among SJC members by drawing lots, the resolution of
court cases involving magistrates is much more difficult. Another debatable
question is should - and if so how - a panel of judges be formed.
l Limiting immunity from criminal prosecution
The need to refine the exemption from criminal liability and the immunity
of judges, prosecutors and investigators from criminal prosecution is still
under discussion within the legal community and among the general
public. Limiting the immunities from criminal prosecution was an issue
raised by the European Commission in its 2002 Regular Report on Bulgarias
progress towards accession and by the Group of Countries against Corruption
(GRECO) in its report on Bulgaria released in May 2002. The problem is
not confined to Bulgaria but is typical of most countries in transition and
is raised primarily in the context of efforts to prevent and combat
corruption in the judiciary.
The major statutory changes in that respect stem from the latest
amendments to the Law on the Judiciary. They modified the procedure for
lifting the immunity of magistrates and envisage that proposals for lifting
the immunity can now be made with respect to all magistrates, including
the Prosecutor General, plus that such proposals may be tabled by one
fifth of the members of SJC. That change was declared anti-constitutional
with the motive that such proposals could only be tabled by the Prosecutor
General as the public prosecution has the function to indict and engage
the liability of perpetrators of crimes. This view could be opposed by
saying that lifting the immunity does not form part of criminal prosecution;
it is only a prerequisite for such prosecution.
A growing number of magistrates share the opinion that immunity should
be limited in a more dramatic fashion, e.g. it should be possible to lift it
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for any crime, not just for serious intentional crimes as is the case now,
and functional immunity should be introduced, i.e. a magistrate should
only be free from liability in his or her direct work.
It is noteworthy that the immunity of magistrates is primarily a
constitutional issue and cannot be solved on the initiative of the judiciary
or through government action alone. It can even less be handled by a
decision of the Constitutional Court. Finding a solution about immunity
and independence, however, should not be an end in itself. Such a
solution should indeed aim to make the administration of justice
completely free from corruption.
C.2.5. Court Administration. Funding for the Judicial System
 The reform of the court administration, the improvement of the technical
infrastructure and better funding of the judiciary would have a strong
anti-corruption effect. The current organization of work of the court
administration, the deplorable conditions in which the bodies of the
judiciary, and their administrations, operate the serious underfinancing
of the judiciary are all conducive to corruption and may easily prevent
the investigation and prosecution of corruption-related crimes.
The amendments to the Law on the Judiciary govern the status of officials
in the administrations of the bodies of the judiciary (court staff). Court
staff should also be appointed on the basis of competition and this is to
be applied in practice. The forthcoming enactment of internal ethical
rules and mechanisms for compliance therewith would enhance the
guarantees that court officials would pursue a corruption-free behavior.
The legislative amendments and the practical measures adopted to date
provide partial solutions to some urgent issues but are insufficient to
implement an entirely new approach to the administration of the bodies
of the judiciary. Such an approach should include case, document and
staff management systems, objective criteria and transparency in the
assignment of cases (assignment should not be done through
discretion) and files, the provision of reliable information on their
movement, etc. The implementation of that approach is necessary to
eradicate the reasons for the undue delays of cases and get rid of the
corruption pressure exerted on the administrations of the bodies of the
judiciary on behalf of private parties, to substantially assist the work of
magistrates and to free them from purely administrative and technical
tasks. For that purpose, a new piece of secondary legislation should be
issued replacing the obsolete Ordinance No. 28 and consistent with the
amendments to the Law on the Judiciary.
Although court staff and train-the-trainers seminars are regularly held, a
system of measures is still required for the recruitment and training of
court staff.
Bringing the budget of the judiciary in line with its needs and the im-
provement of the technical basis and the security of the judicial system
are two short-term priorities in the Strategy for Reform of the Judiciary in
Bulgaria. As far as the budget is concerned, a specialized unit is to be set
up by the Ministry of Finance and SJC that would draft and submit the
annual budget for the judiciary. The amendments to the Law on the Judi-
ciary furthered the principle that the budget of the judiciary would be
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FIGURE 19. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION WITHIN THE JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000, October 2002; SELDI, January 2002
Bulgaria, October 02Southeast Europe,
January 02
autonomous, as the judi-
ciary should be indepen-
dent. Thus, the Supreme
Judicial Council prepares
a draft annual budget and
presents it to the Council
of Ministers for integra-
tion with the Draft Law on
the State Budget. The
Council of Ministers is not
entitled to change the
budget; it can only ex-
press its opinion thereon
before the National As-
sembly. The legislative
procedure to discuss and
adopt the government
Draft Law on the Budget of
Bulgaria in 2003 stirred an
open conflict between
SJC and the magistrates,
on the one hand, and the
government, on the other, as the latter included in the draft law its own
draft budget for the judiciary instead of the draft budget prepared by the
Supreme Judicial Council. The view of the magistrates is that the draft bud-
get for the judiciary proposed by the government fails to ensure the neces-
sary financing for the normal functioning of the judicial system and for the
reforms envisaged in the amended Law on the Judiciary.
That development clearly demonstrated the lack of working mechanisms
of inter-institutional communication, of coordinating the steps to be
undertaken and on preventing inter-institutional conflicts.
Due to the insufficient funding, the improvement of the technical
infrastructure is in a deadlock. For the same reason, the specialized
security and guarding unit to be set up with the Ministry of Justice under
the amended law would hardly be able to operate efficiently in the near
future. That unit indeed has to guard all court buildings, maintain the
order therein and guard judges, prosecutors, investigators and witnesses.
It also has, however, to assist the bodies of the Judiciary with summoning,
with the execution of judgments, with the compulsory bringing of some
persons to the court buildings, etc. The performance of those additional
functions would not only foster security but would contribute to speeding
up the proceedings and preventing the corrupt practices ensuing from
the slow operation of the system.
If the poor working conditions of magistrates and court officials, the lack
of technical equipment and of adequate security persist, they will continue
to be factors that slow down the work of the judiciary and benefit
corruption.
C.2.6. Registration System
The inefficient system of court registration in Bulgaria is one of the factors
for the high level of corruption in the courts. The existing registers in
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Bulgaria are mainly decentralized and are kept on paper. Some courts
have introduced electronic information systems on an experimental basis
but the entries in such systems entail no legal effects. As the information
in the registers becomes more voluminous, it is less accessible and its
handling becomes slower, if not impossible. This, in turn, puts in place
conditions for strong corruption pressures both to register some facts
and to obtain information from the registers. The procedure of
registering legal persons at the company divisions of the courts is non-
contentious and non-adversarial. Judges are virtually unable to review
the legality of all the decisions subject to registration, e.g. those for changes
in the governing bodies of commercial companies. Work at the company
divisions of courts has no uniform standards for the promptness and
reliability of the registrations and entries made and these entries could
even be influenced by non-magistrates (e.g. secretaries). Persons
participating in registration proceedings say that there is a tacit fee for
such services in a number of courts. This situation not only hinders the
normal development of business and turnover but fuels the steady public
perception that the judicial system is corrupted.
To meet the needs of society and the economy, the registration system
should be centralized, exist in an electronic form and enable the making
of entries and the provision of information by telecommunications, by
electronic means online. The persons would thus be able to inform within
hours any third party of newly-arisen and registered facts. Third parties
would be able to check the real situation with the register almost at the
time of the transaction. That would reduce to minimum the chances for
unlawful moves in relation to registration and receipt of information.
An appropriate way to modernize the system of registration and restrict
corruption is to replace the registration in court with registration at the
Central Register of Legal Entities. This could be done through an
institution of public law (state agency) attached to a central government
institution (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Economy, etc.). When the
central register is put in place, it will form the basis for building up an
Electronic Registries Center.
The Central Register of Legal Entities would combine the relevant details
of all legal entities governed by private law and state-owned enterprises
(save for political parties and trade unions). The Register of Legal Entities
may be merged with the Central Pledge Register. A single register would
thus concentrate the information about persons and the collateral they
provide, so as to avoid the unnecessary duplication of functions between
the commercial register and the pledge register that might entail errors
and inconsistencies. In the longer run, the Register of Legal Entities might
be merged with the real estate registers under the umbrella of the
Electronic Registries Center. This could only happen, however, after the
national electronic cadastre has been completed and transformed into a
single national data-base.
The transition to a Central Register of Legal Entities and an Electronic Registries
Center, and the possible future adding of the real estate register would be a
strong anti-corruption incentive and would shrink the opportunities for
unlawful practices that might affect the work of the registers.
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D. CORRUPTION IN THE ECONOMY
In the case of weak institutions, low administrative capacity and lack of
traditions, the states interference with the economy results in conflicting
public and private interests, which create favorable environment for
corruption. In this relation the spheres most susceptible to corruption
risks in Bulgaria are: the states intervention in the economy both as a
shareholder and a regulator, fiscal policy, public procurement, customs,
privatization and post-privatization control, and the underground
economy. Introducing adequate and transparent public sector
management and ensuring free competition in the private sector are the
basic prerequisites for an effective anti-corruption policy in the economy.
Corruption in Transition - the Bulgarian Case
The absence of basic economic rules, combined with the state
monopoly over economic resources and the slow privatization and
restructuring created a favorable environment for the appearance
of corruption in the beginning of transition. The lack of political
will, vision and know-how for carrying out economic reforms in
Bulgaria in the beginning and mid 1990s prolonged the institutional
vacuum and led to two major cycles of siphoning public resources
into private hands.
The first one constituted of decapitalization and unregulated
privatization of state-owned enterprises through the control of their
entry and exit resources by private enterprises.
The second one involved the use of financial institutions for lending
to related parties, who never returned the loans.
The unregulated concentration of economic power in private hands
paved the way for the development of underground economic
activities, money laundering and corruption. Powerful economic
groups realized their interest in preserving the status quo and
launched attempts to capture the state through the corruption of
public officials.
Economic policy liberalization and restraint of direct government
intervention in the economy through subsidies and administered prices
promote competition and limit the possibilities for administrative pressure
and corruption. In the case of Bulgaria, where administrative and
institutional capacity for the implementation of existing economic rules
is still low, any further increase of state intervention in the economy is
likely to create additional incentives for embezzlement and corruption.
In 2002 the government introduced several controversial measures for
D.1. State Intervention in
the Economy and
Corruption
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intervention in the economy, which reduced business environment
transparency and increased corruption incentives. The most notable
among these were:
l the imposition of higher import duties for certain products;
l the introduction of subsidies for grain producers and exporters;
l the sale of bankrupt state-owned shipbuilder to another state-owned
enterprise - the Bulgarian Maritime Fleet.
Such measures benefit closed-group economic interests and present a
suitable precedent for future pressure on government policies. Therefore,
the Bulgarian government should try to ensure adequate enforcement of
existing rules before introducing new ones.
State aid is one of the major channels of government intervention in the
economy. The lack of transparent rules and criteria for state aid
disbursement, coupled with low administrative capacity, increase the risks
of private interest pressure and misuse of public funds. After a long delay,
in 2002 Parliament has adopted a Law on State Aid (LSA) (State Gazette
no. 28/2002), which regulates the rules and conditions for control over
state aid disbursement, as well as for evaluation of its compliance with
the principles of free and fair competition. The provisions of the law
and the introduction of a public state aid registry are prerequisites
for more transparency and better control over government decisions
in this area. However, it is still early to give a definitive evaluation of the
actual LSA enforcement as practical implementation is limited. So far,
the Commission for Protection of Competition (CPC), which is authorized by
law to control state aid, in practice only registers and analyzes government
decisions on subsidizing. The administrative capacity of the Commission
to implement the laws provisions should be strengthened considerably
to reach levels of effective control over state aid decisions. The
Government should also take appropriate measures to insulate CPCs
decisions against possible corruption pressures from interested parties.
In this regard Parliament should consider introducing stricter fines for
administrative offences and eliminating CPC discretionary power to
exempt certain economic agents from obligations under the law. State
aid for public monopolies did not decline in 2002, although the
Government had taken explicit obligations to reduce it. As percent of
GDP state aid in Bulgaria is not higher than the EU countries average but
it might be expected that its distortionary effect on the economy is higher
due to the poorer administrative and economic development of the
country. The establishment of a new state-owned airline carrier with public
resources in 2002 might create undesired state aid increase for the sector
in the future. At the same time this would increase direct state intervention
in the economy and would raise doubts of protection of particular private
interests through public resources.
A major channel for state intervention in the economy, which is not
regulated by the Law on State Aid, is the subsidizing of farmers and
agricultural producers. Justified public suspicion of fraud and corruption
in the past calls for careful monitoring and control over public agricultural
subsidies. The amendments to the Law on Support for Agricultural Producers
(LSAP) (State Gazette, no. 96/2002), which have been adopted by
Parliament in 2002, are not definitive towards reducing the corruption
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potential in the area of agricultural aid. On one hand, they reduce the
risks of corruption by defining more precisely the goals and responsibilities
of State Fund Zemedelie, taking into account the specific requirements of
SAPARD EU pre-accession program. On the other hand, the amendments
stipulate an increase in financing for the Fund (from 0.15% to 0.5% of
GDP) and grant preferences to registered agricultural producers. As there
is no visible improvement in the Funds administrative capacity, this
increases the potential for corruption. The Government should adopt with
priority the following measures to curb corruption in agricultural support:
l define a ceiling as percent of GDP for state agricultural support;
l publicize widely the Annual Report on the State and Development of
Agriculture, which stipulates annual agricultural subsidies;
l strengthen considerably the administrative capacity for internal
financial control of State Fund Zemedelie and the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry.
The existence of public or private monopolies in the economy distorts
free market forces and leads to the concentration of considerable re-
sources in few economic agents, which is a powerful prerequisite for the
appearance of corruption. Surveys of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) show that corruption pressure from public and private compa-
nies with considerable
market power remained
high in 2002. There is
no notable progress in
state monopolies liber-
alization, which pre-
serves possibilities for
corruption in their cus-
tomer relationships.
The areas most often re-
ported by SMEs for re-
quiring additional un-
regulated payments are
fixed line telephone and
electricity supply. In this
relation, the government
and the responsible min-
istries should, in parallel
to gradual liberalization,
embark on measures for
improvement of internal
control enforcement
rules and administrative
sanctions in public mo-
nopolies.
The lack of adequate ad-
ministrative capacity and
experience in anti-trust
regulation enforcement,
and the low financial and
FIGURE 20. SERVICES CONCENTRATING SMES INFORMAL PAYMENTS (RELATIVE SHARE
OF SMES, WHICH MADE INFORMAL PAYMENTS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
SERVICES) (%)
Source: Vitosha Research, Integra, Corruption in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises,
June 2002.
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material sanctions imposed for breaching the existing regulations, result
in ineffective protection against excessive market power concentration.
In 2002 the Government launched legislative efforts to increase CPC pow-
ers. In November the Council of Ministers adopted a Draft Law on Amend-
ments to the Law on Protection of Competition, which contains two major
anti-corruption provisions:
l An increase in CPCs authority to block excessive horizontal and vertical
market concentration in the economy;
l Stricter parliamentary control over CPCs activities.
The amendments, how-
ever, are still pending in
Parliament.
Limiting the freedom of
economic activity through
burdensome state regula-
tion concentrates addi-
tional power in state ad-
ministration and is a
source of corruption.
Governments policy to-
wards business regulation
in Bulgaria remains unfo-
cused and unclear.
Governments regulatory
intervention in the
economy is consider-
able and remains one of
the major sources of
corrupt practices.  In
May 2002 the Council of
Ministers decided to ease
120 and abolish 74 of the
existing 360 regulatory
regimes. But by the end
of 2002 there was no in-
formation that any part of
this decision had been
practical ly enforced.
Meanwhile, new licens-
ing and permit regimes
constantly come into
force. The number of
regulatory regimes cre-
ates only a small part of
the corruption problem
in this area. Bureaucratic
administration and fre-
quent and long personal
contacts between autho-
rized officials and busi-
ness management are the
FIGURE 21. REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS TO BULGARIAN BUSINESS (% OF COMPANIES,
WHICH DEEM PROBLEMS SERIOUS OR EXTREMELY SERIOUS)
Source: Self-Assessment of Administrative Barriers to Investment: Results of the
Administrative and Regulatory Cost Survey FIAS, November 2002
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major motives for busi-
nesses to offer bribes.
Regime administration
has not improved in
2002, although work on
the supply of better ad-
ministrative services and
the creation of one-stop
shops continues. Bul-
garias accession into the
European Union implies a
further increase in regu-
latory regimes. Therefore,
Bulgaria needs a clear
national business regula-
tion policy and an ad-
equate administrative ca-
pacity for quick and trans-
parent enforcement of
existing regimes. Other-
wise, corruption in re-
gime administration will
persist, or even increase.
Regulation and
Corruption in Con-
struction Building
The problem with business regulation concerns all industries but is
most visible in construction building. The existing legislative
framework in the industry creates favorable environment for the
development of corruption. Corrupt practices exist along the whole
process of constructing a building - it starts with obtaining design
permits, goes through the actual construction of the object and ends
with the inclusion of the building into the official town infrastructure.
Practical experience shows that, on average, construction businesses
need 3 months to obtain all permits (more than 8) for starting an
investment project. Additionally, it takes another 4.5 months to
obtain final approval for the launch of the project. At the same
time the Law on the Structure of Territories stipulates that all these
activities should be completed within a month. This pressures
investors into seeking illegal means of obtaining permits and
shortening proceedings, most often though offering bribes.
The lack of advanced corporate governance culture and legitimate
mechanisms for access of competing economic interest to the process of
national economic policy building lead businesses to exert increased
corruption pressure on government decisions.
Bulgarian businesses, especially SMEs, are poorly informed about future
government intentions and about the implementation rules of
governmental regulations and initiatives. The information policies of
different ministries and agencies lack coordination and consistency. The
Register of the Administrative Structures and the Acts of the Administrative Bodies
FIGURE 22. FREQUENCY AND LENGTH OF
INSPECTIONS IN BULGARIA
Source: Self-Assessment of Administrative Barriers to Investment: Results of the Adminis-
trative and Regulatory Cost Survey FIAS, November 2002
D.2. State - Business
Relations. Corporate
Governance and
corruption
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was updated in 2002 but the information it provided remained well below
business needs. The lack of readily available information on governmental
intentions and initiatives in the economy leads to information asymmetry
between the administration and the business. This creates adminis-
trative monopoly on information resources, which is a strong tool for
corruption pressure on businesses.
The work on improving
corporate governance has
a strong anti-corruption
impact because it reduces
demand for corrupt prac-
tices. Good corporate
governance means: more
transparency and respon-
sibility in company and
management activities; no
potential conflicts of inter-
est; adequate protection
of minority shareholders
rights; responsible man-
agement of remaining
state shares in privatized
enterprises; and existence
of professional and ethical
rules for curbing corrup-
tion.
The Law on Amendments
to the  Law on Public
Offering of Securit ies
(LPOS) adopted in 2002 has been the major contribution for the year
towards improving corporate governance in Bulgaria. They improve
significantly the following groups of relations, which have been haunted
by corruption for years - capital increase; investor protection; bid
mechanisms; and information disclosure. Additionally, the amendments
upgrade the status, functions and authority of the State Securities and
Exchange Commission (SSEC).
The actual anti-corruption impact of the amendments cannot be assessed
yet because of scarce practical implementation. So far there have been
no indications whatsoever that companies have accepted and implement
these favorable amendments, nor that SSEC and business associations
have managed to introduce effective self-regulations with anti-corruption
potential. For the time-being good corporate governance codes are the
exception rather than the rule. Government discussions about the
amendments to the Commercial Codes insolvency regulations and about
the introduction of a new chapter on Corporate Governance are a positive,
though belated, step in the right direction. These are pending Government
obligations under the National Anti-Corruption Strategy.
The amendments to LPOS introduce mandatory issuance of freely
transferable and tradable rights to capital increase, which will give
considerable protection to minority shareholders. Although it is too early
to assess the full impact of this particular change it is indicative that there
have been no reports on misuse of capital increases in 2002.
FIGURE 23. TRANSPARENCY OF RULES AND
CRITERIA OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES (%)
Source: Vitosha Research, Integra, Corruption in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises,
June 2002.
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Additionally the amendments ensure more instruments for the
protection of minority shareholders and investors rights -  stricter
rules for bidding and public company delisting mechanisms; less
possibilities for illegal use (siphoning) of company assets by management;
and increase in the controlling authority of the shareholders meeting.
For the first time Parliament introduced a clause in LPOS, which requires
that at least 1/3 of the management or supervisory boards members
of public companies be independent. Independent members will
guarantee minority shareholders rights, which will bear direct effect on
the improvement of Corporate Governance and hence on the anti-
corruption measures. New texts in the law regulate conflicts of interest,
which together with the provision of insider information, are considerable
potential sources of corruption.
Another positive amendment to LPOS is the obligatory introduction of
the position Director for Investor Relations. Thus, the changes to the Law
create favorable conditions for corporate management boards to serve in
the best interest of the company, rather than in their own or that of the
major shareholder.
In 2002 Parl iament
adopted several clauses
particularly aimed at im-
proving public company
transparency. Public
companies will have to
submit more frequently
their financial reports,
provide faster ad hoc in-
formation to SSEC and
compile their balances
according to the Interna-
tional Accounting Stan-
dards. SSECs capacity to
enforce these changes
will be critical in reveal-
ing their anti-corruption
potential.
SSECs record of enforce-
ment capacity is rather
poor. In 2001 it failed to
sanction 85.7 % of all
violations of information
disclosure regulations on
Section A of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE). Almost all sanctions
imposed by SSEC are taken to court and in only 20-30 % of the cases
fines become effective. Court proceedings take on average over two years.
FIGURE 24. DISTRIBUTION OF PANEL SANCTIONS FOR
DISCLOSURE FAILURES (%)
Source: OECD, Second Meeting of the South Eastern Europe Corporate Governance
Roundtable.
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Lack of transparency in the accumulation and redistribution of public
resources through the budget distorts market functioning and results in
the emergence of gray economy and corruption. Low administrative
capacity to manage and control state revenues and expenditures magnify
these distortionary effects in Bulgaria. In this regard there are several major
areas, in which corruption pressures exist: enforcement of tax, social
security and customs laws, public procurement mechanisms, redistribution
of municipal resources through the central budget, and health care funds
management.
D.3.1. Taxes, Social Security Burden and Gray Economy
High taxes and social se-
curity contributions, in
association with opaque
and ineffective adminis-
tration, lead to the emer-
gence of a big gray sec-
tor in the economy and
hence of corruption. In
2002 the Government
reduced only marginally
the tax and social secu-
rity burden, which re-
mained rather high for a
transit ion economy.
There has been no
change in the level of
unrecorded economic
activity, which according
to different estimates
ranges between 25%
and 40% of GDP. Unre-
corded company turn-
over form the bulk of
unofficial  payments
(bribes) in the economy.
The share of the gray economy and its corrupt practices can be best re-
duced through a combination of tax and social security contributions
reduction and improvement in company reporting.
Corruption pressure remains high in the areas of tax administration
and enforcement. The major reasons behind such unfavorable score are:
l Frequent changes in tax legislation, which do not leave enough
accommodation time for economic agents and the administration;
l Rich possibilities for administrative discretion in tax law enforcement;
l Constant and long tax inspections, which are costly to companies and
leave a lot of room for personal interaction between company
managers and tax administrators;
l Low opportunity costs of tax evasion through corrupt practices for both
businesses and tax administration officials;
D.3. Public
Expenditure
Management, Tax
Policy, Gray
Economy and
Corruption
FIGURE 25. MAIN IMPEDIMENTS TO SME
DEVELOPMENT* (%)
Source: Vitosha Research, Integra, Corruption in Small and Medum-Sized Enterprises,
June 2002
(*) Note: The sum of percents exceeds 100 because the respondents gave more than one
answer.
SM
Es
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l Lack of adequate personal safety protection for tax administration officials;
l Insufficient administrative capacity for proper implementation of
existing tax rules and regulations.
The tax changes introduced by the Government through the Law on State
Budget for 2003 follow a strategy for reduction in direct and increase in
indirect taxation reliance. Such strategy, however, does not eliminate
corruption pressure but only redirects its impact inside the tax
administration. The Government should put more efforts to improve tax
administration mechanisms. Like in previous years, in 2002 Parliament
adopted the amendments to tax legislation at its last seating for the year.
This last minute decision-making creates favorable conditions for
preference seeking and increases the instability of the business
environment. It seems that Government changes its tax policy stance to
allow more tax breaks and preferences, which will result in more
corruption should there be no adequate improvement in tax
administrations collection and control capacity.
In 2002 the Ministry of
Labor and Social Policy
(MLSP) and the Ministry of
Finance (MoF) initiated
the introduction of so-
cial security contribu-
tion floors for the differ-
ent branches and profes-
sions. The Government
claims the measure will
increase National Social
Security Fund revenues.
While the latter is very
possible, the floors might
also bring business
flight into the gray
economy with an in-
crease of corruption in
the overseeing adminis-
tration, especially in the
short run. The true costs
of social security contri-
bution floors will only be
fully assessable in 2004.
However, it should be
noted that MLSP suc-
ceeded in minimizing the distortionary effects of the measure by forcing
direct negotiations between employers and trade unions who managed
to agree on their 2003 levels.
In 2002 the government adopted measures, which have real potential to
reduce corruption in the tax and social security area in the medium run:
l a detailed tax policy for the 2003 - 2005 period;
l a Law on National Revenue Agency. The Agency will collect most public
revenues. It is planned to start operation in the beginning of 2005;
FIGURE 26. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG TAX OFFICIALS*
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000, October 2002; SELDI, January 2002
(*) Note: The maximum value of the index is 10.0 indicating the highest possible level of
corruption. The minimum value is 0.0 indicating total absence of corruption.
Legend: AL - Albania; BIH - Bosnia and Herzegovina; BG - Bulgaria; MK - Macedonia; RO
- Romania; HR - Croatia; SERB - Serbia; MNTR - Montenegro.
Bulgaria, October 02Southeast Europe,
January 02
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l consultations with stakeholders on future tax legislation changes;
l better coordination between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Interior to improve tax collection.
Additionally, MoF declared that it had launched a campaign to check
whether the values of luxury property and declared incomes of its owners
match. The successful completion of this campaign will demonstrate
political will and administrative ability in the Government to cope with
pervasive tax evasion. According to MoF data the budget loses annually
above BGL 1.1 bln. in social security and personal income tax revenues
from evasion, while unpaid company tax liabilities towards mid-2002 have
amounted to BGL 928 mln.
D.3.2. Customs and Corruption
Globalization and the continuous increase in international trade flows
render the Customs Agency a control point of significant economic
resources and increase the potential risks of power abuse and corruption.
The Customs Agency collects the bulk of value added tax, which is the
primary budget tax revenue. Additionally, evading VAT and customs duties
through corrupt practices gives companies considerable competitive edge
over their rivals, which stimulates the offering of unofficial payments to
customs officials.
Despite launched cus-
toms reforms in the be-
ginning of 2002, society
preserved its opinion
that corruption is wide
spread among customs
officials. An indirect
proof that being a cus-
toms officer pays off is
the unusually high de-
mand for customs jobs.
In 2002 38 people ap-
plied for 1 customs of-
ficer place, while the
country average ratio
was 25/1. At the same
time in a number of sur-
veys conducted during
the year businesses pin-
point unfair competition,
which in its greatest part
comes through il legal
imports, as one of the major setbacks to their development.
The activities of Crown Agents consultants were the basic tool of
Governments efforts on reforms and countering corruption in the customs
system in 2002. Although it is rather early to give conclusive assessment
of Crown Agents effectiveness, the results they have achieved in 2002
seem to be modest:
FIGURE 27. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG CUSTOMS OFFICERS
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000, October 2002; SELDI, January 2002
Bulgaria, October 02Southeast Europe,
January 02
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l most of the existing channels and schemes for gray imports are still
operational. Some of them have been modified to adapt to changes in
customs control mechanisms (e.g. import of fruits and vegetables from
Turkey, Greece and Macedonia, fuel imports, Chinese imports);
l increase in revenues is not exceptional but follows the trend of the
last four years;
l the first results from the functioning of mobile groups for customs
control produce skepticism among observers about their effectiveness.
Still there have been a number of positive signs in 2002, which directly
or indirectly point to a decrease in the customs corruption potential:
l customs fraud detection increased by 70% on the previous year;
l contraband channels lost political protection;
l the Government  and the EU closed the Customs Union negotiation
chapter;
l an Ethics Code for Customs Officials was adopted;
l the Customs Agency increased its internal control capacity through its
participation in projects with anti-corruption elements financed by
the World bank and EU;
l the Customs Agency signed a memorandum of understanding with the
Ministry of Interior and the State Internal Financial Control Agency.
Accelerating reforms and increasing their combined positive effect
necessitate the practical implementation or completion of a number of
measures, part of which have been included in the National Anti-Corruption
Program. The following several steps should be launched with priority:
l Developing new forms of cooperation between law enforcement
agencies to stop and prevent contraband, trafficking, illegal imports
and corrupt practices that go with them. New, contemporary models
of cooperation between customs authorities and the Ministry of Interior
and the National Investigation Service should be introduced to replace
the bureaucratic and ineffective mechanisms of the past;
l Ensuring information exchange between customs and tax authorities
through the introduction of mandatory mechanisms for constant
juxtaposition of data from customs and tax declarations to ensure
maximal compliance;
l Completing and launching the Bulgarian Integrated Customs
Information System. Additionally, a system for mutual exchange of
information should be created between Bulgarian border customs
points and those of neighboring countries;
l The Customs Agency should regularly release publicly its financial results.
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D.3.3. Public Expenditure Management and Corruption
In view of the low administrative capacity for management and control
of public expenditures reducing their overall amount would lower
corruption pressure in the country. The Law on State Budget of Republic of
Bulgaria for 2002 sets consolidated non-interest expenditures at 38% of
GDP, which is a 1% increase over 2001. The level of central and local
government expenditures remains high for the particular stage of
development of the economy and the state administration. Their level is
appropriately lowered to 36% of GDP for 2003. However, the actual
expenditures at the end of the year will most probably stand at 2-3 %
higher. At the same time according to National Statistical Institute data
government consumption expenditure was 9.8% of GDP (BGL 1.4 bln.)
for the first half of 2002, unchanged over 2001. This level is considered
appropriate to prevent excessive corruption and should not be
exceeded in the future. At the same time the government should
undertake more decisive action to cut the overall state burden,
measured by non-interest expenditures to GDP, to below 30%.
Like previous years, 2002 witnessed a series of irregularities in budget
resources management, which create an environment favorable to
corruption:
l Budget organizations have not made sufficient efforts to collect their
receivables;
l The government has redistributed considerable budget surpluses
without relevant authorization from Parliament;
l Additional resources have been made available to organizations, over
and above their budgets.
In view of the above Parliament should considerably strengthen the
controlling authority of the National Audit Office. At present the latter can
only detect and describe offences. It should be authorized to stop irregular
use of public resources and to indict those responsible. The State Internal
Financial Control Agency (SIFCA), which has greater executive powers, is
still too slow to react and in many cases it detects offences only after the
respective terms of limitation for administrative liability have expired.
On the positive side, the government has taken some measures to improve
the transparency of the budget procedure for 2003, which would allow
better control over public spending decisions:
l The preparation of budget 2003 has begun earlier than in previous years;
l All primary budget authorizing offices have been required to present
their own three year expenditure frameworks, subject to centrally
determined ceilings;
l The Report on Budget 2003 is more detailed and complete than any
one in the past.
More measures should be introduced to guarantee long-term
containment of corruption risks in the area of public spending:
l Completion MoF and primary budget authorizing offices capacity for
strategic programming of expenses;
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l Considerable improvement of accounting transparency and strength-
ening of accountability for budget surpluses redistribution;
l Strengthening SIFCA and Central Audit Offices supervision and control
functions. The Offices recommendations should be obligatory for all
state entities;
l Improvement of financial management capacity at the local level
(especially in small municipalities).
Public opinion continues to associate with corruption and abuse two main
areas of significant public resource spending and redistribution -
municipal budget adjustment and health care.
The central government has been adjusting municipal budgets for
years, through a complex mechanism of subsidies, which enables direct
political control over local governments and creates favorable
prerequisites for the use of public resources for party purposes. The
Government has preserved this mechanism in 2002. With view of
reducing its corruption potential, local governments should be allowed
to develop local revenue sources and use them fully, while central and
local spending responsibilities should be clearly defined. In 2002 the
Government adopted a Strategy for Financial Decentralization, which lays
the foundation for solving the above-identified problems. However, its
practical implementation has been delayed until 2004, which shows the
governments willingness to retain its control on local level before the
local elections due in the fall of 2003.
According to Ministry of
Healthcare data for 2002
unofficial payments in
the healthcare system
amount to BGL 200 - 260
mln. (i.e. about 20% of
government spending
on healthcare). Addition-
ally, experts from the Na-
tional Health Insurance
Fund estimate that be-
tween BGL 10 mln. and
BGL 20 mln. (5-10% of
total budget costs) of re-
imbursement payments
for medicines have been
absorbed through fraud.
This data exemplifies the
huge corruption poten-
tial of the healthcare
system in its present
state. In view of contain-
ing this potential concentrated and consistent efforts are needed in sev-
eral directions:
l Gradual increase in healthcare budget under strict observance of
financial discipline;
FIGURE 28. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG DOCTORS
(GENERAL PUBLIC) (%)
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000, October 2002; SELDI, January 2002
Bulgaria, October 02Southeast Europe,
January 02
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l Improvement of specialized doctors remuneration;
l Reduction in the number of hospitals and transition to a single source
healthcare financing;
l Introduction of stricter and more effective control over reimbursement
of medicines costs, in view of their substantial rise in the future;
l Creation of favorable conditions for supply of private healthcare
services, including private healthcare insurance.
D.3.4. Public Procurement and Corruption
Public procurement is the major mechanism for channeling public funds
and resources to the private sector. The substantial amount of funds being
transferred and the inadequate administrative control in Bulgaria render
public procurement as one of the major corruption risk areas. Therefore,
public procurement must be thoroughly regulated and its administration
should be transparent and competent.
For the past several years
public procurement in
Bulgaria has amounted to
above BGL 1 bln. a year.
According to business
surveys public procure-
ment contracting is a
major source of corrup-
tion in the country,
which generates consid-
erable unofficial rev-
enues for state adminis-
tration officials. Conser-
vative estimates put the
figure of unofficial pay-
ments for 2002 at BGN 15
mln. Furthermore, cor-
ruption in public procure-
ment is systemic - more
than half of companies
who have taken part in
public procurement ten-
ders state that they have
made unofficial payments
to receive every second
contract.
Irregularities in public procurement contracting are especially severe
in Bulgarian municipalities. These require additional attention in at least
two directions:
l Improvement of the administrative capacity for public resource
management in Bulgarian municipalities;
l Strengthening control mechanisms (both preliminary and subsequent)
of public procurement.
FIGURE 29. RELATIVE SHARE OF AWARDED PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
CONTRACTS FOR WHICH COMPANIES MADE INFORMAL
PAYMENTS
Source: Vitosha Research, Integra, Corruption in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises,
June 2002.
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FIGURE30. AVERAGE SIZE OF INFORMAL PAYMENTS MADE TO OBTAIN
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS AS A RELATIVE SHARE
OF THE CONTRACT VALUE
Source: Vitosha Research, Integra, Corruption in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises,
June 2002.
It is important that these
measures be implemented
before the completion of
fiscal decentralization.
In April 2002 Parliament
adopted a Law on Amend-
ments to the Law on Public
Procurement (LPP) (State
Gazette no. 45/2002).
The main amendments
with anti-corruption
bearing are:
l Improved transpar-
ency and control mecha-
nisms through better ac-
cess to evaluation com-
mittees records; precise
specification of contract-
ing procedures; improved
publicity rules; faster court
appeal mechanisms; and
a wider use of commodity exchanges;
l Optimization and reduction in  time periods for public procurement
announcement; for drawing statements on offences; and for dispute
resolution;
l Provisions for more competition through broadening and precise
specification of legal object and subjects under LPP; definition of tender
documentation pricing mechanisms; separating participation and execution
guarantees; and banning contracting without specified time limits.
There is still not enough data to assess objectively whether these new law
provisions have been effectively enforced in the practice.
In spite of good legislative progress in 2002, more measures should be
taken to curb corruption in public procurement, the most important of
which are:
l Establishing an independent Agency on Public Procurement responsible
for the overall execution and monitoring of public procurement;
l The Central Audit Office and the State Internal Financial Control Agency
should be authorized to perform preliminary control over public
procurement, i.e. before contracting. Additionally, their efforts should
be better coordinated;
l Complex procurement cases, in which only part of the activities
envisaged fall under the application scope of LPP, should be better
regulated. In such cases law provisions should be applied even if only
one of the activities falls into the scope of the law;
l Evaluation committees technical skills should be improved, while their
members administrative and criminal liability should be defined more
clearly.
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According to public opinion polls state asset management, privatization
and concessions continue to be the areas most burdened with corrupt
practices in 2002.
In the beginning of 2002 Parliament adopted a Law on Privatization and
Post-Privatization Control (LPPC), which replaced the old 1992 privatization
law. The new law aims at transparent, fast and economically effective
privatization under equal investor treatment. It contains a number of anti-
corruption elements:
l It repeals all preferences given to any class of investors;
l It institutes the practice that non-monetary means of payment can
only be used in sales of a specified list of enterprises;
l It introduces more transparent sales methods - public tender, auction,
publicly announced competition and offering of shares through the
stock exchange
l It defines the Privatization Agency as the only body authorized and
responsible for privatization;
l It stipulates the introduction of public registries on privatization and
post-privatization control.
The new privatization model has already proven its transparency and
fiscal effectiveness. In 2002 privatization revenues have amounted to BGL
207 mln. from 262 deals. Transparency and absence of corruption
allegations is rewarding, as has been best proven in the banking
privatization of 2002. In an open and competitive procedure, the Banking
Consolidation Company has succeeded in attracting the third largest EU
bank to acquire 80% of Biochim Bank for EUR 82.5 mln.
However, only a limited part of LPPCs anticorruption potential
materialized in 2002.      Practically none of the bylaws to LPPC has been
adopted in the stipulated two months period. The governments inability
to enforce the laws provisions in time resulted in sluggish privatization
and failure of the privatization program for 2002. This in return has
increased opportunities for interested parties to adjust to the new situation
and indirectly has raised the corruption potential in privatization. A good
example in this direction is the slow and difficult execution of the biggest
privatization deals for 2002 - those of Bulgartabak and Bulgarian
Telecommunications Company. The courts controversial intervention in
both cases, to stop sales to internationally recognized foreign investors,
has left doubts of the existence of political intervention and corruption in
the judiciary. At the same time the Privatization Agency has failed to provide
convincing enough proof that no conflict of interest or any wrongdoing
has occurred in the two deals. In addition to delays in LPPCs enforcement,
in 2002 Parliament adopted a number of amendments to the existing
privatization texts, some of which seem to serve specific private interests
and might be connected to corruption. Especially worrying in this respect
are actions attempting to include more enterprises in the list of non-
privatizable ones. International fair, Plovdiv has already been added to the
list and MPs have persistently demanded that the Bulgarian Maritime Feet
and the Bulgarian River Fleet be included too.
D.4. State Asset
Management,
Privatization and
Post-Privatization
Control
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LPPC regulates the es-
tablishment of an
Agency Post-Privati-
zation Control Agency
(PPCA) - a specialized
governmental body to
oversee and control
the proper execution of
buyer obligations un-
dertaken in privatiza-
tion contracts. PPCA
has been established
with a six months delay
and still lacks adequate
financial backing. PPCA
has considerable controlling powers, which in combination with an explicit
ban on renegotiation of privatization deals might be a prerequisite for cor-
ruption pressure from buyers. To avoid such pressures the government should:
l Ensure maximal transparency of PPCAs functioning;
l Supply the Agency with an adequate technical base and resources to
perform its duties.
In 2002 the Post-Privatization Control Agency presented its first report on
the observation of buyers contractual obligations undertaken in 2 500
deals concluded in the 1993 - 2001 period. In spite of the many contrac-
tual offences detected the probability that the state will recover at least
part of the estimated losses is very low taking into consideration that many
of the envisaged enterprises have already undergone substantial changes.
However, bearing in mind that privatization has been one of the ma-
jor channels for money laundering, the report should be used by the
prosecution to check incorrect buyers. Until the end of 2002 the pros-
ecution has examined 210 privatization deals and has sent to court 86 of
them. No court decision has yet been taken on any of them.
The delays in the
privatization process
lead to the preserva-
tion of states partici-
pation in the manage-
ment structures of en-
terprises, which might
lead to corruption
pressures in two direc-
tions. First, the ruling
party might use man-
agement board seats
to pay back for elec-
toral support. Second,
the participation of
state administration
representatives in
company manage-
ment creates strong
TABLE 8. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANNUAL
PRIVATIZATION PLAN BY NOVEMBER 31, 2002
Source: Privatization Agency
Indicators Plan Report Implementation Ratio
Deals 349 71 20,3%
Minority Packages 315 48 15,2%
Payments Contracted (thous. BGN) 748 493 316 558 42,3%
Privatization Costs (thous. BGN) 25 277 5 612 22,2%
TABLE 9. ESTIMATED BUDGET LOSSES DUE TO BUYERS
FAILURE TO FULFILL CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD 1993 - 2001.
Source: Agency for Post-Privatization Control
Estimated Losses Mln. BGN
Reduction in contracted prices 6.7
Reduction in agreed level of investment 280.8
Default on agreed level of investment 480.0
Default on price payments 77.8
Default on interest and penalty payments 38.3
Labor obligations penalties 103.0
Other penalties 60.0
Total 1046.6
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vested interests for delaying privatization further. The problem with
management and advisory board assignments of administration offi-
cials has not been resolved in 2002. It is even more acute in big Bulgar-
ian municipalities. The upcoming local elections in the fall of 2003 might
make things even worse. In 2002 some MPs have proposed that state
officials be banned from participation in more than one management or
supervisory board, while their salary is limited to not more than two times
the country average. Politically appealing as they are, such proposals will
not solve the problem but will only alter the forms of corruption.
Concessions and big infrastructure projects are areas, which contain
substantial corruption potential, because they transfer exclusive rights
of public resource management into private hands for considerable
periods of time and they still lack adequate legal framework. The
government should ensure more transparency in both areas in view of
their significant increase in the coming years.
The lack of clearly-defined rules for concession-granting and low
subsequent control on their execution has resulted in 2002 in a
number of public scandals and contract breaks in cases of municipal
utilities and coastal strips concessions.
The upcoming privatization and concession-granting in the energy
sector has already raised concerns and corruption allegations. In
2002 the respected German multinational RWE has declared that
there have been groups in the Ministry of Energy (MoE), who backed
private interests to prevent its daughter company Rheinbrown from
obtaining a mining concession on the Maritsa-Iztok coal mines. In
spite of MoE declarations that it strictly abides by the new Law on
Concessions, the apparent inconsistency between its actions and that
of some MPs and the stated governmental policy for attracting more
quality investors in the country, raises justified concerns of existing
corrupt practices in this area. Moreover so, the rest of the candidates
who have stated their willingness to obtain this concession are being
closely associated by society with corruption in other areas in the
past.
Similarly, private interests seem to raise corruption concerns and
to block the Bulgarian participation in the Bourgas - Alexandrupolis
oil pipeline construction. The apparent support of a high ranking
official from the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works
for one of the candidates to the project, as well as the public
concession of the Minister that he has resigned because he has been
unable to contain corruption within the Ministry, show that urgent
anti-corruption measures are needed in this area.
Organized crime is clearly the most important source of grand
(political) corruption. Therefore, if the government aims at coping with
corruption in the long run, it should concentrate on containing the black
economy.
From the second half of the nineties, organized crime has
undertaken the following steps towards its integration into the
D.5. Black Economy
and Corruption
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Bulgarian business and politics:
l through privatization, control of imports and exports,
racketeering, establishing monopolies in a number of the most
profitable economic sectors, etc.
l redistribution of the profit from economic activity (import and
export of raw materials and commodities, wholesale of
agricultural and industrial production, financial institutions,
tourism, etc.).
l control over the black economy (revenues from petty crime,
car theft, drug trafficking and drug distribution, prostitution,
human trafficking, counterfeiting of money and securities, etc.).
l venturing into new methods for financial crime (cyber crime,
credit card fraud, etc.)
l creation of durable corruption networks through redistribution
of dirty money among the lobbies of the organized crime in
government structures.
Source: Center for the Study of Democracy, The Economy of Crime, Discussion Topics
for international conference in November 2002
In 2002 the government has launched efforts to block some of the
main sources of finance for the organized crime in Bulgaria, through
customs reforms and improvements in the work of specialized units to
the Ministry of Interior. In view of sustaining good results in countering
corruption and the black economy, the government should considerably
improve coordination between government institutions. Additionally
the Government should strengthen anti-money laundering measures
and ensure their effective implementation. Parliaments delay to adopt
the Law on the Amendments to the Law on Measures against Money Laundering
creates possibilities for organized crime to conceal important tracks.
The legislative framework for countering organized crime has not been
improved in 2002. In this relation the following laws should be adopted
and/or amended with priority:
l Law on the Financing of Political Parties - all sources of financing to the
political parties should be clearly defined and publicly known;
l Draft Law on Publicity and Registration of Lobbyists and Lobbying Activity -
it should guarantee full transparency of lobbying activities;
l Draft Law on the Forfeiture to the State of Property Acquired through Illegal
Activities - it should ensure an adequate and transparent mechanism
on forfeiture of property acquired through illegal means, while
guaranteeing property rights.
fl fl fl
In response to increased public pressure, in 2002 the Government has
undertaken a series of anti-corruption initiatives in the economy.
Relatively few of them, however, have been put to practice. Their
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combined effect on limiting corruption can be assessed as moderately
positive. In this view further efforts in a number of areas are needed to
complete reforms:
l Improve administrative capacity to implement and control government
intervention policies in the economy;
l Reform of the judiciary to reduce the scope of its discretionary
judgments in the economy;
l Priority completion of the legislative and institutional framework for
countering organized crime;
l Ensure strong consensual political support for reforms, as improved
effectiveness in l imiting corruption might lead to increased
counteractive pressures from hurt economic agents.
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E. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
E.1.1. Public-Private Partnership against Corruption
The past year was again marked by a tendency towards ever-increasing
role of civil society in formulating the public anti-corruption agenda.
The involvement of the various NGOs and mass media in establishing the
priorities of public counteraction of this phenomenon was driven by both
the activeness or (in their role of facilitating civic involvement) failure to
act of state institutions. In this respect the anti-corruption potential of
civil society in turn reflects the elevated status of corruption-related issues
in the context of the countrys EU and NATO integration.
The anti-corruption priorities of civil society generally coincide with the
goals set in the National Anti-Corruption Strategy adopted by the government
in October 2001. In the course of 2002 representatives of the non-
governmental anti-corruption initiative Coalition 2000 and other
independent experts took part in a Working Group to discuss the Program
for the Implementation of the National Strategy to Fight Corruption and to
outline an Action Plan with specific proposals and forms of cooperation
between state institutions, non-governmental organizations, and the
media. Measures were envisioned to create a favorable environment and
conditions for broad public commitment against the manifestations of
corruption, to elaborate joint plans for extended cooperation, special
programs for involvement of national and private media in anti-corruption
awareness-raising activities, etc.
These intentions, however, were not followed up by specific action. The
clearly formulated task of securing proper channels to inform the
institutions and the public about the results of the anti-corruption efforts
failed to be implemented. This comes as yet another argument in favor
of reinforced civic control not only at the stage of defining the anti-
corruption objectives, but equally over the real actions of the
respective state institutions.
Civic anti-corruption initiatives using monitoring and independent
assessment are becoming an established social practice. One positive
implication of the otherwise alarming fact that 90% of the funds raised
from donors for the third sector come from abroad is that, on the one
hand, Bulgarian NGOs have managed to assert their autonomy vis-à-vis
the state, and on the other hand, that they have become part of a
transnational mechanism to monitor the reforms and respectively, to assess
the anti-corruption actions of the authorities in this country. Despite the
limitations of their scope, these initiatives and the respective projects
help set standards of transparency and accountability in certain particularly
high-risk sectors and activities in terms of civic rights and interests.
The focus on human-rights implications of anti-corruption, along with a
E.1. Non-Governmental
Organizations
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sustained critical distance from the authorities, has been characteristic of
the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, a member of the International Helsinki
Federation for Human Rights. The civic organization Transparency without
Borders is in turn part of the international network specializing in the
anti-corruption sphere, Transparency International.
Another, more ambitious type of partnership could be defined as trilateral
partnership - i.e., anti-corruption partnership between international
donors, their Bulgarian non-governmental counterparts, and the
respective state institutions in this country. One instance of such
partnership has been USAIDs three-year Open Governance Initiative
project, launched in 2002, which brings together the efforts of the Coalition
2000 and state institutions. What is characteristic of this type of public-
private partnership is that it unfolds in the context of the anti-corruption
reforms in state structures, such as the National Audit Office and the
Public Procurement Directorate with the Council of Ministers.
Furthermore, it aims at harmonizing, to the extent possible, the priorities
of state institutions and those of civil society. Such trilateral cooperation
reflects the common anti-corruption interests of civil society, state
institutions, and foreign partners, who support the strategic areas of the
reform in Bulgaria.  It should be noted that the partnership is not solely
confined to funding, but also involves drawing on the experience and
know-how that a structure of the scale of USAID is in position to mobilize.
Leading non-governmental organizations such as the Foundation for Local
Government Reform and the National Association of Municipalities in
Bulgaria have been instrumental for the implementation of a number of
pilot projects on transparency, accountability, and good governance
(such as the establishment of Municipal Information Centers, the
computerization of municipal administrative services, and the introduction
of comprehensive service at one office).
Another positive outcome of partnership has been the establishment of
the mandatory financial accountability procedure, which proceeds in line
with European standards and comprises auditing of the projects by
international auditors.  Thus the anti-corruption projects are themselves
implemented in accordance with the accountability standards established
in the practice of the advanced democracies and in this sense, constitute
a model of transparency in this important sphere.
E.1.2. Coalition 2000 Activities
In 2002 the non-governmental anti-corruption initiative Coalition 2000
carried out a number of activities to expand the transparency and
accountability of the public sector and enhance the anti-corruption
potential of civil society:
l The monitoring of public perceptions and attitudes to corruption
continued. The quarterly Corruption Indexes of Coalition 2000 enjoy
unswerving interest on the part of the public, the media, and the
political elites. Their announcement becomes a media event with a
tangible impact.
l In terms of the anti-corruption public awareness campaign, the past
year was marked by a shift of the emphasis to specialized publications
dealing with specific problems related to corrupt practices and anti-
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TABLE 10. COALITION 2000 ACTIVITIES
IN THE PERIOD 1999 - 2002
Coalition 2000 Activities Total 1999-2002
Information days 19
Radio broadcasts 25
TV programs 5
Clean Future Newsletter 7
Round Tables 60
Anti-corruption readers 9
Other publications 13
Public discussions and seminars on the 19
introduction of the Ombudsman institution,
international conferences
Public discussions on anti-corruption draft 8
laws, codes of ethics, and
anti-corruption projects
Monthly electronic newsletter 38
Corruption Assessment Report 4
Policy Forum 4
corruption activities.
l At the same time,
the educational com-
ponent of anti-cor-
ruption has been as-
suming increasing im-
portance in its own
right. Preparing the
second edition of the
Anticorruption hand-
book and the training
of experts for the
needs of the higher
education system will
help incorporate anti-
corruption topics and
lectures in the system
of secondary educa-
tion and in civil soci-
ety lecture series.
l The expert and con-
sultative capacity of
Coalition 2000  was
drawn on in the prepa-
ration and implementa-
tion of awareness campaigns on the new laws on the electronic signa-
ture, on political parties, on the newly adopted amendments to the
Criminal Code and the Law on the Judiciary. In this way, and as a result of
anti-corruption cooperation with a number of European and international
organizations, public pressure was exerted to adopt the principles of trans-
parency and accountability  in political life in this country.
l What proved most successful was the long-term cooperation between
experts from the third sector and from state institutions within the
framework of working groups on crucial problem areas of corruption
and its counteraction. In the course of the year a Task Force on the
Gray Economy and Corruption was set up in addition to the already
existing Task Force on Trafficking and Corruption. Thus a consultative
mechanism is emerging for assessment and estimation of the entire
cycle of the economy of crime: from the gray and black (illegal)
imports, through the shadow economy and the corrupt redistribution
of criminal money, to its reintegration in the official economy using
money-laundering mechanisms.
Results of the Mechanism for Assessment of the Economy of
Crime
 Two Coalition 2000 studies dealing with the connection between
trafficking and corruption were published in the course of the year.
Smuggling in Southeast Europe examines the processes of transborder
crime in the context of the Yugoslav conflicts. More specifically, it
explores the evolution of state/party monopoly over trafficking in
94 CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT REPORT 2002
the post-Yugoslav states to secondary privatization of the trafficking
channels by those who were initially the executors of the political
will of their party and military leaderships. The alarming fact is
pointed out that a tacit alliance seems to be emerging in the Western
Balkans between the shadow structures of the individual states and
national communities. Within this scheme Bulgaria plays the role
of an intermediary in international trafficking, connecting the
Middle East and Asia with the Western Balkans, and from there,
with Central and Western Europe.
Corruption, Trafficking, and Institutional Reform is a study that further
explores a number of topics considered in an earlier publication of
2000. It contains the first classification of corruption levels and
practices in customs. There is also an expert assessment of the scope
of trafficking by product category. The study finally assesses the
anti-corruption reform within the system of the Ministry of Interior
and in customs and makes recommendations about ways to improve
coordination and enhance the efficiency of the measures to
intercept transborder crime.
Both studies have been published in Bulgarian and English and are
available at www.anticorruption.bg.
l The new stage in the implementation of anti-corruption initiatives at
a municipal level included monitoring of the gray areas of corruption
risk in local government and in the municipal administration of a
number of Bulgarian towns (public procurement, use of municipal
property, processing of citizens complaints about corrupt practices,
municipal privatization, and others).
l The active involvement of Coalition 2000 in the public debate on one
of the most topical issues in domestic and international politics - the
fight against terrorism and organized crime attracted considerable
public attention. Public discussions were initiated  focusing on the
correlation between organized crime and corruption and on the need
for new models of counteraction. There was broad public response to
a number of forums organized by Coalition 2000 with the participation
of representatives of state institutions, independent experts, and the
media. These included the public discussion of the draft law for the
amendment to the Law on the Judiciary, the presentation of the Draft
law on measures against the financing of terrorism, the discussion on the
Draft law on asset forfeiture, round tables with the participation of
emblematic figures in the fight against corruption and organized crime,
such as European Parliament Member Antonio Di Pietro, French
Investigating Judge Eva Joly, and others.
l In the course of 2002 the efforts of Coalition 2000 to introduce the
ombudsman institution in Bulgaria acquired a new dimension.
Whereas in the previous phase the Coalition focused on the elaboration
of a draft law, in 2002 it made successful efforts to implement
mechanisms of the ombudsman type on a local level. On the initiative
of Coalition 2000, a number of Municipal Councils decided to introduce
local ombudsmen or civic mediators. The practical implementation
and experience on a local level are of great importance for the adoption
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of this democratic institution in Bulgaria and for the adoption of the
respective legislation.
l Relatively recent are the efforts of non-governmental organizations to
launch public-private partnership in the sector of security reform.
Anti-corruption is becoming an issue that brings together the interests
of the reforming law-enforcement authorities, some non-governmental
organizations such as the Center for the Study of Democracy, and
their international partners.
E.1.3. Problems and Challenges Facing Civic Organizations
Along with the good practices, the third sector is also faced with certain
structural weaknesses in its anti-corruption activity:
l The poor coordination between the analytical centers and foundations
in the anti-corruption sphere.
l The limited duration of a number of anti-corruption projects, which is
not conducive to making these issues a strategic priority of the
respective non-governmental organizations.
l The inadequate coordination between the international organizations
sponsoring anti-corruption projects, which impedes the more effective
support of the third sector, and others.
The non-governmental sector itself continues to generate corrupt
practices. In the course of the year under review there was a succession
of publications in the media containing allegations against certain
foundations dedicated to supporting the Roma communities in Bulgaria.
The articles criticized the redistribution of donor funds, a considerable
portion of which have allegedly not been spent on the implementation
of the respective project goals.
It should be equally noted that some civic organizations make use of
their platforms and professed public goals in the self-interest of their
members while achieving minimum social impact with the projects they
work on. There is a continuing tendency towards token activities by some
NGOs, which skillfully adjust to the priorities of the financing organizations
and are becoming ever more expert in the bureaucratic jargon when
reporting their otherwise quite modest activities. In the absence of
sufficiently effective control over project implementation by the financing
organizations, there emerge conditions for corruption-related abuse in
this sector.
In 2002 the media covered a number of corrupt practices, which were
the subject of journalistic investigations, analyses, and commentaries. A
great many of the cases exposed and investigated actually started from
and through the media. What is more - investigative reporting continues
to prove more effective in exposing corruption-related crimes than
the competent authorities, despite its limited instruments and capabilities.
In the sphere of political corruption, attention was largely focused on the
investigations of privatization deals initiated by the prosecution, as well as
assumptions of corruption in connection with the activity of the government.
E.2. Media,
Information
Environment, and
Anti-Corruption
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More specifically, the
media stressed the
following problems of
systematic corruption:
- the enduring influ-
ence of organized
crime over the
mechanisms of
power;
- the corrupt prac-
tices sustained by
the very authori-
ties bound to inter-
cept, investigate,
and punish acts of
corruption ( law
enforcement and
the judiciary);
- the continuing ex-
istence of a multi-
tude of registration
and licensing re-
gimes;
- the practice of legitimate personal gain by public officials, including
from the top ranks, through participation in state owned company
boards of directors;
- the adoption of legislation that gives rise to doubts about outright
lobbying or even clientelism.
In addition, the media were also concerned with the reasons for the
poor impact of the governments anti-corruption activities, among
which:
- the coordination problems between the different bodies
counteracting corruption;
- the discrepancy between the declared intention to expose large-
scale corruption crime and the modest achievements of the
executive in this respect;
- certain appointments raising doubts about corruption.
Most of the publications and programs, however, dealt primarily with
corrupt practices in the lower ranks of public officials (about corrupt police
and customs officers and others). This may actually indicate an objective
decrease of the instances of political corruption. At the same time, there
are additional reasons for the reorientation of a number of journalists
towards exposure of cases of abuse of public office in the lower ranks of
the administration, and more notably:
- fear of criminal prosecution;
- lack of support from law enforcement, the administration, and the
judiciary;
- shortage of resources, time, and funds;
FIGURE 31. MONTHLY NUMBER OF ARTICLES ON CORRUPTION IN THE
PRESS*
Source: CMS - media monitoring
(*) Note: No monitoring has been carried out in the period January - April 2002.
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- concerns about possible pressure and covert reprisal against the
media themselves;
- lack of transparency in the top ranks of power.
In addition to these obstacles, the work of the reporters is still impeded
by the poorly regulated and obscure legal and institutional
environment in which the media operate and develop. The more notable
problems in this respect are:
- Impeded access to information, often labeled classified and
official or state secret without sufficient grounds.
- The possibility still exists to compel reporters to disclose their
sources of information.
- Administrative obstacles to obtain the information needed;
- Deficiencies in the registers.
- Poor interaction with both the law enforcement authorities and
the judiciary system - the two basic units in counteracting and
punishing corrupt practices.
- Continuing inertia on the part of the competent authorities, who
rarely initiate proceedings themselves based on journalistic reports
and revelations despite the possibilities offered by the Criminal
Procedure Code.
- The practical application of the Law on the Access to Public
Information, which was adopted two years ago, has proven
controversial. This piece of legislation is supposed to help remove
some of the obstacles before investigative and anti-corruption
reporting, all the more that it explicitly lays down journalists right
not to disclose their sources. However, journalists come up against
a number of difficulties when invoking this Law and in some
situations are confronted with even greater obstacles than before.
One emblematic case was the governments failure to promptly
allow access to the transcripts of Council of Ministers sessions. There
have been dozens of other cases when requests for access to public
information actually led to court action.
- The remaining two legal acts on public information were adopted
in 2002 - Law on the Protection of Personal Data and Law on the
Protection of Classified Information. Neither of the two laws or some
of the by-laws regulating their application were implemented
effectively in 2002. There are warranted fears that the two laws
and the accompanying by-laws could actually impede even further
the access to information and pose yet another obstacle before
investigative reporting.
- The Law on Radio and Television still contains a provision allowing
the disclosure of a source of information. Another problem in
the same law is the provision that radio and television operators
cannot create and disseminate programs containing information
about citizens private life without their consent. Private life is
defined as a persons life in its family, health, and sexual aspects.
The law nevertheless allows reference to information in the public
interest about the private life of persons vested with public authority
or citizens whose decisions have an impact on society.
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- Another group of problems were related to the performance and
professional advancement of journalists active in this sphere. There
was a tangible shortage of qualified and motivated journalists
covering the corruption / anti-corruption thematic cycle.
In this connection, a number of obstacles and weaknesses within the
media themselves need to be brought up for public debate:
- Lack of practical experience among a considerable number of the
journalists covering this subject;
- Inadequate legal awareness of some of the journalists;
- A strong inclination to sensational reporting, tolerated and even
encouraged by the editorial policy of many periodicals;
- Insufficient responsibility when making corruption-related
revelations, the reluctance to double-check the reported facts,
exaggeration and manipulation of the data, etc.
- The high rate of mortality of journalistic revelations owing to the
quest for ever-new sensations and scoops, the lack of sufficient
motivation to complete the investigations and/or reluctance of the
reporters to confront the persons exposed;
- Instances when the media are used for personal or inter-institutional
settling of scores;
- The emergence of symptoms of degradation of the medias
independence and the subjection of the editorial policy of some of
them to group or corporate interests;
- The imposition of a tacit editorial taboo (or reporters auto-
censorship) on cases of violations and abuse of power by law-
enforcement authorities or the judiciary.
The overcoming of the existing weaknesses and obstacles to investigative
reporting require efforts in the following areas:
1. Improving the professional qualification of journalists through
various educational initiatives:
- Organizing legal courses for investigative reporters and
representatives of the media concerned with corruption;
- Anti-corruption courses for media representatives similar to the
lectures envisioned for public officials;
- Creating special awards for journalists with major contributions to
the fight against corruption, as proposed in the 1998 Anti-Corruption
Action Plan of Coalition 2000.
2. Improving the interaction between the media and state institutions
- Improving the cooperation between the judiciary and law-
enforcement authorities on the one hand, and the media, on the
other, including by the creation of special information units;
- Setting up hotlines and joint complaint offices, both within the
respective state institutions and the media themselves;
- Publicly disclosing each proven case of corruption, particularly in
the higher ranks of power.
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3. Improving anti-corruption cooperation between the media and non-
governmental organizations
An important development in this respect was the launch in 2002 of the
anti-corruption monitoring of the media within Coalition 2000. The main
goal of the monitoring is to determine the intensity of media coverage of
the corruption problem and to assess the role of the media in shaping
public opinion and attitudes to this phenomenon. A database was created
for the purpose, with daily entry of items from all of the media monitored
and weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual media monitoring reports.
The anti-corruption monitoring will help journalists follow the evolution
of corruption revelations, as well as their coverage in the media.
This activity will also allow the creation of an ongoing calendar of
corruption disclosures, making it possible to monitor the reactions of
the media and the concerned authorities after the initial corruption
revelations. Such an initiative will further help the journalists keep up-to-
date about the status of the individual corruption cases and get background
information on the exposed facts.
Anti-Corruption Pressure Group
The Anti-Corruption Pressure Group is a project of the ACCESS
Association - Sofia (2001-2002) using media publications to refer
cases of committed corruption-related crimes for prosecution. The
project combined civic control over law enforcement with
partnership between a civic group and the prosecution. Files were
opened on the basis of the 57 articles referred by the Group, as
follows: preliminary proceedings were initiated in 2 cases;
preliminary investigations were initiated in 19 cases; official decline
to launch preliminary proceedings was issued in 5 cases and the
files were closed; in 7 cases it was established that there were
pending or overdue investigations.
The cases referred for prosecution under the project were based
on the findings of a specialized media monitoring of specific
instances of corruption. This type of monitoring involved selection
and analysis of specific reports of corrupt practices brought out in
the media.
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F. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The general international consensus on the significance of corruption in
development, and in particular in the process of transition to democracy
and market economy, continued to hold ground in 2002. The interest of
the international community did not diminishing in this area; on the
contrary, it became more focused, specialized and prioritized.
Nevertheless, apart from the legal provisions of international legal
instruments, international benchmarking in anti-corruption continued
to be problematic. Levels of corruption, and effectiveness of anti-
corruption policies, in the members of the international organizations
which are working out common legislation in this area - the UN, Council
of Europe, OECD, the European Union - still varies significantly. This
makes the elaboration of universally accepted definitions of the scope of
corrupt practices - let alone their international enforcement - a continuing
challenge. Both the manifestations and sources of corruption differ
considerably from country to country and among regions making universal
anti-corruption prescriptions difficult to design.
Benchmarking difficulties are also linked to another persisting problem
faced by international efforts in this area - the reluctance to look into
cross-border sources of corruption, particularly in regions such as South-
east Europe where levels of economic development, institutionalization
of democracy, as well as the international affiliations of countries vary
significantly.
At the same time, a welcomed trend has been emerging lately with respect
to the acknowledgement of the linkages between trans-national crime
and corruption. In the post September 11 context addressing this linkage
acquires an even more poignant urgency.
As noted in the Corruption Assessment Report 2001, there is tangible
trend among Bulgarian policy makers to acknowledge the value of
international anti-corruption cooperation. This has continued in 2002,
particularly in the context of the progress made by the country in its
ranking in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.
In the late 1990s, Bulgarian governments, as well as other CEE
governments, were rather skeptical of the merits of making anti-corruption
a priority for government policy as this was seen as compromising the
countrys efforts to meet requirements for membership in the EU and
NATO. Public awareness campaigns and discussions were seen as
tarnishing Bulgarias international image with all its perceived negative
consequences - diminished investor interest, international peer
monitoring, etc.
Bulgaria has improved its ranking in the Corruption Perception Index of
Transparency International. In fact, Bulgaria is the only EU applicant
country to steadily improve its rating in the TI Corruption Perception
F.1. International
Perceptions of
Bulgarias Anti-
Corruption
Progress
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Index in the past few years.  From 66th place in 1998, Bulgaria is now at
45th place out of 102 countries ahead of countries such as the Czech
Republic, Latvia and Slovakia.
In contrast, the annual
Transition Report for
2002 of the European
Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD)
states that there was a
significant increase in the
incidence of corruption
in Bulgaria. This sug-
gests that the burden of
corruption has been
partly reduced by eco-
nomic growth and rising
sales while some of the
fundamental factors that
contribute to corruption
remain (p.28). Accord-
ing to EBRDs Business
Environment and Enter-
prise Performance Survey
the percentage of compa-
nies making bribes fre-
quently has increased from 23 in 1999 to 32.8 in 2002. The average bribe
tax (the proportion of sales that are paid in the form of unofficial pay-
ments to officials) as a percentage of annual firm revenues has increased
from 1.3 to 1.9. This should be viewed against the trend of a reduction of
the unweighted average of this type of burden. It should be noted that
the survey shows some surprisingly wide variations among countries (e.g.
the percentage of firms making bribes frequently for Georgia is almost
three times that of Armenia, while Yugoslavia has half that of Bulgaria).
Bulgaria has undertaken a number of international commitments with
respect to countering corruption. It has acceded to the leading
international instruments in this area, notably the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption and Civil Law Convention on Corruption. Bulgaria has also
continued to cooperate actively with the auxiliary and monitoring bodies
of the CoE and OECD conventions, in particular with GRECO and the
Working Group on the OECD convention.
In 2002, GRECO completed the first round of its evaluations, including
for Bulgaria, of the compliance of the member states and the Bulgaria
consented to the second phase of OECDs Working Group evaluation.
Added to several years of corruption assessment made in the European
Commissions annual Regular Report, this should provide a good
opportunity for some conclusions of the impact of international corruption
monitoring.
The adoption of the provisions of a number of advanced international
anti-corruption documents is indicative of the political will in Bulgaria to
FIGURE 32. RANKING OF SOME EU APPLICANT COUNTRIES ACCORDING
TO THE TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
PERCEPTION INDEX
Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index
http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/
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adhere to modern anti-corruption standards. At the same time, there is a
risk that a kind of legal optimism could blur the sharpness of the anti-
corruption response.
An apparent contradiction highlights this risk: although, for example, all
EU member states score better than Bulgaria in the TI Corruption
Perception Index (and for all intents and purposes could be said to be
relatively less corrupt), the majority of these countries have not ratified
the Council of Europes Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, while
Bulgaria has been among the first countries to do so.
Two conclusions could be drawn from this. The first one is by now
commonplace, namely that the adoption of legal provisions is by no means
a guarantee against widespread corruption. The gap between the
adoption of modern anti-corruption legislation in Bulgaria and the
effectiveness of its implementation, if persisting, threatens to undermine
the rule of law in general by making regulations seem irrelevant to society
and the business.
The second one, however, is that countries aspiring to EU and NATO
membership, such as Bulgaria, could be required to adopt anti-corruption
standards not part of many EU states legislation. This should have certain
implications for the international monitoring efforts in this field.
Most importantly, the monitoring mechanisms should be capable of
adapting the requirements of effectiveness and objectivity. The fact
that the publication of monitoring reports by international institutions
makes significant impact domestically should increase the requirements
that their conclusions and recommendations be both specific and
acknowledge benchmarking difficulties.  In particular, this could mean:
- adopt a system of indicators that objectively demonstrate
progress made by the country through measures, actions, policies
or strategies in the field of transparency, governance and
accountability. The European Commission, for example, is
increasingly using such indicators since its Report in 2000 when it
referred to persisting rumors;
- create synergies with other recognized monitoring systems
including national ones (Coalition 2000s Corruption Monitoring
System is a good example);
- mutual monitoring mechanisms should include an independent
expertise into their evaluation work. This would ensure: a) the
consistency of the quality of evaluation (which now depends on
the particular team and varies); b) that diplomatic considerations
do not undermine objectivity of conclusions.
An example of the limitations of peer monitoring mechanisms is the
provision of Article 15 of the GRECO statue which states that evaluation
reports shall be confidential. Nevertheless, the report for Bulgaria, adopted
in May 2002, was made public. As it was drafted in September 2001 it
does not reflect some developments in the anti-corruption environment
in the country (e.g. the adoption of the government action plan). It
correctly highlights some deficiencies of the anti-corruption infrastructure
in Bulgaria (the lack of a system of collection and processing of data with
regard to the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption
offenses; the need to redefine the role of the investigation service with
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respect to other law enforcement institutions, etc). Still, the report could
have been expected to make more specific recommendations.
The second round of OECDs monitoring of Bulgaria in the framework
of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials started
in 2002. The evaluation focused on the capacity of government agencies
trusted with the enforcement of the implementation of the provisions of
the Convention. Bulgarias participation in the Working Group on the
Convention contributes significantly to the capacity of the administration
to put into practice modern anti-corruption standards although the bribery
of foreign officials may not be among the highest corruption risks in
Bulgaria.
As the focus of assistance of the European Commission is on helping the
harmonization of rules and enhancing the capacity of the national
administrations to enforce them, it has focused on exclusive cooperation
with executive agencies. Nevertheless, in the last few years the potential
of civil society in areas such as corruption monitoring and awareness
building have received growing acknowledgement by the Commission.
This appreciation is evident, arguably for the first time in Bulgaria, in the
2002 Regular Report of the European Commission on Bulgarias progress
towards EU membership.
The Government undertook a serious consultation exercise with
NGOs and donors on the preparation of the Strategy and the Action
Plan, and these bodies will be involved in implementation. The
strong role of NGOs is to be welcomed. Measures are aimed at
preventing as well as tackling corruption. However, on some
important aspects of the strategy, such as decentralisation, the
improvement of local governance, and the establishment of
improved mechanisms for financing political parties, there is no
detail as yet on concrete measures and deadlines.
European Commission Regular Report 2002, p. 26
In 2002, the Open Society Institute undertook an evaluation effort aimed
at mapping corruption and anti-corruption policies in the ten CEE
countries aspiring for EU membership. One of the reasons prompting
this exercise was the formalistic approach both by the candidates and
the EU itself in this area. The report on Bulgaria highlights law enforcement
and judiciary aspects and lack of conflict of interest and lobbying
provisions.
The EU accession process has been one of the most important
influences on the development of anti-corruption policy, and anti-
corruption is clearly recognised by the Government as a condition
for both EU and NATO accession. Pressure from the European
Commission was instrumental in encouraging the Government to
produce the National Strategy, and anti-corruption policy has been
an important part of the Accession Partnerships. The Commission
has provided increasing assistance for the development of anti-
corruption policy.
Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy in Bulgaria, OSI, pp.82-83
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In 2002, Bulgaria participated in the negotiations for the United Nations
Convention against Corruption. Discussions of the best monitoring
mechanism of the Convention have been part of these negotiations. A
number of views have been expressed on this issue, ranging from states
that consider that it is necessary to envisage in the text of the Convention
provisions providing for a mechanism to monitor implementation to those
that have not yet expressed clear positions on the issue or have more
restrictive approach. In this context, the Bulgarian government should
take a more active role by putting forward proposals for a monitoring
mechanism that takes into account lesson learned from previous
experience in this area. Such a mechanism should include three main
elements - annual meetings of the State Parties to the Convention, a
Committee of international experts (subsidiary body) and a new more
active role of the Center for International Crime Prevention.
The most significant development in this area was the launch of the Open
Government Initiative project, implemented in the framework of an
agreement between the Bulgarian government and the US Agency for
International Development (USAID). The project focuses on building the
capacity of key government agencies, as well as civil society organizations
to prevent and tackle corruption. Within it, assistance will be provided in
the fields of the transparency and accountability of public finances and
public procurement, as well as to the process of Coalition 2000.
The latter is in continuation of the public-private partnership approach
adopted by USAID in this area. It is also indicative of a growing
appreciation of building coalitions of stakeholders in order to ensure the
effectiveness of the provision of international assistance.
Little progress has been made on a problem identified in the Corruption
Assessment Report 2001 - namely that results of the EU assistance
provided, mostly under the national Phare program, are not sufficiently
transparent. The European Commission is supporting a number of twinning
projects that have a potential anti-corruption effect - with the Prosecutor
Generals office, with the Bureau of Financial Intelligence, National Audit
Office, and others. Important as the twinning mechanism is for enhancing
administrative capacity, it needs to be supplemented with other types of
assistance (e.g. such that allow replication in other beneficiary institutions,
including non-governmental) in the field of anti-corruption to ensure its
wider impact. As noted in previous reports, the planning of the Phare
program assistance priorities still lacks adequate transparency and
excludes various stakeholders (business, NGOs, media, etc) whose
participation in anti-corruption efforts could be a guarantee of the
sustainability of reforms. Further acknowledgement is needed of the fact
that corruption - unlike most other areas of EU technical assistance -
requires extra efforts to be made for ensuring the support of these
stakeholders for anti-corruption programs as well as outreaching to the
public.
In the Second Country Cooperation Framework for Bulgaria (2002 - 2006) the
fight against corruption and the support to the judicial reform has been
identified as a major priority for United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). In July 2002 UNDP and the Ministry of Justice
started a joint project Comprehensive Review of the Administrative
Justice System in Bulgaria, which is implemented in cooperation with
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the Supreme Administrative Court and with the financial support of UNDP
and the British Embassy. Its main objective is to help reduce systemic
corruption by enhancing the transparency and accountability of the public
sector through external control over the activities of state administration.
At the request of the Minister of Justice UNDP and the Center for the
Study of Democracy started the development of a Judicial Anti-Corruption
Programme (JACP), which will focus on the role of the Judiciary for
preventing and combating corruption. In particular, the JACP will identify
areas that require reform and will formulate recommendations for
enhancing the legal stability and the confidence in the Judiciary in Bulgaria
Two general World Bank Governance and Public Sector Reform missions
and one specialized Anti-Corruption Mission visited Bulgaria in 2002 to
discuss the main issues and offer policy advice to the major stakeholders
form the government, the respective non-governmental sector and the
key donors in the area. As a result of these missions a two-day workshop
The Role of Anti-Corruption Commissions and Agencies in Reducing
Corruption was organized in cooperation of the government Anti-
Corruption Commission. Discussions addressed the three key functions
of each anti-corruption commission: - investigation, prevention and public
outreach and education. A set of conclusions and recommendations was
drafted, which was submitted to all the parties concerned in the area.
fl fl fl
In 2002, positive developments took place as regards coordination of
international assistance in the field of anti-corruption. A welcomed effort
was made by the government to harmonize the various aid projects
implemented by the international donor community in Bulgaria. In March
the Minister of the Economy announced the launch of a new Donor
Assistance Coordination Mechanism with thirteen jointly co-chaired
working groups. The Bulgarian Team of the Working Group on
Anticorruption, Transparency, Accountability is chaired by the Deputy
Minister of the Interior with the development partner being UNDP. Still,
certain overlapping existed in 2002 between the projects of some donors
in the field of anti-corruption and little effort was made to multiply the
results of successful projects.
As noted in previous Corruption Assessment Reports the cross-border
aspects of corruption in Southeast Europe have not always been readily
acknowledged by Bulgarian governments. For example, Bulgaria opted
out of the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative for fear of being tied
down to the Western Balkans agenda rather than the EU and NATO
enlargement one.
Nevertheless, in 2002 the international community, including Bulgaria,
focused particular attention to the cross-border aspects of organized crime
and related corruption. The Bulgarian government has shown heightened
sensitivity to the threats posed by regional organized crime and its impact
on corruption. In November 2002, the Bulgarian Minister of Interior
participated in a European Union-led conference on organized crime in
F.4. Regional Aspects
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Southeastern Europe in London. The conference, which was organized
by the British Home Office, adopted a final statement outlining what it
calls a joint coordinated effort by the international community and the
countries in the region to tackle organized crime.
Thus, the understanding of the implications of regional instability on
corruption in the countries region has been growing. In 2002, the
Southeast European Legal Development Initiative (SELDI) published
an assessment of corruption in SEE which emphasized its trans-national
sources.
fl fl fl
It is commonly argued that criminals, including the perpetrators of
corruption-related offenses, are always at least one step ahead of law-
enforcement authorities. This observation is all the more pertinent to
societies that are in the process of radical transformation of property
ownership without the adequate rule of law.
The Bulgarian experience suggests that it is not possible to drastically
restrict corrupt practices without transparency and democratic control
over the operation of the judiciary and the institutions upholding law
and order. Anti-corruption measures need to start with severing the links
between organized crime and the authorities trusted with opposing it.
Completing such a task requires a high measure of coordination and the
concerted efforts of all three branches of power.
As the processes of Bulgarias integration in NATO and the European
Union gain momentum, corruption can no longer be treated as a national
problem alone. Furthermore, the pre-accession mechanisms are assuming
an ever more important role in creating the legal and institutional
preconditions for reducing the corruption risk. This is equally the aim of
the efforts of civil society, which has been making headway in its combined
role of partner and staunch critic of the institutions of the state.
